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In 2008, Somali pirates began increasing their attacks off the East African coast, there-
by, forcing ship owners and charterers to seek ways to reduce risk of capture and plun-
der, and consequently avoiding the rapidly increasing “exception” insurance premiums 
for routes like the Gulf of Aden and expanding piracy zone in the Indian Ocean. To 
date, no ship with armed security has been successfully hijacked. In 2015, pirates 
claimed over $170 million in ransom money for hijacked vessels and their crews. 
 That figure represents an increase since 2010 when, according to a report by 
United Nation Office of Drugs and crime (UNODC), ransoms paid amounted to over 
$110 million. Ransom money is increasingly flowing into the legal financial system, 
while laundering the proceeds of piracy is causing consumer prices to rise steeply in the 
Horn of Africa and surrounding areas. According to a review conducted by UNODC, in 
twenty countries, 1,116 Somali men are currently facing criminal proceedings for pira-
cy, while 688 are being handled within the region. This research reveals there is no au-
thority in the international system that enforces the law in international waters, nor is 
there a true legislative organ. All rights and responsibilities of the States and the rules 
regarding sea piracy that are stipulated in the International Law of the sea is based on 
the consent and readiness of States. Therefore, identifying issues and formulating law is 
a time-consuming process. Moreover, this study identifies the legal issues that might 
prevent a ship owner from recovering its losses to Somali pirates. 
 As a result, international organizations such as the United Nations, the Interna-
tional Maritime Organization, have submitted many drafts concerning the codification 
of the development of International Law regarding piracy acts committed in territorial 
waters, and the actions under the command of the UN general assembly or naval forces. 
Furthermore, International Law does not permit extension of those waters beyond 12 
vi 
nautical miles, as discussed in the second chapter. The major maritime powers and the 
coastal States have found a need for a new legal framework concerning the jurisdiction 
of chase and arrest duty at sea. The maritime powers, for instance, desire a new law that 
would deal with the use of force on the high seas, while not infringing upon a state's 
sovereignty.  
 The study establishes reasonable regulations on suppressing piracy and closing 
legal loopholes through which pirates have managed to elude the law. The cornerstone 
of regulations to address maritime security is placed in many conventions and agree-
ments; for instance, the International Convention, UNCLOS and IMO, which are regu-
lations mandated to make trade and travel by sea as safe as possible, extends to mari-
time security. Organizations such as the United Nations, or international maritime or-
ganization, should respond to threats in two ways; by developing appropriate regula-
tions and guidance through its Maritime Safety Committee, and through capacity-
building work. 
 These organizations have been addressing maritime piracy for some time and a 
series of measures, developed in cooperation with member States and the shipping in-
dustry, have helped significantly reduce piracy in the troubled spots of the world. 
Since 2005, regional co-operation has addressed piracy off the coast of Somalia, in the 
Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, and is currently implementing a strategy for en-
hancing maritime security in West and Central Africa. 
 In 2009, the IMO propagated the Djibouti Code of Conduct, and the 
IMO’s SUA treaties were adopted in 1988, and underwent a comprehensive revision in 
2005. These treaties provide an international legal framework to ensure that appropriate 
action is taken against persons committing unlawful acts against ships. These unlawful 
acts listed in the treaties include the seizure of ships by force, acts of violence against 
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persons on board ships, and placing devices on board a ship that could destroy or dam-
age it. 
 This research suggests that the member States of UNCLOS should have agreed 
to review their national legislation to ensure the existence of laws that criminalize pira-
cy and armed robbery against ships. In the case that prosecution is not possible, the 
code would dictate that States should extradite or hand over the pirates. Furthermore, 
State parties must agree to cooperate in a manner consistent with the International Law, 
in the investigation, prosecution and arresting pirates, and with respect to the interdic-
tion and seizure of suspected pirate ships. The international community should promote 
the implementation of the resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council regarding 
the repression of Somali piracy. 
 Seizure of piracy funding must be available to commit resources to this field, 
which will undoubtedly lead to successful prosecution and the seizure of funds in juris-
dictions outside Somalia as an interim measure while its legal system is strengthened. 
Piracy-related business currently represents the main income source for much of the 
coastal communities, without which the communities may become destitute. Efforts 
must be made to develop an alternative viable economy within Somalia, in addition to 
interdicting the illegitimate economic system as stated in the final chapter of this work.  
The heads of state and government in West Africa stressed the importance of 
political leadership and the coordinating role of regions in combating the increasing 
threat posed by piracy and other forms of organized maritime crime in the Gulf of 
Aden.  On the other hand, to make efforts more effective, maritime nations need broad-
er international support. The commission was tasked to develop a holistic strategic 
maritime policy framework to guide future actions and cooperation and strengthen col-
laboration. Addressing the growing problem of piracy off the coast of Somalia, and im-
viii 
proving the regional capacity to counter-piracy, should be done by developing and en-
hancing regional cooperation and coordination, all of which are based on the four pil-
lars of Legislation, Training, Capacity Building, and Information Sharing.  
 In this work, I present a range of guidance aimed at addressing maritime securi-
ty which concerns Somali piracy and armed robbery against ships; this includes guid-
ance to governments, ship owners and ship operators, shipmasters and crews on pre-
venting and suppressing piracy and armed robbery against ships; investigation of of-
fences and the use of armed personnel should be granted and enacted into law which 
are binding on all state parties internationally and regionally. These recommendations 
should promote the development of the international shipping industry, and bring 
peace to the Gulf of Aden. 
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In honest work, the food is bad, the wages are low and the work is hard. 
In piracy, there is plenty of loot, it's fun and easy and we are free and 
powerful. Who, when presented with this choice, would not choose pi-
racy? The worst that can happen is you can be hanged. No, a merry life 
and a short one shall be my motto. 
Black Bart 1 
 
1.0 - Introduction 
 
The words above can be viewed as those of practical man, a mad man, an ideal-
ist, or even an entrepreneur of a devious sort. Black Bart, however, lived out his days as 
a man one would call an enemy of all mankind, a pirate. Thanks to Hollywood and the 
comic books, the very term, pirate” brings to mind an image of a swarthy, surly and 
belligerent man, dressed perhaps in garish clothing,2 and armed with a sword and a sin-
                                               
1  Bartholomew "Black Bart" Roberts. “Roberts (1682-1722) was a Welsh pirate. He was 
the most successful pirate of the so-called "Golden Age of Piracy," capturing and looting more 
ships than pirates like Blackbeard, Edward Low, Jack Rackham, and Francis Spriggs put to-
gether. At the height of his power, he had a fleet of four ships and hundreds of pirates. His suc-
cess was due to his organization, charisma and daring. He was killed in action by pirate hunters 
off the coast of Africa in 1722.https://www.thoughtco.com/real-pirate-quotes-2136215 (As-
sessed 11/25/17). 
2  Black Bart was a flamboyant and good-looking man, who was daring, bold and care-
free. Consider the following: Bartholomew Roberts was described as a tall, an attractive man, 
who loved the expensive clothes and jewelry. He was often seen dressed in a gorgeous crimson 
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2 
gle shot pistol.  To complete the picture, we might even note the eye patch, and on his 
broad shoulders, a gaily colored parrot. This man would be at the helm of one of the 
common warships of the day, perhaps a “Sloop,” or a “Brigantine,” sleek in design and 
fitted with great canvas sails that bore markings of red and black.3 This notion while 
romantic, is more appropriate for the annals of a crime journal because unto much of 
the world, pirates have been in in many instances, the most loathsome form of humani-
ty; opportunistic creatures who for centuries, have dared to pursue their nefarious ex-
ploits upon the high seas. Although the current sentiment may be that the above scenar-
io ceased to exist at some time in the past, recent reports over the last couple of years 
confirm that pirates are not relics of bygone eras; but are yet very much active, and 
with the aid of various technologies, their activities appear to be on the increase.  
 The continued existence of piracy may seem like a paradox existing alongside 
today’s modern technology and more enlightened societies. Yet, as will be described 
later in this work, the ancient scourge of piracy has availed itself of the many tools of 
modern technology,4 which has provided both benefits and detriments to the modern 
                                                                                                                                        
dressed. On his chest, was a heavy gold chain with a diamond cross hanging to it.  
http://www.thewayofthepirates.com/famous-pirates/bartholomew-roberts/. (Assessed 11/26/17). 
3  A “Sloop” was a common pirate ship. Sloops were fast ships, designed to easily trav-
erse the Atlantic and carry goods and cargo and an increased rate. This also made them ideal for 
pirates using them to capture a larger, slower ship. A “Brigantine” was a two-masted sailboat 
and the second most popular ship of the time. These ships . . . could withstand the waves of the 
Atlantic and with two major sails they would not have to sacrifice speed . . .. Brigantines [car-
ried] a larger crew, and [had] more room for weapons such as cannons, mortars and storage 
space . . .. A Brigantine was a perfect ship for pirates because it allowed a pirate to mount at 
least a dozen cannons and hold a larger crew. . ..Types of Pirate Ship-
shttp://www.goldenageofpiracy.org/pirate-ships/types-of-pirate-ships.php. 
4  Brown, N. (2014, May 1).  Taking the Fight to the Pirates. Jane’s Navy International. 
Jane’s Information Group. Edit.2014, Vol.12  
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world. In fact, it is technology that has enabled piracy to flourish on an even grander 
scale than ever before.  
 Piracy has never been eliminated or eradicated from the world; it has merely 
been suppressed in one area only to sprout up vigorously in another, while following a 
predictable and constant pattern. Let us consider a group of individuals who pursue this 
dishonorable activity, which begins with erratic attacks on soft targets, and gradually 
becomes more organized and frequent, and then targets “harder” or more valuable tar-
gets. The intensity and frequency of the attacks may escalate to the degree that it crip-
ples maritime commerce.5 The States whose maritime commerce is affected must then 
collaborate and mobilize their navies to counter these acts.6 
 Through the collective efforts of navies, the activities of the pirates may be 
brought to a standstill, or more often, mitigated to the extent that piratic endeavors are 
severely hampered, meaning the havens and hideouts of pirates are destroyed, and their 
leaders and operators captured, prosecuted in courts of law, or in some cases summarily 
executed.7 These collaborative efforts may result in the high seas being declared safer 
and more secure for maritime commerce. However, because ineffective anti-piracy 
measures, pirates are still laying siege to and invading many maritime routes with the 
result being that in recent years, throughout many parts of the world, piracy has 
emerged as a major threat to sea transportation. Many estimates conclude that pirate 
                                               
5  JOHN E. NOYES. Essay on piracy. An introduction to the International Law of piracy, 
Hein online  21 cal. W. Int, 1 L.J. 105 2014-2015 
6  P.W. Brine, Piracy, past, present and future, Vol.1 (marine piracy July 2016, Butter-
worth &Co (publishers) ltd.  
7  International Maritime Organisation, International shipping facts and figures-
Information resources on trade, safety, security, environment, London: Maritime Knowledge 
Centre, 2016, at p.7 
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attacks have increased by an enormous 75% in the last decade alone.8 As 
per International Maritime Organization data, there were 489 reports of piracy and 
armed robbery against ships in 2015 reflecting a 20% increase over the previous year, 
2014.9 The International Maritime Bureau (IBM) publishes monthly,10 quarterly, and 
annual piracy reports, which provide names of ships attacked, position and time of at-
tacks, consequences to the crew, ship or cargo, and actions taken by the crew and 
coastal authorities. 
Because of its continued international impact, piracy is noteworthy 
in International Law because it is commonly held to represent the earliest invocation of 
the concept of universal jurisdiction. It is considered, moreover, a breach of jus co-
gens,11 a conventional peremptory international norm that all States must uphold. 
Those committing theft on the high seas, inhibiting trade, and endangering maritime 
communication are considered by sovereign States to be hostis humani gene-
ris (enemies of humanity).12 Thus, because of its nature and long history, and based on 
Customary Law definitions among the nations of the world, piracy has long been con-
sidered an international crime.   
                                               
8   International Law conference report- Piracy and legal issue: reconciling public and 
private interests, Vol.2 p.21-01-10-2014 www.chathamhouse.org.uk 
9  Report of the Monitoring Group pursuant to Security Council resolution 1811 (2015), 
United Nations, 10 December 2015. 
10  International Maritime Bureau. (2014). Weekly Piracy Report." List of ship attacked " 
Vol.2, Edit.2014: www.icc-ccs.org/imb. 
11  That body of peremptory principles or norms from which no derogation is permitted; those 
norms recognized by the international community as a whole as being fundamental to the maintenance of 
an international legal order. Jus Cogens. (n.d.) West's Encyclopedia of American Law, edition 2. (2008). 
Retrieved January 23 2017 from http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Jus+Cogens. 
12  Kissinger, Henry (July–August 2016). "The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction". De-
partment of Foreign Affairs. Document No. 1307 p.148-188. 
 
5 
As the world further globalized after World War II,13 in addition to the law of 
nations and certain treaties, there was a need for more regulations and codifications.14  
In the 2000s seaborne piracy against transport vessels remains a significant issue (with 
estimated worldwide losses of US$16 billion per year in 2015),15 particularly in the wa-
ters between the Red Sea and Indian Ocean, off the Somali coast, and in the Strait of 
Malacca and Singapore.16  
Preventing piracy is difficult; for example, modern pirates favor using small 
boats and taking advantage of the limited number of crew members on modern cargo 
vessels and transport ships. On the other hand, they also use large vessels to supply the 
smaller attack/boarding vessels.17 In addition, because these attacks often occur 
in international waters, the international community faces difficult challenges in bring-
ing modern pirates to justice.18 This academic research takes its perspective on marine 
piracy from within an operating international legal system, namely, the way that Inter-
national Law of the Sea regulations have become state action through law. The purpose 
                                               
13  Brown, N. (2016, May 1).  Taking the Fight to the Pirates. Jane’s Navy International. 
Jane’s Information Group. p.256-380  
14  For example, the obvious definition of piracy, Absolute Right to pursuit the pirate ship, 
and the strict universal jurisdiction over acts of piracy. 
15   Michel-Rolph Trouillot"Foreign Affairs – Terrorism Goes to Sea" Boston: Beacon 
Press, Retrieved December 8, 2015 see also in Robert Ritchie "Piracy in Asia: A Growing Bar-
rier to Maritime Trade" Cambridge: Harvard University Press, Vol.67. Retrieved December 
8, 2015. 
16  Ocean development & International Law, 33:343-358, 2012 copyright 2012 Taylor & 
Francis, 0090-8320/12, Vol.5 edit. 2012  
17  "Recent Piracy." Journal of public and international affairs: Mohadi You, Volume 
14/spring 2013. 
18  D. Archibugi, M. Chiarugi, "Piracy challenges global governance" (April 9, 
2015). IMO Journal, Vol.2A p.284-401 
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of this dissertation, as part of transnational dialogue, and for the effective eradication of 
Somali piracy, is to locate the principle of The Law of the Sea within the framework of 
International Law, and to highlight the essential features of other related-regulations. It 
also discusses the many complex issues regarding piracy, and is thus divided into five 
chapters.  
Chapter I introduces the concept and historical background of piracy. In addi-
tion, it discusses the political and social context of piracy and suggests why it has flour-
ished practically unfettered. The research begins with an overview of maritime piracy. 
The term “pirate” will also be analyzed in the second section of this chapter. In addi-
tion, the historical background of piracy is presented in the latter part. The conclusion 
provides a summary of piracy activities.  Chapter II discusses the rules of International 
Law governing combating piracy. This chapter discusses how International Law is ap-
plicable to acts of piracy, and focuses on related international conventions correspond-
ing to those acts. 
Chapter III describes the characteristics by which Somali pirates are identified. 
The first section explains the necessity of companies around the world to use the Gulf 
of Aden sea route. Furthermore, this chapter explores the underlying reasons that we 
must eliminate Somali pirates rather than change the maritime route. Additionally, this 
chapter shows the Somali pirates growing in numbers, explains how they endanger the 
peace of the sea, and discusses their history of plunder. This chapter further categorizes 
the acts of Somali pirates, and delicately discusses the impact of their actions. The col-
lapse of the Somali government, which expanded to the failure of administration in 
Somali, is also discussed. 
Chapter IV, which lists the legal issues pertaining to Somali pirates and evalu-
ates the effectiveness of rules of law on the acts of Somali pirates, is divided into two 
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main parts. The first gathers the incidents related to acts of Somali pirates from recent 
years to the present. In evaluating the law of dealing with acts of Somali pirates, it 
shows that the other rules and regulations are essential. This section gathers the extract 
from each rule that was used as a source of analysis. Finally, this section combines all 
the regulations from Somali Law which relate to the Somali piracy issues, and analyzes 
the underlying meaning and purpose of each rule of law. 
In Chapter V, the first section illustrates and analyzes new, and hopefully effec-
tive, anti-piracy measures. It further reveals the legal issues that should be improved, 
carefully discusses the solution to the boundary invasion problem, and presents an ef-
fective way by which to solve the limitation of right to chase, arrest and repel the So-
mali pirates in each area of the sea. The chapter proposes a reassessment of a counter-
piracy approach that proposes to allow Somalis themselves to be at the forefront of 
tackling and eradicating piracy. 
Besides prevention and protection measures for Somali pirate problems, long-
term developments shall be suggested as the requirement to support the solutions to this 
problem. Furthermore, compensation to which the loser in this circumstance is entitled, 
will be discussed.  
1.1 Piracy and International Law 
 
Piracy, as previously noted, long known to world and to International Law, was the 
first internationally recognized crime. According to International Law, piracy is 
any robbery or other violent action for private ends. Piracy takes place outside the nor-
mal jurisdiction of a state, occurs without state authority, and is private, not political. 
Acts of unlawful warfare, acts of insurgents, revolutionaries, mutiny, and slave trading 
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have been defined as piracy by national laws of various countries or by special trea-
ties.19 
As contemporary international trade routes developed throughout the Seven-
teenth Century, slow moving and undefended ships were easy targets against which 
pirates plied their looting, pillaging and plundering.20 Throughout the Nineteenth Cen-
tury, a legal regime developed in response to the threat of piracy, and customary Inter-
national Law evolved which, in effect, made piracy the first universal crime over which 
all States had the capacity to arrest and prosecute. 
International Law is a legal system directed toward the defeat or suppression of 
a category of violators known as “enemies of mankind,” or hosti humanis generis.21 
Occasionally, these enemies have been war criminals, or sometimes terrorists or even 
slave traders. To those most familiar with crimes, it is indeed not an unbearable stretch 
of the imagination, to say that the original enemy of mankind was the “pirate.” Thus, as 
if by default, piracy gives rise to a highly specialized form of international jurisdiction 
known as universal jurisdiction.22 
                                               
19  Piracy: Out of Sight, Out of Mind? Goorangai, RANR Occasional Papers, August 
(2013) Royal Australian Navy 
20  Contemporary Maritime Piracy. By: Chalk, Peter. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 
January–March 2014, Vol. 21 Issue 1, p. 87, 26p, 1 chart; (AN 286864). 
21  I Sailed with Chinese Pirates by Aleko Lilius, Oxford University Press, US, October 
17, 2014, ISBN 0-19-585297-4.  
21  Goodman, Timothy H. 'Leaving the Corsair's name to other times:' How to enforce the 
law of sea piracy in the 21st century through regional international agreements / Timothy H. 
Goodman In: Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, Vol. 31 (Winter 2016) nr.1, 
pp. 139–168. 
22  Dangerous Waters, Modern Piracy and Terror on the High Seas, by John S. Burnett. 
Dutton, 2013, Plume, 2013–2014, New York. (ISBN 0-452-28413-9) 
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These developments in custom found their way into the modern law of the sea 
as it developed throughout the Twentieth Century.23 The 1958 Geneva Convention on 
the High Seas, and later, the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS), both outlined an international regime for the repression of piracy and ef-
fectively recognized universal jurisdiction on the part of all States to suppress pirate 
acts.24 The UNCLOS 1982 Convention, which now has 157 State parties, is generally 
considered to be reflective of customary International Law.25 
 
1.2 Definition of Piracy 
 
Uniformity in Maritime Piracy Definition 
Given the diverging definitions of piracy in international and mu-
nicipal legal systems, some authors argue that greater uniformity in 
the law is required in order to strengthen anti-piracy legal instru-
ments.26  
A definition of piracy is both fundamental and necessary to my overall thesis. The def-
inition offered here, however, is not intended to provide an exhaustive examination of 
the concept of piracy, as this has been amply discussed elsewhere. Rather, its purpose 
is to briefly state the assumptions on which later arguments are based, and to generally 
examine certain issues that are central to the discussion that follows. More specifically, 
this section addresses the questions caused by the definitional interpretation of piracy. 
                                               
23  Maritime Piracy. By: Herrmann, Wilfried. Naval Forces, 2014, Vol. 25 Issue 2, pp. 
18–25, 6p; (AN 13193917). 
24            Id.  
25  Modern Piracy. Naval Forces, 2015, Vol. 26 Issue 5, pp. 20–31, 7p; (AN 18506590) 
26  Bento, Lucas, 'Toward An International Law of Piracy Sui Generis: How the Dual Na-




 Definition is used here in the sense of delimiting the boundaries of a scientific 
subject. It includes the methods, basic assumptions, and categorizations, as well as the 
basic principles of piracy elements. In this sense, definition is designed to provide the 
blue print concept of piracy as conduct in perspective that is wide enough to consider 
both old and new social communities. In an ever-globalizing world with a plethora of 
different actors, one might wonder what the exact definition of piracy is and whether 
the concept of piracy has remained the same.27 
 
1.2(a) General Definition 
 
The word “piracy” was first recorded in the English language in 1419.28 However, un-
der Roman law, piracy, or piracy jure gentium (piracy by the law of nations) as it is 
known was part of jus gentium (law of nations).29 Piracy, as a term, originates from the 
Greek “peirateia,”30 thus suggesting that piracy has been a problem for millennia.  
 As noted, piracy is a crime under International Law and municipal law. Under 
International Law, piracy jure gentium is different from piracy under municipal law.31 
Offences that fall under the definition of municipal law do not necessarily fall within 
the definition of piracy under International Law and, subsequently, are not susceptible 
                                               
27  Pennell, C. R. "TEDx Talk: What is Piracy?" Harvard Press, Vol.51: Re-
trieved October 23, 2014. 
28  Wolfram Alpha, "Origin of piracy," http://www.wolframalpha.com/input/?i=piracy , 
(09-20-2016). 
29  Philip de Souza, "Piracy in the Graeco-Roman World", (2014). ISBN.2010-3784-6501 
p.131-167 
30  Miriam Webster, "Definition Piracy," http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/piracy , (09-20-2015). 
31  (Towards a new definition of piracy). The Achille Lauro Incident, Virginia Journal of 
International Law vol. 26:3 2015-2016. 
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to universal jurisdiction.32This general definition of piracy is consistent with the com-
mon expression that a pirate is hostis humani generis: an enemy of all mankind.33 
 In his 1897 Bouvier's Law Dictionary, American jurist John Bouvi-
er defined piracy as a robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful 
authority, "done animus furandi," in the spirit and intention of universal hostility.34 
It is not necessary that the motive be plunder or that the depredations be 
directed against the vessels of all nations indiscriminately. As in robbery 
upon land, it is only necessary that the spoliation or intended spoliation 
be felonious. That is with intention to injure and without legal authority 
or lawful excuse.35 
Since the development of this definition, there have been two significant expansions to 
the definition of piracy, the being established by In re Piracy Jure Gentium. The dis-
tinction between piracy and piracy jure gentium lies in the manner in which the act is 
punished, and was described by Wheaton as follows:36  
Piracy under the law of nations (jure gentium)37 may be tried and 
punished in the courts of justice of any nations, by whomever and 
                                               
32  Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law 1265 (6th ed. 2015). 
33  Ward, ed, Graham (Excerpt published 2016-02-21). Submission to 
the HMASSydney II Commission of Inquiry, ed. Under The Brave Black Flag: Pirates and Mu-
tineers, Australia: Ministry of Defense. pp. 6th pg. 
34  1897 Bouvier's Law Dictionary, John Bouvier, " done animus furandi " Coovardi press 
35   Wallace, R. and A. Holliday,  International Law, 1st Ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 
2014), pp. 91-92. 
36   Keith, A. B., Wheaton's Elements of International Law, 6th Ed. (London: Stevens and 
Sons, 2016), page 277.  




wherever committed. On the other hand, piracy created by munici-
pal (domestic, state) statute can only be tried by that state within 
whose territorial jurisdiction, and on board of whose vessels, where 
the offence was committed. 
 
The second significant development was the ancient restriction that piracy occurred on 
the high seas, which is to say, upon one of the great oceans or many seas of the world,38 
and was achieved by employing a seafaring vessel. Having been in place for thousands 
of years, this definition did not foresee. This exclusion was resolved by the advent 
of UNCLOS, as set out above.39 
1.2(b) Legal Definitions 
1) Definition of Piracy under Articles 101 to 103 of United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea 1982 
In the international arena, the definition of the crime of piracy is contained in Articles 
101 through 103 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UN-
CLOS),40  which provides as follows:  
Piracy consists of any of the following acts: 
                                               
38  International Maritime Organization, MSC.4/Circ.180, Reports on acts of piracy and 
armed robbery against ships, annual report-2015, March 1, 2016, p. 3.  
39   "In re Piracy Jure Gentium, 1934 A.C. 586 ", Keith, A. B., Wheaton's Elements of In-
ternational Law, 6th Ed. (London: Stevens and Sons, 2016), p. 277. 




(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, 
committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private 
ship or a private aircraft, and directed: 
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an 
aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;  
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in 
subparagraph (a) or (b).'' 
ARTICLE 102 
Piracy by a warship, government ship or government aircraft whose crew has 
mutinied. 
The acts of piracy, as defined in article 101, committed by a warship, govern-
ment ship or government aircraft whose crew has mutinied and taken control of 
the ship or aircraft are assimilated to acts committed by a private ship or air-
craft. 
ARTICLE 103 
Definition of a pirate ship or aircraft 
A ship or aircraft is considered a pirate ship or aircraft if it is intended by the 
persons in dominant control to be used for the purpose of committing one of the 
acts referred to in article 101. The same applies if the ship or aircraft has been 
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used to commit any such act, so long as it remains under the control of the per-
sons guilty of that act.41 
This definition was formerly contained in articles 15 to 17 of the Convention on the 
High Seas signed at Geneva on April 29, 1958.42 It was drafted by the International 
Law Commission.    
The definition above is in line with that of Customary Law. However, the actus reus of 
this offense does not depend on factors such as gravity or an intention to act openly.43  
The old common law definition had focused on robbery; yet in this case there had been 
no robbery. The offense had been stopped just before it occurred, though there had 
been violence.44  Justice Sankley for the House of Lords rendered the decision. While it 
skated around and ultimately declined to define piracy, the court nonetheless made two 
points which shaped International Law.45 
The first, "Actual robbery is not an essential element in the crime of piracy jure 
gentium. A frustrated attempt to commit a piratical robbery is equally piracy jure genti-
um." 46 Secondly, Justice Sankley states that a robbery committed on a sea liner by one 
                                               
41  Id. Art.103 
42  "Archbold Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice." 2015. Paragraph 25–39 at page 76 refers 
to the Schedule to the Tokyo Convention Act 1967. That schedule, and section 4 of that Act, refer to the 
said articles of Convention on the High Seas. 
43  Elias Bantekas & Susan Nash, "Private actus  reus” International criminal law (2nd ed. 2013). 
44  Terror on the High Seas. By: Koknar, Ali. Security Management, June 2014, Vol. 48 Issue 6, 
pp. 75–81, 6p; (AN 13443749). 
45  Piracy: Out of Sight, Out of Mind?, Goorangai, RANR Occasional Papers, August (2016) Royal 
Australian Navy.  
46   Id. 
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passenger upon another is not piracy.47 A key factor in the definition of piracy is that, 
regardless of its success or failure, piracy must be performed by operators commanding 
a private ship or aircraft, and such an act is carried out for private ends. This means that 
attempts are also categorized as piracy.48 In addition, it should be performed without 
authorization by public authority, committed on the seas or in the air outside the normal 
jurisdiction of any State.  
Under the UNCLOS 1982, an act of piracy can only occur beyond the limits of 
the territorial sea, which in most cases extends twelve nautical miles from the coastline 
of which a State claims jurisdiction.49  One consequence of these developments is that 
the modern law on piracy has been significantly constrained so as to effectively fall in-
to two categories.50  One is piracy on the high seas beyond the twelve nautical mile 
limit of coastal state jurisdiction and sovereignty, and pirate-type acts that occur within 
territorial waters, including the water of archipelagic States such as Indonesia.51 
 A crucial element of the UNCLOS 1982 definition of piracy is that piracy is an 
act which occurs on the high seas, which also includes the adjoining exclusive econom-
ic zone which extends from the edge of the territorial sea to 200 nautical miles.52 When 
                                               
47  Ibid. 
48  Lucie-Smith, Edward (2015). Outcasts of the Sea: Pirates and Piracy. Paddington 
Press. ISBN 9780448226170. 
49  Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia. By: Liss, Carolin. Southeast Asian Affairs, 2013, p. 52, 17p; 
(AN 10637324).  
50  Id. 
51  Earle, Peter (2013) The Pirate Wars Methuen, London. ISBN 0-413-75880-X. 
52  Id.  
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piracy was first subject to regulation under the Law of the Sea, nearly all the world’s 
oceans were considered high seas.53 
This is essentially the same definition as Article 15 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on 
the High Seas.54  Piracy is a criminal offense, but it is also a component of transporta-
tion law because pirate ships were subject to seizure and transfer of ownership to the 
jurisdiction of the seizing ship. Historically, piracy was a crime that was committed 
upon the ocean only. If a person committed otherwise unlawful acts against property or 
persons of a country on the high seas, that person was not automatically an enemy of 
mankind, but merely of that one specific country. While this more encompassing defi-
nition allows the IMB to produce a more comprehensive picture of maritime crime, this 
definition is not recognized by International Law.55  Some would prefer to cut to the 
chase and declare that piracy is an act of robbery or criminal violence at sea, and that 
those who engage in acts of piracy should be considered pirates. 
Meanwhile, the term can be included acts committed in the air, on land (espe-
cially across national borders or in connection with taking over and robbing a car or 
train), or in other major bodies of water or on a shore. However, this regulation above 
focuses on maritime piracy,56  which does not normally include crimes committed 
against people traveling on the same vessel as the perpetrator (e.g., one passenger steal-
                                               
53  Id.  
54  Heller-Roazen, Daniel (2014). The Enemy of All: Piracy and the Law of Nations. Zone 
Books. ISBN 978-1890951948. 
55  Id. 




ing from others on the same vessel). Piracy or pirating is the name of a specific crime 
under Customary International Law, and the name of many crimes under the municipal 
law of many States.57   
2) Definition of piracy and armed robbery against ships under Resolutions 
adopted by The United Nations Security Council 1946. 
The Resolution on Code of Practice for the Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and 
Armed Robbery against Ships determined that armed robbery against ships consists of 
any of the following acts:58  
(a) Any illegal act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or 
threat thereof, other than an act of piracy, committed for private ends and di-
rected against a ship or against persons or property on board such a ship, within 
a State's internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial sea. 
(b) Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described   above. 
It is also important to distinguish the crime of piracy from armed robbery against ships, 
which can occur within the internal waters and territorial sea of a coastal State.59 In ac-
cordance with Part II of UNCLOS 1982: Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, in cases 
of armed robbery against ships, the primary responsibility for enforcement normally 
                                               
57  Ananthakrishnan A., Dombrowski K., Marcus A., (2015), Editorial: The Enemies of All Man-
kind’’, Vol.74 Edit 2015. 
58  David P. Forsythe (2016). "Encyclopedia of Piracy, Volume 1". Oxford University Press. p. 
464. ISBN 0195334027. 
59  Resolution A.1025(26) (Annex, paragraph 2.2) on Code of Practice for the Investigation of the 
Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, 1946. 
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falls on the coastal state.  Armed robbery against ships also constitutes an offense under 
the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Mari-
time Navigation60  and, in some cases, the 2000 United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime. 61 
The UNCLOS 1982 definition of piracy developed into International Law and 
the International Maritime Organization (IMO) has recognized and accepted this defini-
tion.62  Thus, according to International Law, any illegal acts of violence and detention, 
which are committed within a State’s territorial waters, are not defined as piracy.63  
However, according to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB),64  nearly all illegal 
acts in Southeast Asia occur within territorial waters and would not fall under the defi-
nition of piracy.  
Technically, if an attack occurs within the territorial jurisdiction of a State, the 
event is only classified as piracy if that nation’s penal code criminalizes it as such. 
Moreover, the IMO defines any unlawful act of violence or detention or any act of dep-
redation at anchor off ports, or when underway through a coastal State’s territorial wa-
                                               
60  Niclas Dahlvang, Thieves robbers & terrorists: piracy in the 21st century-Heinonline – 4 Regent 
J. Intl-L. 19 2016. 
61  Id. part 3 Art.3 (a). 
62  Hugo Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace, http://www.constitution.org/gro/djbp.htm , (Last 
visited, 09-20-2016). 
63  Samuel Pyeatt Menefee, "The new discipline, problems with piracy, maritime terrorism and the 
1982 convention on the law of the sea." —6 conn. J. int, I L.127 (2014-2015.) 




ters as armed robbery against ships.65  To overcome the distinctions between high seas 
and territorial waters, the IMB defines piracy as: 
“an act of boarding (or attempted boarding) with the intent to commit theft or 
any other crime and with the intent or capability to use force in furtherance of 
that act.”66 
 
However, according to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), nearby all ille-
gal acts in Southeast Asia occur within territorial waters and would not fall under the 
definition of piracy.  
Technically, if an attack occurs within the territorial jurisdiction of a State, the 
event is only classified as piracy if that nation’s penal code criminalizes it as such. 
Moreover, the IMO defines any unlawful act of violence or detention or any act of dep-
redation at nchor, off ports or when underway through a coastal State’s territorial wa-
ters as armed robbery against ships.  To overcome the distinctions between high seas 
and territorial waters, the IMB defines piracy as: “an act of boarding (or attempted 
boarding) with the intent to commit theft or any other crime and with the intent or ca-
pability to use force in furtherance of that act.” 
 
 
                                               
65  LAWRENCE J. KAHN, "pirates, rovers and thieves: new problems with an old enemy." 20 Tul. 
Mar. L.J. 293 2015-2016. 
66  Dillon, D. R. (2013).  "Piracy in Asia: A Growing Barrier to Maritime Trade." Heritage Founda-
tion Backgrounder #1379.  Vol.8 Edit.7th 2013, www.heritage.org. 
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3) Definition of Marine Terrorism under The Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
against the Safety of Maritime Navigation Convention 1988 
The Council for Security Cooperation Working Group under The Suppression of Un-
lawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation Convention 1988 has offered an 
extensive definition for maritime terrorism: 
[t]he undertaking of terrorist acts and activities within the maritime environ-
ment, using or against vessels or fixed platforms at sea or in port, or against any 
one of their passengers or personnel, against coastal facilities or settlements, in-
cluding tourist resorts, port areas and port towns or cities.67  
 
This definition, however, does not define “terrorism,” nor does it clarify whether it only 
includes maritime attacks against civilian (merchant) vessels or also attacks against 
military craft. It defines maritime terrorism, therefore, as the use or threat of violence 
against a ship (civilian as well as military), its passengers or sailors, cargo, a port facili-
ty, or if the purpose is solely a platform for political ends.68   
The definition can be expanded to include the use of the maritime transportation 
system to smuggle terrorists or terrorist materials into the targeted country. Maritime 
terrorism is motivated by political goals beyond the immediate act of attacking a mari-
time target.69 On the other hand, the contemporary law of piracy, embodied in the Unit-
                                               
67  D.Archibugi, M.Chiarugi (April 9, 2016). "Piracy challenges global governance" open Democ-
racy”, Sea Journal (p.4, Vol.3A). 
68  David J. Bederman, Emory, International Law Review, "Suppression of Maritime Terrorism”, 
CSCAP (09-20-2016). 





ed Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, has defined piracy as an “act of 
violence or depredation committed on the high seas by a private actor acting for private 
ends.” 70  
This distinguishes piracy from naval warfare or recognized belligerency on the 
high seas, but it has complicated efforts to apply the law of piracy to terrorists (who, 
after all, act for political ends, and most commonly in the territory of sovereign 
States).71 It has meant that acts of piracy committed in the territorial waters of States 
are not subject to the International Law of piracy (and the expansive forms of jurisdic-
tion that accompany it).72 Therefore, attempts to incorporate terrorism into piracy have 
fallen afoul of the technical rules governing traditional piracy. Likewise, these same 
rules have frustrated initial efforts to confront the growing problem of traditional piracy 
carried out in places other than the high seas. For instance, the “international terrorist” 
and the Somali pirate pose different problems for International Law. 
 
1.2(c) Definitional Problems of Piracy Articulated by UN Organizations 
Article 101 of the Convention defines an act of ship-based piracy as “consisting of acts 
of violence or detention, or an act of depredation, committed for private ends by the 
crew of a private ship directed against another ship on the high seas, or outside the ju-
risdiction of any State.”73 As such, a century ago nearly all violent acts at sea commit-
ted for private ends would have been characterized as piracy.  
However, under the new law of the sea, as reflected in the UNCLOS 1982, vast 
tracts of the world’s oceans have now fallen under the sovereignty and jurisdiction of 
                                               
70  Declaration of Joint Action to Counter Terrorism, (2015), Association of Nations, retrieved on 
14.03.2016. 
71  Id. Art.101. 
72  Kimball, Steve (2016). The Pyrates Way Magazine. The Pyrates Way, LLC. p. 64. 
73  Rediker, Marcus (1987). Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Merchant Seamen, Pirates 
and the Maritime World, 2015. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-37983-0. 
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coastal States.74 Piracy also extends to the operation of a pirate ship, which is a ship 
used for the purposes of committing pirate acts. However, by limiting the definition to 
acts committed for ‘private ends’ any actions taken for political motives are excluded.75 
To that end, the International Law on piracy does not apply to incidents occurring with-
in a coastal State’s adjacent waters. The effect of this is that it has been left to those 
countries that have been faced with offshore pirate-type attacks and incidents of sea 
robbery within their jurisdiction to utilize their own criminal justice systems to police, 
patrol their waters and ultimately enforce their criminal laws through prosecution.76   
A limitation of article 101 above is that it confines piracy to the High 
Seas. As the majority of piratical acts occur within territorial waters, 
some pirates are able to go free as certain jurisdictions lack the resources 
to monitor their borders adequately. 77 
Thus, a somewhat uneven legal regime has developed that depends upon the capability 




                                               
74  Id. 
75  Langewiesche, William (2014). The Outlaw Sea: A World of Freedom, Chaos, and Crime. 
North Point Press. ISBN 0-86547-581-4. 
76  Girard, Geoffrey (2016). Tales of the Pirates. Middle Atlantic Press. ISBN 0-9754419-5-7  
77  Id. 




1.3- History of Piracy 
1.3(a): Ancient to Modern Traditions 
Unfortunately, pirates have plagued seafarers for millennia. For instance, noted 
historians, Homer and Cicero wrote of incidents involving ancient Greek and Roman 
mariners, and several hundred years later, Western Europeans weathered Viking on-
slaughts during the Middle Ages.79  The first recorded incidence of piracy dates to as 
early as the 14th century BC when sea peoples threatened Aegean and Mediterranean 
voyages.  In classical antiquity (starting in 8th century BC),80 the Illyrians, Tyr-
rhenians, Greeks, Romans, as well as the Phoenicians had been involved in piracy as 
pirates. In the 3rd century BC, Illyrian pirates were constantly raiding the Adriatic Sea, 
and thus conflicting with the mighty Roman Republic. Their activities were finally 
crushed after Rome conquered Illyria in 168 BC.81 In certain cases, piracy spiraled out 
of control.  
With the Illyrians piratical attacks in 233 BC, the Roman Empire had to protect 
Italian and Greek traders from common enemies after pirates consistently attacked 
shipping routes. It took three intricate military campaigns to defeat the threat at sea. Yet 
thereafter, piracy didn’t disappear from history,82    but continued to persist in various 
                                               
79  Cordingly, David (2015). Under the Black Flag: The Romance and the Reality of Life Among 
the Pirates. Harvest Books. ISBN 0-15-600549-2. 
80  Ivan R. Dee., "From ancient high seas pirates to 'road agents' and a host of other bush and 
mountain pass brigands, bandits have been with us for ages." p. 242.ISBN 9781566639088. Re-
trieved 2015-03-05.  
81  Fukuyama F., (2014), "The End of History, The National Interest", Summer Edit 2009, p.4. 
82  Huntington P. Samuel, (202015), The Clash of Civilizations? In Foreign Affairs, Summer2015, 
Vol. 72, No. 3, p.22, retrieved on 14.10. 2015 from Harvard University. 
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locations worldwide. England, as a sea faring nation, has historically had much juris-
prudential experience related to piracy throughout its history; examples are the Offenc-
es at Sea Act 1536 (UK).83  
During the 1st century BC, pirates set up a large nation in Cilicia (Turkey) 
along the Anatolian Coast, threatening the trade of the Roman Empire in the Mediter-
ranean.  The great Roman emperor Julius Caesar was said to have been captured by Ci-
lician pirates on a voyage across the Aegean Sea in 75 BC. He was released only after 
the payment of a huge ransom in the amount of fifty-talents of gold. It was said that 
after his release, he raised a fleet, captured the pirates and put them to death.84  
 During the period of 258-264 AD, the Gothic pirates looted the towns along the 
Black Sea Coast and Aegean Coast and reached Cyprus and Crete. In 286 AD, Rome 
appointed a military commander to eliminate the Frankish and Saxon pirates. The Irish 
pirates were captured and enslaved by the famous Irish saint, St. Patrick, around 450 
AD.85  
1.3(a)-1: The Middle Ages to the 19th Century 
Pirates have been the subject of countless books, movies, plays, and have been 
stock features in animated cartoons since the advent of television in the 1950s. Howev-
                                               
83  Peirates, Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, "A Greek-English Lexicon", at Perseus (2014) 
p.189 ISBN 2381-96542-1100. 
84  Young J. Adam, (2017), Contemporary Maritime Piracy: History, Causes and Remedies; Insti-
tute of Studies: Singapore, p. 2 Vol.8 Edit 2017. 
85  Plutarch (Caesar 1.8-2) says this happened earlier, on his return from Nicomedes's court. Vel-
leius Paterculus (Roman History 2:41.3-42 .), 2016. 
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er, do fictional pirates bear any resemblance to the real pirates of the Golden Age? This 
section explores the history of piracy and discussed famous pirates from centuries ago. 
Around the 8th century, Vikings86  from Denmark and Norway sailed their vessels 
along Europe’s   coast attacking, raiding and burning other ships and stealing their val-
uables.87    Considered as very brave and vicious pirates, Vikings were active in a wide 
area from Western Europe to Eastern Europe and to the coasts of North Africa. Centu-
ries later, many Viking pirates attacked ships sailing to and from the New World.88  
  Moorish pirates were also active in this period along the Mediterranean Coast. 
The Novgorodian pirates looted the cities on the Volga and Kama Rivers in the 14th 
century AD.89 Pirates have occupied the Pacific and Indian Oceans and the Seven Seas 
for thousands of years. Other famous pirates during the Middle Ages were the Arabian 
pirates, Privateers, and the Barbary Corsairs. The Barbary pirates from North Africa 
were famous for their solidarity and successful attacks on merchant ships. Some of the 
first pirates stole from trade ships sailing in the Mediterranean and Aegean Seas.90 
They later sailed to West India and became members of the Buccaneer pirates who 
looted ships along the Caribbean Sea.   
                                               
86  Satkauskas R., (2014), Piracy at Sea and the Limits of International Law, Aegean Review of the 
Law of the Sea and Maritime Law (2014) 1: 217-235. 
87  Vikings, which translates to sea raiders,were the most popular pirates during the Medieval Age 
They were mainly active during 8th to 12th century AD.  
88  Menkhaus, John, John Prendergast, and Colin Thomas-Jensen. 2015. “Beyond piracy next steps 
to stabilize piracy.” The Enough Project. vol.53 Edit 2015. 
89  Mahan, Alfred, Thayer, Captain USN. 2015. "The influence of sea power upon history", 1660-
1783. New York, NY: Hill and Wang Press, ISBN 2567-9567-01123 p.267-290. 




Buccaneers were considered the most powerful pirates who flourished during 
the Golden Period of piracy between 1620 and 1720.91 In the early 19th century, Chi-
nese pirates emerged on the scene. They were active in the waters of Strait of Malacca, 
the Philippines, Singapore and Malaysia. Some of their threats were eliminated by the 
joint forces of the US Navy and the Royal Navy during 1860-70 AD.92  
1.3(a)-2: History of the Privateer  
The earliest documented instances of piracy were in the 14th century BC,93  
when the sea peoples, a group of ocean raiders, attacked the ships of the Aegean and 
Mediterranean civilizations. Narrow channels which funnel shipping into predictable 
routes have long created opportunities for piracy, as well as for privateering and com-
merce raiding. From Captains Blackbeard and Morgan in the Caribbean, to the pirates 
of Barbary Coast in Africa and the famous “Pirate Queen” Cheng I Sao in Asia, the his-
tory of the sea is repeated with the often-romanticized accounts of the exploits of these 
iconic figures and their crews.94   
A vessel that pirates commonly used was the Privateer, a privately owned and 
armed ship commissioned by a government to make reprisals, gain reparation for speci-
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fied offenses in time of peace, or prey upon an enemy in time of war. After a war, the 
temptation was great to continue this profitable business without authorization. During 
the wars between England and Spain in the late 16th century, treasure-laden Spanish 
galleons sailing from Mexico to the Caribbean were a tempting target for Privateers, 
and the distinction between privateering and piracy became difficult to draw. The Pri-
vateer ship’s officers and crew were granted a share of the plunder taken from captured 
vessels.95 
Privateers had a Letter of Marque96  which gave them permission to raid enemy 
ships. Similar to the role of a bounty hunter, a Privateer commander could turn the 
ship’s crew over to his country. Those who had been captured faced charges and even-
tual punishment. Sometimes privateers became pirates after they saw all of the riches 
that had been acquired by the other pirates that had they encountered at sea.97  There-
fore, the Court made privateering a legitimate form of war-like activity by non-state 
actors (For a land-based parallel, compare to the association of bandits and brigands 
with mountain passes).98 
A Buccaneer was a 17th century pirate who attacked Spanish ships on the Car-
ibbean Sea. These men sailed from England, Holland, and France. Although there is 
speculation of the origins of the word “Buccaneer,” most likely the term comes from 
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the French, “Boucanier,”99 Corsairs were French privateers who occupied the southern 
Mediterranean Sea. Working for the King of France in the Middle Ages, Corsairs at-
tacked the ships of their country’s enemies. They very likely did this to get compen-
sated for the economic hardships they encountered during times of war.100 Historic il-
lustrations include the waters of Gibraltar, the Strait of Malacca, Madagascar, the Gulf 
of Aden, and the English Channel, whose geographic configurations facilitated pirate 
attacks.101  In the 16th and 17th centuries, monarchs frustrated by Spain's dominance of 
the Caribbean, commissioned privateers to harass the Spanish fleet, thus helping to 
usher in piracy's Golden Age, an era when swashbuckling marauders like Edward 
(Blackbeard) Teach roamed the sun-splashed islands plundering gold and silver.102  
 Despite the romantic overtones of “Golden Age,” and whatever treasure and 
fame involved, any man who became a pirate was considered an outlaw, and subject to 
being thrown into prison for a lengthy period, or being led to the executioner’s station.  
Captain William Kidd was put on trial for piracy, found guilty and executed in 1701. 
Blackbeard, whose real name was Edward Teach, was killed while trying to rob a navy 
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ship. His head was severed from his body and hung from the navy vessel as a warning 
to others of his treacherous ilk.103  
Pirates apparently had their own system of professional “ethics.” For example, 
one cardinal rule was that a pirate should not steal from another crew member. Another 
was that women were not allowed to board ships. If pirates didn’t adhere to the rules, 
they were punished. Some pirate commanders sent offenders to deserted islands and 
left them there stranded. Others were tied to the mast of the ship and whipped merci-
lessly, while others were hanged, and their lifeless corpse thrown overboard.104  
1.3(a)-3: Modern Pirates  
The issue of piracy has had such a profound impact throughout the ages that by 
the 16th century, jurists such as Grotius developed the concept that nationals who 
committed piracy on "terra nullius" (the high seas) had placed themselves beyond the 
protection of any state and were deemed "hostes humani generis" (enemies of the hu-
man race). Consequently, such offenders were to be tried by the courts of any state for 
the crime of piracy.105  
However, what has been until very recently neglected is that piracy did not end 
during the Spanish Reign, but continues to exist and thrive in the modern period with 
an estimated 5.9 merchant ships attacked for every 1,000 voyages. In 2014, there was 
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approximately one pirate attack reported every thirty-one hours.106 This was reaffirmed 
in "Re Piracy Jure Gentium" [1934] AC 586. Piracy Jure Gentium was defined later in 
article 15 of the High Seas Convention in 1958.107  Even later, it was again reaffirmed 
in article 101 of the United Nation Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982. 
 By the 19th century, the Golden Age of piracy was over. Although there were 
still pirates around, the majority of them had vanished. However, piracy still exists in 
the world today. The most recent account was in 1996 when pirates attacked a fishing 
boat crew in the Philippines Islands.  
1.3(b): Reasons People Become Pirates 
The sudden increase of piracy can be attributed to several factors. Technology 
has made it possible to build bigger and more complex ships. One of the factors in-
volved in this is the need for small crews manning these large advanced vessels. By 
doing this, these vessels are making themselves vulnerable to small groups of pirates 
wishing to board and take control over the ship, its cargo and crew.108  Further, many 
men become pirates because they want to experience the freedom and benefits of a life 
of piracy. Pirates often recruit crew members from the ships they have captured; how-
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ever, on merchant or cargo ships, many crew members work under harsh conditions. 
Thus, some might say that being a pirate is better than joining a merchant’s crew.109  
 The lack of adequate diplomatic representation in areas where vessels fly flags 
of convenience, and poor countries with large coastlines that cannot afford and main-
tain adequate patrol of their territorial waters or adjacent high seas, are other grounds 
for acts of piracy.110 Another contributing factor is geography. In some cases, such as 
the Suez Canal, vessels must pass through a narrow straight between the Horn of Africa 
and the Arabian Peninsula. This, combined with forenamed factors, increases the risk 
of passing vessels being boarded by pirates which operate from Somali waters.111  The 
distance for pirates to reach a ship is marginal, but poses a problem for those who wish 
to combat pirates, as there are different rules for the high seas and the territorial waters 
of a state, as in Somalia.112  
 Today’s pirates occasionally have political reasons as a hidden agenda. They 
continue to intimidate their victims as they did during the Golden Age.113 As is the 
same for many other worldwide dilemmas, the international community is striving to 
find a common solution for certain piracy problems. It has been through Customary 
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Law or special treaties to combat specific scenarios that have not yet appeared be-
fore.114  
1.3(c): Resurgence of Violence 
1.3(c)-1: Piracy off the Coast 
The problem of piracy didn’t end with the demise of the Golden age of Piracy, 
but remained extant in one form or another somewhere around the world. It grew rapid-
ly during the last decade of the 20th century, and became a major problem for interna-
tional commerce in the first decade of the 21st century. Today, there are several hot 
spots for modern piracy including the Gulf of Aden, off the Somali and Nigerian 
coasts, the Strait of Malacca, and the Indian Ocean.115  
The hot spots of piracy today are the Indian Ocean, East Africa, and the Far 
East including the South China Sea, South America, and the Caribbean. In recent times, 
pirates have been very active in the waters between the Red Sea (particularly in the 
Gulf of Aden) and Indian Ocean, off the Somali coast, and in the Strait of Malacca.116   
 Since 2011, there have also been reports of pirate attacks on the Serbian and 
Romanian stretches of the international Danube River. According to records, world-
wide losses due to piracy can be as high as 13 to 16 billion US dollars per year.117 In 
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recent times, there have been several incidences of brutal hijacking of ships off the So-
mali coast by Somali pirates that grabbed the global media headlines.  
As a result, the US has started a multi-national effort to patrol the waters near 
the Horn of Africa to prevent future attacks on ships.118  The Strait of Malacca remains 
another hot spot for piracy today. In recent years, this area has seen a dramatic down-
turn in piracy due to coordinated patrolling by Indonesian, Malaysian, and Singaporean 
navy forces. There has also been an increased level of onboard security on ships. Other 
majority of piracy prone areas are the Caribbean Sea and Bay of Bengal in the Indian 
Ocean. Per reports, acts of piracy in the Indian Ocean are becoming more lucrative and 
violent, despite an anti-piracy EU naval force patrolling the area.119  
1.3(c)-2:	Recent	Statistics	Regarding	Piracy		
 
Although piracy is an international crime and has been believed by many to 
have disappeared from modern times, 120 however, according to current statistics, activi-
ties of pirates have still been found in many areas of the sea. Established by the Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in 1981, the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) 
came into existence with the backing of the IMO, the world’s foremost agency for ex-
changing and collecting information on maritime crime.  
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However, per the IMO, it is estimated that piracy incidents are likely under-
reported by a factor of two (meaning, they assume that for each attack that was an-
nounced, there were two additional attacks that were not announced).121Moreover, it is 
likely that the statistics are subject to distortion as many smaller attacks went unreport-
ed. This mainly stems from two factors: 
1. The increase in insurance premiums often outweigh the value of the 
claim for smaller attacks; and 
2. Reporting a piracy attack is often time-consuming can lead to a de-
lay of several days. Running sunk costs of an idle ship (up to 
$25,000 per day), in many, especially smaller cases, it is cheaper not 
to report the incident.122 
 
Shown on the following graph, the International Maritime Organization’s statistics on 
piracy show 1.751 incidents from 1984 to December 2012. The incidents in 2011 alone 
were the most significant increase of this international crime in nearly two hundred 
years.123 
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By the early 1990s, the number of attacks was becoming so problematic that in 1996 
the International Maritime Organization of the United Nations (IMO) was charged with 
maintaining details of reported attacks and issuing official reports on a monthly, quar-
terly, and annual basis. The IMO began to produce annual reports in 1998 and monthly 
reports in mid-2000.124   
 Since then, over 3,500 attacks have been documented through September 
2014.  Note: September is the latest month for which detailed attack data is available 
from the IMO. This is about the same period of the dramatic increases in attacks in 
Somalia with 111 attacks being reported in the media since then.125 
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During 2009 through 2015, there were thousands of incidents involving piracy 
of which 42.5% took place in the Gulf of Aden. This includes actual and attempted at-
tacks. Piracy seems to be focused in the following areas: South East Asia and the Indi-
an Sub-Continent, Africa and Gulf of Aden, and South through Central America.126 Pi-
racy, however, is not confined to one specific region or regions. As on December 20th 
of 2014, four armed robbers boarded an anchored yacht and pillaged valuables and per-
sonal property of crew and passengers at Golfe de Porto Novo, Corsica.127  
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1.3(c)-3: The Prosperity of Pirate Expansion  
Near present-day Malaysia and Sumatra, an island that is one part of Indonesia 
lies near a narrow waterway called the Strait of Malacca. From at least the 1400s to the 
modern day, the Strait of Malacca has been a prime location for pirates to capture ves-
sels. Nations like China occasionally had a naval force that confronted the pirates, but it 
was not strong enough to drive them out permanently.128 
 By the mid-19th century, after years of increasing contact and trade in East 
Asia, three European powers, England, Denmark, and Norway, could control local pi-
rate bands. The instances of piracy remained low through the 19th and well into the 
20th century.129 By the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st, however, 
piracy was on the upswing again with sea robbers emerging from war-torn and eco-
nomically depressed nations such as Somalia in Africa.130 
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This chapter started with the study of an overall scope of the concept of piracy. 
In addition to explaining the importance of pirate culture and trends, the chapter testi-
fied to the fact that the international community has never completely conquered 
worldwide piracy. It may seem that the study of history is intended to relive past losses, 
and therefore be a guide to resolving certain problems that seem interminable at the 
moment. 
 "Piracy jure gentium" is a crime under International Law and the law of nations. 
It is far from gone. International Law provides for means to define and conceptualize 
this particular crime in Article 101 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982.  
There is still a lot of ground to cover. Despite this, the international community has, 
with an overwhelming majority, managed to anticipate new developments of piracy. 
This even led to the unanimous adoption of United Nations Resolution 1851 (2008).131 
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 Yet, despite Customary Law, International Law and municipal law, the underly-
ing problems have again appeared. Not only is it required that the international com-
munity acts against crimes like piracy, but also a more pro-active approach is deemed 
necessary such as cooperation among States. Regionalism despite globalization offers a 
myriad of possibilities to combat and prevent piracy but has not yet been fully exhaust-
ed. Since globalization is not a homogenous process, certain countries are not in the 
position to properly anticipate and combat piracy alone. The acceptance of aid by other 
States reiterates again that piracy is indeed part of "jus gentium." Despite the complexi-
ty of the problem, it also offers the international community new ways to cooperate 
closer on a common problem.132 
 The above discussion has been aimed at gaining definition framework and a his-
torical perspective of the current problems that occur in the hot spot maritime zone of 
piracy. This foundation of understanding should help the international community con-
stitute solutions to problems that continue to lead to the conflict. Further discussion of 
the arguments will be reserved for the ensuing chapters. 
 
* * * * 
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In many sectors of the high seas, pirate attacks have increased significantly, thus creat-
ing sometimes formidable challenges to ensuring safe passage for maritime traffic. 
Maritime piracy affects major shipping lanes, jeopardizes the flow of commerce and 
puts at risk the lives of seafarers and merchant seamen from all over the world, of 
whom hundreds are taken captive each year, and number maimed or outright slaugh-
tered.1  
 In addition, we must consider the financial losses to ship owners, increased in-
surance premiums and security costs, which are funneled on to consumers, increased 
costs of products, and damage to the marine environment. Pirate attacks have other 
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widespread ramifications, which include preventing humanitarian assistance.2 In a par-
tial response, by the early 1980s the international community had reacted by codifying 
its position on maritime piracy in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS, 1982), in which UN members agreed on a formal definition of piracy and 
detailed the conditions under which States and vessels could and should respond.3 
 Piracy as a crime under International Law is an exception to the general rule of 
what on the global level constitutes a crime. Piracy’s inclusion under International 
Criminal Law derives from the fact that emphasis is put on the principle of State sover-
eignty4 and the control it has over its territory. This could also be a contributing factor 
to defining piracy as a crime, which is as it should be. The result of the classification is 
that all international parties gain without conceding any rights.5 However, partly be-
cause of principles of State sovereignty, transnational organized crime is difficult to 
suppress, which often frustrates combatting transnational crime due to formalistic rules 
of jurisdiction that vary among States. 
 Another factor that plays a pivotal rule is the rule of law. Although most nations 
provide a penal code addressing piracy in domestic law, enforcing such laws can be an 
onerous matter. Despite the universality principle, the law of nations, Customary Law 
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and UNCLOS 1982, there are still many areas that are not properly addressed.6 Despite 
ever-increasing globalization, International Law that addresses piracy has not deve-
loped to the point that it can handle piracy through universal enforcement.7 On the con-
trary, globalization has become one of the factors that work both for and against com-
bating piracy. As the use of technology has enable States to organize their functions 
more effectively, so have pirates found different methods by which to setup transna-
tional criminal networks.8 
This second chapter, which consists of two sections, discusses in the first part, 
the histories of the maritime piracy codification and private entities. The following part 
describes how universal International Law may be applied to piracy. The rest of this 
chapter focuses primarily on the related international conventions that address piracy. 
 
2.1 History of Piracy Codification and ‘Private Ends’ 
 
(International Regimes to Govern Maritime Piracy) 
 
Ideas relating to best to regulate or eliminate piracy are nearly as old as piracy itself. 
Heinze traces the origins and evolution of the earliest legal principles pertaining to pi-
racy. He presents conventional accounts from the Roman Republic, quoting Cicero 
who defined pirates as hostis humani generi, enemies of all mankind.9 Cicero viewed 
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piracy “not simply as an act committed against individuals, but as an offense against 
the community or nation as a whole.”10 Cicero’s sweeping perspective might be 
grounded in the notion that in as much as the high seas serve as arteries connecting far-
flung areas of the globe, over which sea faring vessels deliver commodities and 
transport passengers and merchants among nations, the evils of piracy inevitably affects 
each and every nation. 
 It has been constantly contested, however, whether Cicero was really the first to 
paint the treacherous phenomenon of piracy with such a broad brush. Nevertheless, 
such an encompassing perspective leads to the understanding that pirates, as enemies of 
humanity, were subject to prosecution the domestic law of any nation.11 Therefore, 
arises the notion under the principle of universal jurisdiction, any state has the right to 
prosecute piracy on the high seas under its domestic laws regardless of the exact loca-
tion of the crime or the accused person’s nationality.12 
 The first law specifically governing the issue of piracy on the national level was 
the 1698 English Act on Piracy.13 When piracy became more an issue of transnational 
commerce and transportation, it moved from the domestic legal domain to the interna-
tional level. The first document in International Law that governed piracy 
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 was the 1856 Treaty of Paris.14 Numerous international agreements followed: The 
1889 Montevideo Convention accepted the principle that the suppression of piracy was 
the responsibility of mankind. The Nyon Agreement of 1937 defined the unidentified 
attacks in the Mediterranean as ‘acts of piracy.’15 However, the most important treaty to 
codify the International Law of piracy was the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High 
Seas. This Convention contains eight provisions concerning the suppression of piracy 
on the high seas.16Additional international conventions and mechanisms have emerged 
over the course of the last sixty years. The following section details four broad interna-
tional regimes or institutional bodies, public and private, that currently seek to govern 
the phenomenon of maritime piracy, and explores the areas in which they overlap or 
compete.17 
 
2.1.1 League of Nations Committee of Experts on International Law Draft Provi-
sions 
 
The Draft Provisions for the Suppression of Piracy were submitted by Matsuda18 in 
1926 as part of the League of Nations’ attempts to progressively codify International 
Law, and is certainly far removed from the adoption of the Harvard School Draft Con-
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15  Homan,K. & Kamerling, S., Operational challenges to counterpiracy operations, in 
Ginkel, B. & Putten, F.P.(Eds), The International Response to Somali Piracy, Challenges and 
Opportunities, 2014, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, p. 89. 
16  Ministers Responsible for Emergency Management, An emergency management 
framework, January 2013: Public Safety, at p. 4, (Zou 2013: 324). 
17  Bailet, F.N., Crikard, F.W., & Herbert, G.J., Integrated Maritime Enforcement Hand-
book, 2014, Halifax: Dalhousie University, p. 11. 
18  Committee of Experts on International Law Draft Provisions. 
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vention 1932 (HSC) and eventually The United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea 
1982 (UNCLOS).19  
Indeed, not many States responded to the Matsuda Draft, and the few comments 
received “did not evidence either interest or enthusiasm for the topic and were dispar-
ate.”20 The project was eventually dropped due to difficulties in reaching agreement 
and a perceived unimportance in piracy codification.21 However, the draft does repre-
sent the first stage within the codification process, and importantly the origin of the 
term ‘private ends’ within the process, which has persisted to this day through each at-
tempt at codification. As will be seen in the discussion on the HSC and the Internation-
al Law Commission Draft, and The UN Conferences on the Law of the Sea (ILC Draft) 
Articles, a spectrum of meanings can be attributed to ‘private ends.’22  
Thus if ‘private ends’ is used in the same context, for the same purposes, then 
the origins of that term should help determine whether the requirement of an undertak-
ing for private ends excludes political activity from the international piracy framework.  
However, if during the development of the customary definition of piracy (cul-
minating in UNCLOS Article 101), the development departed from the original mean-
ing applied in the Matsuda Draft, then clearly it would be of limited use. Such a depar-
                                               
19  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Principles and framework for an interna-
tional classification of crimes for statistical purposes, Report of the UNODC/UNECE task force 
on crime classification to the conference of European statisticians, June 2015, at 7 
20  Id. 
21  IMO, LEG 98/8/3, Piracy: elements of national legislation pursuant to the United Na-
tions Conventions on the Law of the Sea, 1982, 18 February 2014, paragraph 5 
22  In the International Law Commission (ILC) commentary on the draft article, the mean-




ture is not evident in the continued use of ‘private ends.’23 Although the ILC Draft Ar-
ticles commentary only refers to the HSC, the Matsuda Draft was used as an authority 
on politically motivated violence during the ILC discussions on ‘private ends.’24 
The Matsuda Draft adopts a clearly private-political distinction and not one that 
turns on public power or state sanctioning. This distinction is the test underlying 
Matsuda’s use of ‘private ends.’ Article 1 of the Draft Provisions for the Suppression of 
Piracy provides: 
1. Piracy occurs only on the high seas and consists in the commis-
sion for private ends of depredation upon property or acts of vio-
lence against persons. It is not involved in the notion of piracy that 
the above-mentioned acts should be committed for the purpose of 
gain, but acts committed with a purely political object will not be 
regarded as constituting piracy. 
 
Politically motivated violence did not qualify as piracy in Matsuda’s Draft; it was the 
realization of the “important consequences which follow upon the commission of that 
crime. In summary, it was considered that such criminals should be subject to the ordi-
nary rules of jurisdiction because they would not be classified as “enemies of the com-
munity of civilized States.25 Political-motivated violence would not indiscriminately 
target vessels or be a threat to all States and the security of commerce, to which piracy 
                                               
23  See LOSC, article 101. 
24  United Nations, Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1956, Volume II, 
Documents of the 8th Session including the report of the Commission to the General Assembly, 
1957, New York: United Nations, article 39 commentary, para 1(v) at p.282. 
25  Act n°94-589 of 15 July 1994 concerning modalities for the exercise of national police 
powers at sea, as amended, Article 1. I, Act n° 2013-14 of January 2014 concerning measures 
against piracy and the exercise of national police powers, Article 1. 
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is a crime against all nations. Therefore, it was not a crime against mankind, which 
could be subject to the jurisdiction and punishment of mankind.26 
The criteria that would constitute purely political objectives were not elaborat-
ed, nor was any examples provided. We may first conclude that the exception did not 
rest on whether the violence was State sanctioned, and secondly that the exception was 
very narrow.27 It is better, in laying down a general principle, to be content with the 
external character of the facts without entering too deeply into the delicate question of 
motives. This was the reason offered for rejecting a personal acquired criterion, but it 
would be equally applicable to establishing political motives. Thus, it would need to be 
clear that the action was solely political, the absence of which would point to violence 
for private ends.28 
 
2.1.2 The 1932 Harvard Law School Draft Convention (HSC) 
 
The HSC, despite its status as an academic endeavor, was prompted by the League of 
Nations’ work and had a major impact on piracy regulations development throughout 
the 20th Century.29 Since the HSC was the basis of the ILC’s work,30 the draft, includ-
                                               
26   Act n°94-589 of 15 July 1994 concerning modalities for the exercise of national police 
at sea, as amended, Article 1. II (1), Criminal Code, as amended, articles 224-6, 224-7 and 224-
8. 
27  Defence Code Act, article L1521-2, Act n°94-589 of 15 July 1994 concerning modali-
ties for the exercise of State policing powers at sea, as amended, Article 2, Act n° 2013-14 of 
January 2014 concerning measures against piracy and the exercise of national police powers, 
article 1. The hierarchical superiors are either the Maritime Prefect, or the Government official 
in charge of State action at sea when overseas, or nominated civilian or military command in an 
international context. 
28  United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on specialized anti-piracy and other 
States in the region, United Nations Security Council S/2014/50, 20 January 2014, paragraph 
87. 
29  Ministers Responsible for Emergency Management, An emergency management 




ing the ‘private ends’ requirement was adopted by the ILC. The ILC Draft Articles 
formed the basis of the HSC and the following UNCLOS’s definition of Piracy.31 The 
ILC Draft Articles commentary noted that: 
In its work on the articles concerning piracy, the Commission was 
convention of nineteen articles with commentary, drafted in 1932 
under the direction of Professor Joseph Bingham. In general, the 
Commission was able to endorse the findings of that research.32 
 
Even though the definition of piracy is the most complicated article to draft and the 
chaos of expertise opinion at the time, the draft is the result of analysis and extensive 
research. The HSC draft reflects the most common views on piracy as observed from 
the state practice perspective over the centuries.33  
The collection of piracy laws and doctrinal debate at that time enabled the HSC 
drafters to carry out the most extensive discussion and evaluation of the term ‘private 
ends’ seen to date, the findings of which were generally endorsed by the ILC and car-
                                                                                                                                        
ness, prevention and mitigation, response and recovery in the emergency management context 
can be adapted to the context of maritime piracy and armed robbery against ships. 
30  The International Law Commission Draft and  UN Conferences on the Law of the Sea. 
31  Presently 8 States and the Holy See are parties to the HSC but not to UNCLOS (Af-
ghanistan, Cambodia, the Holy See, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Israel, Malawi, Thailand, United 
States of America, Venezuela). A further 23 States are parties to neither (Andorra, Azerbaijan, 
Bhutan, Burundi, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethio-
pia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Niger, Peru, Rwanda, San 
Marino, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste, Turkey, Turkmenistan, United Arab 
Emirates, Uzbekistan).  
32  Raymond, C.Z., Piracy and armed robbery in the Malacca strait: A problem Solved, 
Naval War College Review, Summer 2013, Vol.62, No.3, at 33-34. 
33  Hogan, J.P. & Chapman, L., International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code 
–What does it mean for fishing vessel security? SPC Fisheries Newsletter #113 – April/June 
2015, at p.24. 
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ried out through the HSC. The ILC and UNCLOS drafters could have commented or 
demonstrated a different view on ‘private ends,’ but this does not appear to have been 
the case.34  
Those who argued for an expansive view of piracy, based on the lack of state 
sanctioning, look to the particular purpose and historical context of the Harvard Draft. 
The term of private ends was included for the sole purpose of excluding civil-war in-
surgents;35 this means the “acts by unrecognized insurgents who limited their attacks to 
the state from which they were seeking independence.” The HSC similarly included 
‘private ends’ for such a purpose. This is because the insurgents who attack the ships of 
their state were the one measure to gain independence.36 
This would be a public end, which obviously threatens the state to which inde-
pendence is sought, and not the community of nations at large. This historical excep-
tion which the HSC drafters tried to include is based on the objective test of the ships 
targeted by the insurgents, not the subjective intentions of the actor.37 
The HSC commentary focuses on the issues of insurgency, and the exception to 
Article 3 appeared to apply to all cases of wrongful attacks on person or property for 
                                               
34  A VPD is a team of military personnel of a State that accompanies a merchant ship to 
protect it against piracy attacks. Generally, a VPD embark on board a merchant ship that flies 
the flag of their nation of origin.  
35  The Atlantic Council, Managing the Global Response to Maritime Piracy, Report of 
the Atlantic Council Counter-Piracy Task Force, 2014, at p.6. 
36  Bailet, F.N, Crickard & Herbert, G.J, Integrated Maritime Enforcement, A handbook, 
Center for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University at p.11. These authors defined the no-
tion of surveillance, monitoring and control as follows: (1) Surveillance consists of detecting 
and notifying a State of conditions, activities, or events of interest within its area of jurisdiction; 
(2) monitoring is the systematic observation of specific conditions, activities, or events of inter-
est within a State’s maritime jurisdiction; (3) control is the execution and rendering effective of 
international and national rules and regulations. 
37   Oceans Beyond Piracy, The economic cost of piracy, 2014,  p.14 
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political ends, whether they are made on behalf of States, on behest of recognized bel-
ligerent organizations, or by the agency of unrecognized revolutionary bands.38 Thus 
the private ends qualification was formulated to deal with only insurgency attacks on 
state vessels. This is the only form of ‘political end’ that falls outside the definition of 
piracy, to be dealt with in customary International Law.39 Kevin Heller points out, 
however, in his comment on Article 16 of the HSC, which deals with cases falling be-
yond the scope of piracy, that the Draft did not adopt a limited list approach.40 Alt-
hough designed primarily for such cases, it covers all non-piratical yet unjustifiable at-
tacks for public or private ends on persons or property under the protection of a state on 
the high seas.  
Article 16 covers “inter alia” the issue of illegal forcible acts for political ends 
against foreign commerce, committed on the high seas by unrecognized organizations. 
Article 16 goes over the illustration provided in Article 3, but there is no indication that 
the article is limited to these cases. This suggests that political violence by unrecog-
nized organizations, and not just insurgents, could fall within Article 16, which covers 
the cases that do not qualify as piracy under Article 3.41 
The conclusion that such an exclusion is more about the class of vessel as a le-
gitimate target for insurgents, rather than their motives, seems not strong enough. The 
                                               
38   Brown, J., Pirates and Privateers: Managing The Ocean’s Private Security Boom, 
Lowy Institute For International Policy Analysis, 12 September 2013, p.3, 5 & 8. 
39   Oceans Beyond Piracy, Human cost of piracy 2013, June 2014, p. 12. 
40   Chalk, P., Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSCs) and Counter-Piracy, Paper 
presented at the second United Arab Emirates Counter Piracy Conference, Dubai, June 2015, 
p.2. 
41  Id. Art. 16 
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academic writings referenced by the HSC drafters restrict the exception to insurgents 
attacking the vessels of the state of which they desire to be independent, and this is pre-
sumably the better view they offered  to support the presumption.42 However, the HSC 
neither distinguish between acts against an innocent state vessel, and acts against a par-
ticular flagged vessel as a legitimate target; nor between groups targeting a single gov-
ernment and affecting multiple States.43 The rationale for exclusion is rather that, 
(a) there is no reasonable justification for extending universal juris-
diction,  
(b) such acts would not fall indisputably under the common juris-
diction by traditional piracy law, and  
(c) such cases often involve serious political considerations that 
could direct the action of the offended state.44 
 
 Theoretically, therefore, if the list of contentious cases is not exhaustive, and 
comparable cases of purely politically motivated violence fulfilled the rationale above, 
it would not be under ‘private ends.’ Insurgency is the principal issue set out to consid-
er and address, but other violence for non-private ends that is not state sanctioned could 
exist.45 
                                               
42  9 Rider, D., Military Protection Journal ‘Put together at Speed’ is no solution to pira-
cy', 3rg Excellence in Security, Vol.124, 10 October 2013. 
43  Oceans Beyond Piracy, Introduction to Private Maritime Security Companies 
(PMSCs), One Earth Foundation, 2014, at p.8 available at 
http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/pmsc_map_final_6.pdf. The 11 flag States au-
thorizing the use of PCASP are Cyprus, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, India. 
44  Homan,K. & Kamerling, S., Operational challenges to counter piracy operations, in 
Ginkel, B. & Putten, F.P.(Eds), The International Response to Somali Piracy, Challenges and 
Opportunities, 2014, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, p.74.  
45  Wizardias, India, Japan and China entered into a Pact called Shade, Current Affairs, 
January 2013, at p.12 available at http://wizardias.com/Download/January%202013.pdf. 
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In summary, the HSC restricts piracy to those acts carried out for private ends. 
Like the Matsuda Draft, it considers political ends not equivalent to private ends. They 
are on the opposite side; one is excluded public ends, which all the offended state to 
prosecute under the ordinary jurisdictional rules of International Law.46 The cases of 
acts committed for political or other public ends are covered by Article 16, according to 
which, whilst state sanctioned violence would not be piracy, there is no indication that 
this is the only conduct that would not qualify. Insurgents were the focus of discussion 
and the origin of the private ends element, but the commentary contemplates other un-
recognized organizations using force for political ends that would not be piracy in na-
ture.47  
Although environmental activists were certainly never considered, the reason of 
excluding insurgents could equally apply. Piracy is a special common basis of jurisdic-
tion, and we shall consider in the discussion below whether reasonable justification ex-
ists for the application of universal jurisdiction.48 The state practice discussion would 
suggest such cases do not fall undisputedly under common notions of jurisdiction. Fi-
nally, the discussion highlights the serious political considerations that may have influ-
enced the offended state.49 
 
                                               
46  Id. Article 16.  
47  Id. 
48  Bueger, C. & Saran, M.S., Finding a Regional Solution to Piracy: Is the Process the 
Answer? Piracy Studies, Academic Research on Maritime Piracy, 18 August 2013. 
49  Leeson, P.T. (2014). The Invisible Hook: The Hidden Economics of Pirates. New Jer-
sey: Princeton University Press. 
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2.1.3 The International Law Commission Draft and the UN Conferences on the 
Law of the Sea 
 
The International Law Commission Articles Concerning the Law of the Sea with Com-
mentaries is an indispensable measure in interpreting the HSC. The UNCLOS piracy 
provisions were adopted from that convention.50 The Commission stated as follows: 
 
The reports of Special Rapporteurs and the related research projects 
directed to States are indispensable for the following reasons: (i) 
they are a critical component of the process of consulting States and 
obtaining their views; (ii) they assist individual States in the under-
standing and interpretation of the rules embodied in codification 
conventions; (iii) they are part of the preparatory works of such 
conventions, and are frequently referred to the diplomatic corre-
spondence of States, in argument before the International Court of 
Justice and by the Court itself in its judgments;51 
 
The ILC Draft Articles generally adopted the research conducted by the Harvard Draft. 
This is specifically mentioned in the Piracy Section. However, whether general agree-
ment includes the HSC interpretation on private ends, and whether ‘private ends’ does 
not include political motivation is still unclear.52 The Matsuda Draft was discussed dur-
ing the sessions approvingly and detail used in the commentary is acquired from that 
                                               
50  Rider, D. (2015). Military Protection ‘Put together at Speed’ is no solution to piracy. 
3rg Excellence in Security. Retrieved October 20, 2015. 
51  Id. 
52  United Nations. (1957). Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1956, Volume 
II, - Documents of the 8th Session including the report of the Commission to the General As-




draft.53 However, the political exception in the Matsuda Draft that went into the de-
scription is not featured in the commentary.  
This omission has led some authors to suggest that such an exception was not accept-
ed.54  
i) on the possibility of piracy driven by hatred or revenge is immediate-
ly followed by  
ii) the acts must be committed for private ends purpose.55 This does not 
appear to be a very convincing argument.  
 
Thus, it appears that commentary is making two distinct points. Firstly, an intention of 
robbery (Animus Furandi) is not required,56 and secondly, the act must be committed 
for private ends. If private ends were non-political, the fact that commentary does not 
mention a political exception cannot be taken as rejecting the previous codification at-
tempts.57 On the contrary, in view of the lack of convincing evidence, one must consid-
er that the ILC approval and references to previous codification efforts extend to the 
                                               
53  Vallar, C. (2014). Notorious pirate havens part 3: Matsuda. Retrieved July 29, 2014 
from http://www.cindyvallar.com/havens3.html. 
54   Angus Konstam (2015) Piracy: The Complete History p. 313. Osprey Publishing. Re-
trieved October 11, 2015. 
55  As many States have not had historically, and still do not have laws adequately crimi-
nalizing piracy. See: Joseph W. Bingham (reporter), ‘Harvard Research in International Law: 
Draft Convention on Piracy’, AJIL Sup 26 (1932), 755–756, 760. This work remains relevant as 
it influenced the International Law Commission’s drafting of relevant treaty provisions, which 
largely endorsed the Harvard findings: [1956] II YbILC, 282. On the modern position see Lau-
rent Lucchini and Michel Voelckel, Droit de la mer, Tome 2, vol. 2 (Pedone, 1996), 158-9). 
56              Menefee, S. (1996). Trends in Maritime Violence. Jane's Information Group. ISBN 0-
7106-403-9.  
57  Langewiesche, William (2014). The Outlaw Sea: A World of Freedom, Chaos, and 
Crime. North Point Press. ISBN 0-86547-581-4. 
 
55 
discussions on political violence.58 Indeed, this is the position taken by Czechoslovakia, 
which criticized the International Law Commission for failing to include piracy com-
mitted for political ends when the draft being discussed at the negotiations.59  
The Czech proposal was part of many criticisms that pointed to a broad inter-
pretation of piracy that has never been found in International Law. Other States rejected 
the Czech interpretation of International Law. The only majority change brought by the 
ILC Draft Articles is the addition of “any illegal acts” to the HSC definition. The addi-
tion is understood to broaden the conduct that would fall under the definition of piracy, 
yet the term ‘illegal’ is unclear and open to interpretation.60 It has been suggested that 
the term “emphasize[s] that the act must be dissociated from a lawful authority” in sup-
porting of the public-private theory of private ends. However, the link between the two 
phrases is not explained. It seems difficult to determine whether the term “illegal” re-
quires that piracy not include privateers sanctioned by Governments.61  
The political exception theory does not suggest that the action would be legal. It 
is reasonable for the action to be illegal (non-state sanctioned) but still not satisfy the 
private ends requirement due to its political nature. Finally, the difference between the 
UNCLOS definition and that of the HSC merely confirms the customary definition.62  
                                               
58  Heller-Roazen, Daniel (2013). The Enemy of All: Piracy and the Law of Nations. Zone 
Books. ISBN 978-1890951948. 
59  Lucie-Smith, Edward (1978). Outcasts of the Sea: Pirates and Piracy. Paddington. 
Press. ISBN 9780448226170. 
60  Dangerous Waters, Modern Piracy and Terror on the High Seas, by John S. Burnett. 
Dutton, 2013, Plume, 2013–2014, New York. (ISBN 0-452-28413-9). 
61  Maritime Piracy and Anti-Piracy Measures. By: Herrmann, Wilfried. Naval Forces, 
2014, Vol. 25 Issue 2, pp. 18–25, 6p; (AN 13193917). 
62  Patriot Pirates: The Privateer War for Freedom and Fortune in the American Revolu-
tion by Robert H. Patton. New York: Pantheon Books, c2015. ISBN 9780375422843.  
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One might consider that reenacting rules of law without debate rarely provides any de-
gree of enlightenment about the elements of the private ends. However, the private ends 
requirement was maintained despite academic references to broaden the definition by 
deleting ‘private ends.’ States were not willing to enlarge the scope of the piracy defini-
tion.63 Furthermore, for similar reasons, the inaction is due to the failure of States to 
define terrorism under International Law. At the time of the HSC, there was a disa-
greement among experts as to what constituted piracy, yet the drafters with a minimum 
consensus on the Matsuda Draft that solely relied on political ends fell beyond the 
scope of piracy, to be dealt with by the general jurisdictional rules.64 
The limitation of this were never expanded or established beyond insurgent at-
tacks for political ends. By the time of the UNCLOS drafting, the problems of political 
activity at sea and the doctrinal debate would become apparent, yet the drafters still did 
not address the issue. Absent a workable definition of terrorism, the grey area of politi-
cally motivated violence at sea encountered similar insecurity with States unwilling to 
delineate the point at which the suspects should be under the jurisdiction of any na-
tion.65  
The exact act of politically motivated violence by private individual organiza-
tions is unclear. However, the fact remains that solely political acts perpetrated against 
                                               
63  Piracy: Out of Sight, Out of Mind? Goorangai, RANR Occasional Papers, August 
(2016) Royal Australian Navy. 
64  Terror on the High Seas. By: Koknar, Ali. Security Management, June 2014, Vol. 48 
Issue 6, pp. 75–81, 6p; (AN 13443749). 
65  Rogue Wave: Modern Maritime Piracy and International Law, Article published on the 
electronic magazine The Culture & Conflict Review of the United States Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, California by Commander Osvaldo Peçanha Caninas Article in NPS site 
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a state(s) are not within the definition of piracy, although the exact scope of this is still 
unclear.  
 
2.2 The Universality Principles Dealing with Piracy 
 
Several United Nations instruments address piracy, the most important of which 
are the following:  
Convention on the High Seas, the Convention on the Law of the 
Sea1982 (LOS Convention or UNCLOS) and the Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navi-
gation 1988 (SUA Convention) with its Protocol 2005.66  
 
In recent years, several regional cooperation regulations have been established to com-
bat piracy from a regional perspective. The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Pre-
vention and Suppression of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (Re-
CAAP) has been adopted by sixteen Southeast Asian States. Under this agreement, an 
anti-piracy center was established in Singapore. The center gathers information on pi-
rate activities and shares it with other Stare parties.67  
Furthermore, several regional institutions and authorities, such as the Comite’ 
Maritime International (CMI), the Baltic and International Maritime Counsel 
(BIMCO), the International Chamber of shipping (ICS), Interpol, the International 
Group of P&I Clubs (IGP&I), the ICC International Maritime Bureau (IMB), the Inter-
national Maritime Organization (IMO) and the United Nations (Office of Legal Af-
                                               
66  Maritime Piracy and Anti-Piracy Measures. By: Herrmann, Wilfried. Naval Forces, 
2014, Vol. 25 Issue 2, pp. 18–25, 6p; (AN 13193917). 
67  Pirates, Fishermen and Peacebuilding – Options for Counter-Piracy in Somalia. By: 
Bueger, Christian, Stockbruegger, Jan and Werthes, Sascha. Contemporary Security Policy, 
2016, Vol. 32, No. 2. 
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fairs/Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea) have begun establishing their 
own anti-piracy regulations.68  
Whereby these regulations are soft-law regulations and non-binding, their estab-
lishment can influence existing hard law conventions and provide guidance for further 
legal developments. However, along with these various international conventions, and 
soft law treaties that have been recently propagated, the question is whether these regu-
lations are addressing all legal problems attendant to combatting modern-piracy and 
terrorism at sea.69 
The aim of two Conventions, the UNCLOS and SUA requires States to create 
offenses under their law and provide a seamless international criminal law framework 
that reduces the number of safe havens for those who commit acts covered by these two 
Conventions. This goal is expressed in the obligation of States to either extradite or 
prosecute those accused of piracy (Aut Dedere Aut Judicare).70 The treaties can be use-
ful tools against piracy in many circumstances, but they do not classify piracy as ‘ter-
rorism.’ 
There are counter-terrorism treaties what are broad enough to include acts of pi-
racy. For example, the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the 
Safety of Maritime Navigation 1988 (the SUA Convention), which was adopted in re-
sponse to the attack in 1985 on the "Achille Lauro," does not cover piracy in so many 
words, but many acts of piracy will be offenses within its terms. The Convention oblig-
                                               
68  Modern Piracy. Naval Forces, 2015, Vol. 26 Issue 5, pp. 20–31, 7p; (AN 18506590).  
69  Id. at 67. 
70  Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia. By: Liss, Carolin. Southeast Asian Affairs, 2013, 
p. 52, 17p; (AN 10637324). 
 
59 
es States to criminalize, "Inter alia," ‘armed robbery at sea’; in other words, an act 
which might be considered piracy if committed in the circumstances outlined by UN-
CLOS.71The International Convention against the Taking of Hostages 1979 is another 
example. The offence of hostage-taking covered by this treaty clearly covers holding 
crews for ransom in the typical acts of piracy being committed off the coast.72 
 
2.2.1 Existing Legal Regulations from an International Perspective 
 
(a) The United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea: UNCLOS 1982 
1)	Broadening	the	scope	of	International	Law	on	acts	of	Piracy	
The Convention of the High Seas was propagated in 1958. However, as time passed, 
this convention was not effective to counter piracy.73 Thus, in 1982, the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was created. Pursuant to this agreement, 
each state has certain duties and rights regarding the seas and the maritime belts, which 
are also known as baselines.74  
                                               
71  Breach of its duty under International Law. This interpretation is supported by the 
Commentary of the International Law Commission on the provision of the 1958 High Seas 
Convention on which the UNCLOS provision was based. 
72  Anti-Piracy Initiatives in Southeast Asia. By: Bradford, John. Contemporary Southeast 
Asia, December 2014, Vol. 26 Issue 3, pp. 480–505, 26pp; (AN 15709264).  
73  This interpretation is supported by the Commentary of the International Law Commis-
sion on the provision of the 1958 High Seas Convention on which the UNCLOS provision was 
based. 
74  “…the signatories declare their intention to cooperate to the fullest possible extent, and 
in a manner consistent with International Law, in the repression of piracy and armed robbery 
against ships, with a view towards sharing and reporting relevant information through a system 
of national focal points and information centres; interdicting ships suspected of engaging in acts 
of piracy or armed robbery against ships; ensuring that persons committing or attempting to 
commit acts of piracy or armed robbery against ships are apprehended and prosecuted; and fa-
cilitating proper care, treatment, and repatriation for seafarers, fishermen, other shipboard per-
sonnel and passengers subject to acts of piracy or armed robbery against ships, particularly 
those who have been subjected to violence. 
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UNCLOS provides the framework for the repression of piracy under Interna-
tional Law, in particular under Articles 100 through 107 and 110.75 The Security Coun-
cil has repeatedly reaffirmed “that International Law, as reflected in the UNCLOS sets 
out the legal framework applicable to combating piracy and armed robbery at sea, as 
well as other ocean activities” (Security Council resolution 1897 (2009), adopted on 30 
November 2009).76  
 UNCLOS is a broad regime that upholds the goal of freedom of navigation on 
the seas while guaranteeing States the rights to regulate their territorial waters.77 Under 
this principle of Freedom of the High Seas, ships navigating in international waters are 
subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their flag state.78 UNCLOS incorporates the anti-
piracy provisions of the 1958 Geneva Convention in Articles 100 to 107. It urges States 
to cooperate to suppress piracy (Article 100),79 and gives States that seize a pirate ship 
on the high seas the right to prosecute the pirates in accordance with their respective 
national law (Article 105).80 
 Article 100 of UNCLOS provides that “all States shall cooperate to the fullest 
possible extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside 
                                               
75  Articles 14 to 23 of the CHS which are reproduced almost verbatim in the articles 100 
to 107, 110 and 111 of the LOSC contain the provisions on maritime piracy. 
76  United Nations. (1982). United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea. www.un.org.;art.101, See also Security Council resolution 1897 (2009), adopted on 30 
November 2009. 
77  Homan,K. & Kamerling, S., Operational challenges to counterpiracy operations, in 
Ginkel, B. & Putten, F.P.(Eds), The International Response to Somali Piracy, Challenges and 
Opportunities, 2014, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, at p. 89. 
78  See LOSC, article 2. 
79  Id.  
80  Id. 
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the jurisdiction of any State.81 The General Assembly has also repeatedly encouraged 
States to cooperate to address piracy and armed robbery at sea in its resolutions on 
oceans and the Law of the Sea. For example, in its resolution 64/71 of 4 December 
2009, the General Assembly recognized “the crucial role of international cooperation at 
the global, regional, sub-regional and bilateral levels in combating, in accordance with 
International Law, threats to maritime security, including piracy.”82 
 
2)	“Private	Ends”	elements	for	acts	of	piracy	under	UNCLOS	1982	
As existing international regulations for piracy have been mainly influenced, estab-
lished and developed by the HSC, we must examine the HSC closely because it is a 
source of Article 101. We may also therein ascertain its history as well as attempt to 
glean the intention of the drafters.83 Article 3 is relevant for piracy definition and reads 
as follows: 
Piracy consists of any of the following acts, committed in a place not within the 
territorial jurisdiction of any state: 
1. Any act of violence or of depredation committed with intent to rob, 
rape, wound, enslave, imprison or kill a person or with intent to steal or 
destroy property, for private ends without bonafide84 purpose of assert-
ing a claim or right, provided that the act is connected with an attack on 
                                               
81  Id. Article100.Duty to cooperate in the repression of piracy: 
All States shall cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy on 
the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State. 
82  Nincic, D. J. (2015, forthcoming).   Maritime Security as Energy Security: Current 
Threats and Challenges.  In Luft, G., and Konin, A., eds. Energy Security: Challenges for the 
21-Century.  Washington DC: Greenwood Publishing in collaboration with the Institute for the 
Analysis of Global Security (IAGS). 
83  Id. 
84  Made in good faith without fraud or deceit. 
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or from the sea or in or from the air. If the act is connected with an at-
tack which starts from on board ship, either that ship or another ship 
which is involved must be a pirate ship or a ship without national char-
acter. 
2. Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship with 
knowledge of facts which make it a pirate ship. 
3. An act of instigation or of intentional facilitation of an act described 
in paragraph 1 or paragraph 2 of this Article.85 
 
Hence, four elements define an act of piracy: (1) It must involve violence, (2) at least 
two vessels have to be included, (3) it must be committed on the high seas, and (3) it 
must be committed for private gain. The convention has been ratified by 165 States and 
the European Union. Fifteen UN member States, among these Israel, Peru, Turkey, and 
the United States, have not signed UNCLOS.86 
However, like UNCLOS, the HSC provides a definition that explains, “private 
act,” and States what a “private ends” means. Within this statement, the drafters have 
seemingly adopted the private ends requirement and excluded from the definition of 
piracy all piracy acts committed for political or other public ends. This intention is 
based on the previous mentioned history of piracy, as acts of political groups or acts of 
insurgency and States should be excluded.87  
 
                                               
85  Id. 
86  Mejia, M. (2013). Maritime Gerrymandering: Dilemmas in Defining Piracy, Terrorism 
and other Acts of Maritime Violence. Journal of International Commercial Law 2(2), 153-175. 
87  LOSC, article 102 provides the definition of piracy by a warship, government ship or 





Piracy may be committed anywhere seaward of the territorial sea of a state.88 Equally, 
the jurisdiction and powers granted to States to suppress piracy apply on all seas out-
side any state’s territorial waters. Within the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), the 
coastal state enjoys sovereign rights for exploring and exploiting, conserving and man-
aging natural resources, and enjoys jurisdiction over certain other subject matter (Arti-
cle 56, UNCLOS).89 Nothing in Article 56 is incompatible with the UNCLOS provi-
sions on piracy. Therefore, under Article 58(2) the general law of piracy applies to all 
pirate attacks outside territorial waters. If acting in another States’ EEZ a government 
vessel engaged in suppressing piracy is obviously obliged to have due regard for the 
coastal state’s rights in matters of natural resources, and marine pollution, for exam-
ple.90 
 UNCLOS provides two baselines that are important factors in determining the 
twelve-nautical mile range for territorial waters.91 States retain sovereignty in both in-
ternal and territorial waters; yet they have an obligation to grant the right of innocent 
passage, if this does not impede the state’s security.92 However, it is important to note 
that the freedoms of the high seas are not absolute. They must be exercised consistently 
                                               
88  This is consistent with the position adopted in Article 4(4) of the Djibouti Code of 
Conduct 
89  Id. Art. 56, UNCLOS.  
90  Id. Art 58(2), UNCLOS. 
91  Id. Article89 :  
Invalidity of claims of sovereignty over the high seas 
No State may validly purport to subject any part of the high seas to its sovereignty. 
92  Brown, J. (2015). Pirates and Privateers: Managing The Ocean’s Private Security 




with International Law, and regarding the interest of other States as they endeavor to 
exercise their freedom of the high seas. This suggests in certain situations the exercise 
of the authorized researchers’ freedom of navigation could be balanced against the gen-
eral right of others to exercise their right of freedom.93  
Yet if political ends are pursued by an organization, it is difficult to see what in-
terest the flag-state could have that would legitimize any action that might constitute a 
necessary restriction on the freedom to move about the high seas. The definition of pi-
racy requires an act of violence, detention or depredation, which would take any such 
[pirate] ship outside the realm of exercising the freedom of navigation.94 
 This is because the high seas are reserved for peaceful purposes, and precludes 
any effort to restrict any interest of the flag-state to only unobstructed peaceful naviga-
                                               
93  Id. Article90 
Right of navigation: 
Every State, whether coastal or land-locked, has the right to sail ships flying its flag on 
the high seas. 
94  Id. Article87 
Freedom of the high seas: 
1. The high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked. Freedom of the 
high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by this Convention and by other 
rules of International Law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and land-locked 
States: 
(a) freedom of navigation; 
(b) freedom of over flight; 
(c) freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, subject to Part VI; 
(d) freedom to construct artificial islands and other installations permitted un-
der International Law, subject to Part VI; 
(e) freedom of fishing, subject to the conditions laid down in section 2; 
(f) freedom of scientific research, subject to Parts VI and XIII. 
2. These freedoms shall be exercised by all States with due regard for the interests of 
other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas, and also with due regard 
for the rights under this Convention with respect to activities in the Area. 
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tion of its subjects. A similar rationale could be applied to any suggestion that such po-
litical parties are upholding the common interest of States in marine environmental pro-
tection.95 
 The extent of powers granted to suppress piracy, means a warship or military 
aircraft, or other ship or aircraft, clearly marked and identifiable as being on govern-
ment service and authorized to that effect (Article 107, UNCLOS)96 on the high seas 
has the power: 
to visit any vessel that it has a reasonable ground for suspecting of 
being engaged in piracy and, if suspicions are not resolved by an in-
spection of its papers, proceed to search it (Article 110, UN-
CLOS);97 and  to seize any pirate vessel and arrest any suspected pi-
rates (Article 105, UNCLOS); subject to a duty to compensate a 
vessel for any loss or injury suffered as a consequence of inspection 
or arrest where suspicions of piracy prove unfounded and the vessel 
“has not committed any act justifying them” (Articles 106 and 
110(3), UNCLOS).98 
 
                                               
95  Id. Article88 : 
Reservation of the high seas for peaceful purposes 
The high seas shall be reserved for peaceful purposes. 
96  IMO, LEG 98/8/3, Piracy: elements of national legislation pursuant to the United Na-
tions Conventions on the Law of the Sea, 1982, 18 February 2014. 
97  See LOSC, article 106, article 110, para. 2 & 3. 
98  Article106 : 
Liability for seizure without adequate grounds 
Where the seizure of a ship or aircraft on suspicion of piracy has been effected without 
adequate grounds, the State making the seizure shall be liable to the State the nationali-




Piracy includes “any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship with 
knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship” (Article 101(b), UNCLOS). A pirate ship is 
one “intended by the persons in dominant control to be used” in a pirate attack or which 
has been used in such an attack and is still under the same control (Article 103, UN-
CLOS).99 Therefore, a warship has a clear right of visit and inspection where it suspects 
a vessel is under the control of persons intending to use it for a future pirate attack.100 
Indeed, a warship may arrest persons on the basis that those persons “intended” a future 
pirate attack.  By definition, the powers of visit, seizure and arrest are granted on the 
high seas (or in the exclusive economic zone of a State as discussed above) and do not 
extend to pursuing pirates into foreign territorial waters without the coastal State’s con-
sent.101 
4)	Jurisdiction	over	acts	of	Piracy	under	the	Division for Ocean Affairs regu-
lations and Law of the Sea	
 
The Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, as the secretariat of UNCLOS, 
is mandated to provide information and advice on the uniform and consistent applica-
tion of the provisions of UNCLOS,102 including those relevant to the repression of pira-
cy. It also has a mandate to provide information, in the annual reports of the Secretary-
                                               
99   See LOSC, article 103. 
100  This results from applying the definition in Article 103 to the powers granted in Article 
105 and 110, UNCLOS. 
101  While there has been some scholarly support for such a right, it has not found ac-
ceptance in State practice: Lucchini and Voelckel, Droit de la mer, Tome 2, vol. 2, 165; 
O’Connell, International Law of the Sea, vol. 2, 978. UNSCRs 1816 (operative paragraph 7), 
1846 (operative paragraph 10) and 1851 (operative paragraph 6) obviously provide a mecha-
nism for ‘co-operating States’ to enter the territorial waters and land territory, based both on the 
consent and the authority of Chapter VII. 
102  Security Council speaks out against piracy, armed robbery off the coast. (2015, 2 
June).  UN News Centre. www.un.org. 
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General on oceans and the law of the sea, on relevant developments in oceans and the 
law of the sea to the General Assembly, as well as to the Meeting of States Parties to 
UNCLOS.103  
 Monitoring, containing, or more hopefully discouraging, Piracy requires a uni-
versal approach. As pirates make no discrimination among vessels subject to attack, it 
is problem that should concern all nations. Since the times of Grotius104 and others, pi-
rates have been considered "hostis humanis generis."105  The best basis on which to ad-
dress problems of a universal nature is through cooperation, or the Universality Princi-
ple. Piracy has, as already stated above, been a problem throughout the ages, and with 
the expansion of shipping routes, it has eventually become a problem affecting all na-
tions. By the sixteenth century, the concept of piracy and exclusive jurisdictions were 
already developed, yet by no means did this legislative clarity indicate that the piracy 
problem had suffered a lasting demise. 106  
 Because of the nature of piracy, any state may seize a pirate ship or aircraft on 
the high sea (terra nullius). The persons on board the vessel may be arrested, and the 
property seized. The courts of the state that has executed the seizure has jurisdiction to 
impose trial and penalties against the alleged pirates, and that state may further decide 
                                               
103  United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on modalities for the establishment of 
specialized anti-piracy courts, United Nations Security Council S/2014/360, 15 June 2014, 
paragarah 63.  
104  Id. 
105  The preambles to UNSCR 1848 and 1851 (2008) reaffirm ‘that International Law, as 
reflected in [UNCLOS], sets out the legal framework applicable to combating piracy and armed 
robbery at sea, as well as other ocean activities’; see also operative paragraph 3, UNSCR 1838 
(2008). 
106  United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on modalities for the establishment of 




what action to take regarding the ship or aircraft and property, subject of course, to the 
rights of third parties such as insurance companies that have acted in good faith.107 
 Since pirates were a threat to the global order (particularly global sea trade), and 
committing particularly heinous acts, and since their acts were committed in a place 
beyond the territorial jurisdiction or sovereignty of any state (different reasons have 
been adduced at different times), they were subject to the jurisdiction of any state that 
happened to identify them, engage with, and capture them. Thus, a pirate could be 
prosecuted in every state’s courts.108 
5)	Exercising	Jurisdiction	over	Pirates	
UNCLOS Article 105 refers only to the power of a seizing state to try a seized pirate. 
However, as a matter of customary International Law, every state has jurisdiction to 
prosecute a pirate subsequently present within their territory irrespective of any connec-
tion between pirates, their victims or the vessel attacked and the prosecuting state (uni-
versal jurisdiction).109 
 In addition to the existence of universal jurisdiction at public International Law, 
States may also have jurisdiction over suspected pirates on other bases as a matter of 
national law. Following ordinary principles of criminal jurisdiction, the State of the 
                                               
107  Chalk, P., Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSCs) and Counter-Piracy, Paper 
presented at the second United Arab Emirates Counter Piracy Conference, Dubai, June 2014, at 
p.2. 
108  Roger, L. P. , Mauritius officially on board to prosecute as other options dwindle, 
Communis Hostis. 
109  Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2013 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium), 
Judgment, ICJ. Reports 2013, p.3, President Guillaume (Separate Opinion), para. 5 and Judges 
Higgins,Kooijmans and Buergenthal (Joint Separate Opinion), para. 61; Ian Brownlie, Princi-
ples of Public International Law, 7th ed (Oxford University Press, 2014), 229; Bingham, ‘Har-




suspected pirate’s nationality, the state of nationality of the suspected pirate’s victim 
and the flag state of any involved vessels may all also have valid claims of jurisdiction 
over a suspected pirate. An act of piracy, like any number of other offenses, may pro-
vide many States with equally valid claims to exercise jurisdiction over an offense.110 
Any state may seize a pirate ship or aircraft or a ship or aircraft taken by pirates 
and arrest the persons and seize the property on board.111 In turn, the courts of the state 
which carried out the seizure may subsequently decide upon the penalties to be im-
posed, and may determine the action to be taken with regard to the ships, aircraft or 
property, subject to the rights of third parties (Article 105,UNCLOS).112 Any warship 
or military aircraft, or other clearly marked government vessel may seize pirates (Arti-
cle107).113 
 Customary International Law provides basic principles governing the appropri-
ate amount of force to be used whenever it is lawful to stop and arrest a ship at sea.114 
Piracy is an ordinary crime and navies are undertaking law enforcement duties, not en-
                                               
110  A pirate vessel does not necessarily lose its nationality (Article 104, UNCLOS), and 
may still be subject to its flag State’s jurisdiction in addition to the jurisdiction of the State of 
the seizing warship. 
111  Brown, J., Pirates and Privateers: Managing The Indian Ocean’s Private Security 
Boom, Lowy Institute For International Policy Analysis, 12 September 2014, at p.3. 
112  Id. Art.105. 
113  Article10.7 : 
Ships and aircraft which are entitled to seize on account of piracy A seizure on account 
of piracy may be carried out only by warships or military aircraft, or other ships or air-
craft clearly marked and identifiable as being on government service and authorized to 
that effect.  
114  The principles were considered in another context by the International Tribunal for the 
Law of the Sea in the case of Saiga 2 (http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html). See also the case of 
S.S. ‘I’m alone’ (Canada/United States, 1935), U.N.R.I.A.A., Vol. III, p. 1609 and The Red 




gaging in conflict. Navies have the right to use reasonable force in pursuit of their law-
enforcement mission. The amount of force use must not exceed what is reasonably re-
quired in the circumstance.  
 In the event of death or serious injury, human rights and the requirement of hu-
mane treatment necessitate the holding of an enquiry.115  As described in the previous 
section, apart from these international regulations, customary International Law author-
izes any state to prosecute piracy activities occurring within its territory based on its 
national criminal code. Due to the location of the piracy crime itself, and the fact that 
most States do not have the resources, or are unwilling to respond effectively to a pirate 
attack, it is the coastal state that is the most appropriate entity to combat piracy.116 
 In the territorial sea, States other than the coastal state do not have any jurisdic-
tion for enforcement measures against piracy. For centuries, as noted several times al-
ready, nations have deemed pirates to be “hostis generis” (enemies of all mankind), so 
that a state may use its own domestic laws to punish piracy, regardless of the pirates’ 
nationality or where the piratical acts took place.117  
As an enemy of mankind, it is recognized in customary International Law, that 
States could exercise universal jurisdiction because the pirate commits hostilities upon 
                                               
115  The principles were considered in another context by the International Tribunal for the 
Law of the Sea in the case of Saiga 2 (http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html). See also the case of 
S.S. ‘I’m Alone’ (Canada/United States, 1935), U.N.R.I.A.A., Vol. III, p. 1609 and The Red 
Crusader case (Commission of Enquiry, Denmark–United Kingdom, 1962), I.L.R., Vol. 35, p. 
485. 
116  Report of the UN Secretary-General pursuant to UNSCR 1846(2014), 13 November, 
2015/590. 
117  Joint Communiqué from the Eastern and Southern Africa – Indian Ocean Ministers and 
European Union High Representative, at the 2nd Ministerial Meeting on Piracy and Maritime 
Security in the Eastern and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean Region, 7th October 2014, Pre-
amble, paragraph 7. 
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the subjects and property of any and all nations, regardless to right or duty, or any pre-
tense of public authority.118 The following chapter examines whether national regula-
tions are comprehensive enough and whether States use their own existing internal ju-
risdiction and criminal law codes to combat against modern-day piracy and maritime 
terrorism within their own maritime zone. 
 
6)	Justification	for	the	Universal	Jurisdiction	of	International	Law 
The piracy provisions are part of the high seas regime and should not be applied in iso-
lation.119 The legal regime of piracy should be considered in the context of the general 
principles of International Law governing jurisdiction. The high seas regime is founded 
on the freedom of the high seas, as evidenced by its prominence in Article 87 of UN-
CLOS.120  
                                               
118  Hirsi, A. (2013). Somali Sea-Piracy: Business model or resource conflict? Wardheer 
News. Retrieved July 26, 2013 from 
http://www.wardheernews.com/Articles_2013/Sept/15_Ahmed_Hirsi_Somali_Piracy.pdf.  
119   Satay, N., Nadan, C.B.E & Rosenne, S. (Eds.), United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea 1982: A commentary, Volume III, Articles 86 to 132 and documentary Annexes, 
1995, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, p. 201. 
120  Id. Article87: 
Freedom of the high seas: 
1. The high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked. Freedom of the 
high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by this Convention and by other 
rules of International Law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and land-locked 
States: 
(a) freedom of navigation; 
(b) freedom of overflight; 
(c) freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, subject to Part VI; 
(d) freedom to construct artificial islands and other installations permitted un-
der International Law, subject to Part VI; 
(e) freedom of fishing, subject to the conditions laid down in section 2; 
(f) freedom of scientific research, subject to Parts VI and XIII. 
2. These freedoms shall be exercised by all States with due regard for the interests of 
other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas, and also with due regard 
for the rights under this Convention with respect to activities in the Area. 
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This freedom, coupled with the denial of any sovereign claims, means the gen-
eral principle of jurisdiction on the high seas is that of flag state exclusivity. Any claim 
to jurisdiction over other vessels, unless provided for under International Law, would 
be tantamount to a claim of a sovereign right within the high seas to the detriment of 
the other state involved. The exclusive flag state jurisdiction provision is found in Arti-
cle 92 of UNCLOS, which restates the international Customary Law.121 
The universal jurisdiction over pirates is one such exception to the general prin-
ciple of flag state exclusivity, and is repeated in Article 105 of UNCLOS.122 As an ex-
ception should be interpreted restrictively, we should be cautious to extend the reach of 
such a principle. A restrictive approach can be seen in the subsequent acts of States, 
which have not followed the age-old crime of piracy and granted universal jurisdiction 
over other threats to their interests in the high seas, such as illegal fishing or passenger 
                                               
121  Id. Article92 : 
Status of ships: 
Ships shall sail under the flag of one State only and, save in exceptional cases express-
ly provided for in international treaties or in this Convention, shall be subject to its ex-
clusive jurisdiction on the high seas. A ship may not change its flag during a voyage or 
while in a port of call, save in the case of a real transfer of ownership or change of reg-
istry. A ship which sails under the flags of two or more States, using them according to 
convenience, may not claim any of the nationalities in question with respect to any 
other State, and may be assimilated to a ship without nationality. 
122  Article105 : 
Seizure of a pirate ship or aircraft 
On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State, every State 
may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship or aircraft taken by piracy and under the 
control of pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the property on board. The courts of 
the State which carried out the seizure may decide upon the penalties to be imposed, 
and may also determine the action to be taken with regard to the ships, aircraft or prop-
erty, subject to the rights of third parties acting in good faith. 
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hijacking.123 Indeed encroachments onto flag state exclusivity are permitted to the min-
imum extent possible. Thus, we must question whether the justifications for providing 
universal jurisdiction under the International Law of piracy extend to politically moti-




Many different theories have been advanced to explain why piracy is a crime subject to 
universal jurisdiction. The very first and most popular theories argued that once one 
becomes involved in piracy, that one becomes denationalized and opens oneself to the 
jurisdiction of all States.124 This is, of course, based on the ancient presumption that 
pirates are enemies of all mankind. By such actions, the pirates have rejected the au-
thority of that to which they are properly subjected. Therefore, no state should be held 
accountable for those actions. If the flag state cannot be held to account, but such action 
threatens the interest of all States, then the right should be granted to all States to exer-
cise jurisdiction.125  
Their self-imposed denationalization would, as quoted by the HSCers,126 take 
them out of the protection of all laws and privileges. Without the nationality and flag 
state protection of their registry, pirates can be subjected to the ancient and well-
                                               
123  This should not be taken as meaning a flag vessel is territory; a flag vessel is, however, 
subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of its flag State on the high seas: Article 92(1), UNCLOS.  
124  Walker, P., Mystery of the Sea: Ship Feared Seized by Pirates in European Waters: The 
Guardian, August 11, 2014, at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2014/aug/11/arctic-sea-
missing-ship-pirates. 
125  ICC-International Maritime Bureau Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, Report 
for the period 1 January – 31 December 2015. London: ICC International Maritime Bureau. 
126  Id.  
 
74 
established universal jurisdiction that has been extant since the 17th century.127 How-
ever, this theory has been broadly rejected. UNCLOS’ position is that denationalization 
is not an automatic or necessary step, but is left to the national law of the flag state un-
der Article 104.128 International Law is indifferent to the nationality of the ship under 
the piracy provisions and whether nationality is kept or lost.  Such rationale, as indicat-
ed by the academic scholar,129 can also be found and confirmed in States’ attempts to 
construct an effective international regime in response to the variety of situations and 
the difficulties of enforcing International Law that are presented by the coastal state, 
which lacks capacity in maritime law enforcement.  
Both elements of the ‘common interest’ rationality are found in the Security 
Council resolutions constituting this unique regime. Resolutions adopted by Security 
Council 1846 provide temporary authorization to ‘cooperating’ States to use all neces-
sary means within their territorial waters to repress piracy. Such authorization was 
based on the first element of the ‘common interest’ rationality, the threat posed to the 
common interest in international navigation and commerce.130  
                                               
127  RAPIDBI. (2015). SWOT analysis (TOWS matrix) Made Simple. Retrieved Novem-
ber 15, 2016from http://rapidbi.com/swotanalysis/#Background.  
128  Article104 : 
Retention or loss of the nationality of a pirate ship or aircraft: 
A ship or aircraft may retain its nationality although it has become a pirate ship or air-
craft. The retention or loss of nationality is determined by the law of the State from 
which such nationality was derived. 
129  Zibell, R., McCarthy, D. & Barnwell, J.R. et all. (2012). Piracy: An ancient risk with 
modern faces, an insurer’s perspective from Allianz Global Corporate & Specialty. Retrieved 
October 15, 2014. 
130  Participants intend to fully co-operate in the arrest, investigation and prosecution of 




  "The Locus Delicti"131 is a different circumstance in that it concerns the loca-
tion of the crime; i.e., in territorial waters, yet the same issue lacks effective state juris-
diction, and the threat of serious crimes going unpunished prevails. Modern efforts are 
guided by the rationality of ‘common interest’ as much as was the original justification 
for universal jurisdiction.132 Piracy does not affect exclusive flag state jurisdiction over 
navigation rules, safety regulations, or rules of nationality. In addition, piracy does not 
affect the exclusive flag-state prescriptive, executive, or judicial jurisdiction in relation 
to any other issue; it only represents a limited waiver in relation to piracy law enforce-
ment.133 
We conclude that the universal jurisdiction over piracy results from balancing 
competing navigational interests. In upholding the freedom of the high seas, the princi-
pal starting point is exclusive flag-state jurisdiction. However, once an activity presents 
a threat to the common interest of States in the freedom of the seas, the rationality 
points to an exception to exclusive flag-state jurisdiction to ensure the activity being 
punished and the freedom is restored for all other users of the high seas.  
                                                                                                                                        
seize suspect ships and the property on board such ships; and rescue ships, persons, and proper-
ty subject to acts of piracy. These acts would be consistent with International Law. 
131  Locus delicti is a Latin term which means the ‘scene of the crime.’ It is the place where 
tort, offence, or injury was committed or the place where the last event necessary to make the 
actor liable occurred. Locus delicti gives the court exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute or 
crime. Under common law, crimes are local and it is recognizable and punishable exclusively in 
the country where it is committed. 
132  On the use of ship-riders see: Kathy-Ann Brown, The Shiprider Model, Contemporary 
Caribbean Legal Issues No. 1 (Faculty of Law, University of the West Indies, 1997); Guilfoyle, 
Shipping Interdiction, 89–94, 119–20, 145-146, 196–7, 209–11; Bill Gilmore, “Counter-Drug 
Operations at Sea: Developments and Prospects” (1999) 25 Commonwealth Law Bulletin 609, 
612-613. 
133  Participants intend to fully co-operate in the arrest, investigation and prosecution of 
persons who have committed piracy or are reasonably suspected of having committed piracy; 
seize suspect ships and the property on board such ships; and rescue ships, persons, and proper-






The international community retains its rights of regulation and enforcement of ‘tradi-
tional’ acts of piracy on the high seas, as may be given the developments in the law of 
the sea and maritime crimes.134 Most global pirate attacks have taken place within en-
closed waters within the territorial sea of coastal States, and therefore, within the re-
sponsibility of the coastal State in whose vicinity the crime took place. However, not 
all States have an equal capacity to ensure maritime security within their waters and 
this is emphasized by current events involving piracy.135 
UNCLOS provides that all States are obligated to cooperate to the fullest possi-
ble extent in the repression of piracy (art. 100) and that all States have universal juris-
diction on the high seas that authorize them to seize pirate ships and aircraft, or a ship 
or aircraft taken by piracy and under the control of pirates. Moreover, a State may ar-
rest the persons and seize the property on board (art. 105).136  
Article 110,137 inter alia, also allows States to exercise a right of visit vis-à-vis 
suspected ships which appear to have been engaging in piracy.138 These provisions 
                                               
134  For example, paragraph 14 of 1846(2008) calls upon States to co-operate in investigat-
ing and prosecuting persons suspected of piracy and armed robbery consistent with International 
Law.  
135  However, the obligation in UNCLOS to cooperate in the repression of piracy can be 
interpreted as meaning that any state having an opportunity of taking measures against piracy 
and failing to do so is in breach of its duty under International Law.  
136  United Nations, Oceans and Law of the Sea, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/index.htm , 
(09-20-2014). 
137 Article110 : 
Right of visit: 
1. Except where acts of interference derive from powers conferred by treaty, a warship 




should be considered together with article 58(2) of UNCLOS, which makes it clear that 
the above-mentioned articles and other pertinent rules of International Law applied to 
the exclusive economic zone in so far as they are not incompatible with the provision 
of UNCLOS relating to the exclusive economic zone.139 Thus, UNCLOS makes it clear 
that high seas piracy is illegal and that all States have a right to seize and prosecute 
those responsible for piracy on the high seas.140 The sudden influx of piracy cases dur-
ing the last couple of years has sparked public interest. The Maritime Safety Committee 
                                                                                                                                        
immunity in accordance with articles 95 and 96, is not justified in boarding it unless 
there is reasonable ground for suspecting that: 
(a) the ship is engaged in piracy; 
(b) the ship is engaged in the slave trade; 
(c) the ship is engaged in unauthorized broadcasting and the flag State of the 
warship has jurisdiction under article 109; 
(d) the ship is without nationality; or 
(e) though flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag, the ship is, in real-
ity, of the same nationality as the warship. 
2. In the cases provided for in paragraph 1, the warship may proceed to verify the 
ship's right to fly its flag. To this end, it may send a boat under the command of an of-
ficer to the suspected ship. If suspicion remains after the documents have been 
checked, it may proceed to a further examination on board the ship, which must be car-
ried out with all possible consideration. 
3. If the suspicions prove to be unfounded, and provided that the ship boarded has not 
committed any act justifying them, it shall be compensated for any loss or damage that 
may have been sustained. 
4. These provisions apply mutatis mutandis to military aircraft.  
5. These provisions also apply to any other duly authorized ships or aircraft clearly 
marked and identifiable as being on government service. 
138  United Nations Security Council, Security Council authorizes States to use land-based 
operations, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sc9541.doc.htm , (Last visited, 09-20-
2014). 
139  Burnett, J. S. (2014). Dangerous Waters: Piracy and Terror on the High Seas. New 
York: Dutton. 
140  This interpretation is supported by the Commentary of the International Law Commis-




has given recommendations and the International Chamber of Commerce has even 
started a live piracy reporting service that lists ships that have been victims of piracy, 
and it also indicates where the event occurred.141 
 The international community has reacted swiftly to the piracy problem by creat-
ing an unprecedented international naval cooperation. In this initiative, the navies of the 
United States, Great Britain, France and India have played significant roles. This coali-
tion, for the first time in history, includes the first ever European Union naval force and 
represents the first time that China has deployed its naval force outside of the South 
Chinese Sea region.142 Through this effort, the coalition managed to fence off pirate 
attacks. They did not, however, pursue and apprehend them. In addition, the costs of 
this operation made it an expensive undertaking. The international community has real-
ized that a proper approach involves not only defending vessels, but also apprehending 
the criminals.143 
 The United Nations Security Council has passed five resolutions in 2008 that 
deal with piracy. These were passed pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, allow-
ing the use of military force against threats to international security.144 On the 16th of 
                                               
141  The principles were considered in another context by the International Tribunal for the 
Law of the Sea in the case of Saiga 2 (http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html). See also the case of 
S.S. ‘I’m Alone’ (Canada/United States, 1935), U.N.R.I.A.A., Vol. III, p. 1609 and The Red 
Crusader case (Commission of Enquiry, Denmark–United Kingdom, 1962), I.L.R., Vol. 35, p. 
485. 
142  See: Article 6(2), European Convention on Extradition 1957; Article 16(10), United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 2000. 
143  Ship-riders need not be law-enforcement personnel. The present author understands 
that EUNAVFOR has used ship-riding translators, for example. 
144 U.S. persons for example need to meet the requirements outlined under Title 18 of the US 
Code Article.  
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December 2008, the United Nations Security Council passed a broader resolution, ex-
tending the authorization of military force to land-based operations.145 
 Seeing that piracy has been regarded as an offense against the law of nations, 
the public vessels of any state have been permitted to seize a pirate ship, to bring it into 
port, to try the crew (regardless of their nationality or domicile), and, if they are found 
guilty, to punish them as well as to confiscate the ship.146 
 
2.3 Principles from Related International Conventions Dealing with Piracy 
 
(a) International Maritime Organization Regulations: IMO 
 
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the International Maritime Bureau 
(IMB) constitute two institutional bodies involved in the governance of maritime pira-
cy. Established in 1959, the IMO is a specialized agency of the UN and its purpose is to 
set global standards for the safety, security, and environmental performance of interna-
tional shipping.147  
 The IMO currently has 171 member States. The organization facilitates discus-
sions between industry, member States, security forces, and UN agencies that are con-
cerned with piracy. Since 1998, the organization has been working on an anti-piracy 
program, which aims at fostering the development of regional agreements that imple-
                                               
145  Security Council 6046th Meeting (PM), 2014, [1956] II YbILC, 282. 
146  Report of the Monitoring Group pursuant to Security Council resolution 1811 (2008), 
United Nations, 10 December 2015, available at: 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/604/73/PDF/N0860473.pdf? OpenElement. 
147  International Maritime Organization, MSC.4/Circ.180, Reports on acts of piracy and 
armed robbery against ships, annual report-2013, March 1, 2014, at annex 4. 
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ment counter piracy measures.148 Its activities were essential in developing the 2009 
Djibouti Code of Conduct, in which the Arabian Peninsula and East African littoral 
States agreed to cooperate in the repression of piracy and armed robbery against ships 
in the West Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden.149  
 The IMB, which is a division of the International Chamber of Commerce, has 
become an increasingly important part of the antipiracy regime. It suggested a defini-
tion of piracy as “an act of boarding any vessel with the intent to commit theft or any 
other crime and with the intent or capability to use force in the furtherance of that 
act.150  While this definition seems to be accepted by the shipping industry, it has not 
been recognized in international or domestic law. In 1992, the IMB established the Pi-
racy Reporting Centre (PRC) in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The PRC functions as the 
single point of contact for ship masters anywhere in the world who are under piratical 
or armed robbery attack.151 If an attacked vessel contacts the PRC, the information is 
immediately passed on to local law enforcement agencies and shared with all ships in 
the region.  
(b) IMO Support for New Piracy Framework 
  
At a ministerial meeting in Cotonou, Benin, the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO) pledged to support the implementation of a new code of conduct on piracy and 
                                               
148  International Maritime Organization, MSC.4/Circ.180, Reports on acts of piracy and 
armed robbery against ships, annual report-2013, March 1, 2014, at p.3.   
149  Principally, resolutions 1816(2008), 1838(2008), 1846(2008), and 1851(2008). 
150   For instance, Recommendations To Governments For Preventing And Suppressing 
Piracy And Armed Robbery Against Ships MSC/Circ.622/Rev.2. 
151  The International Maritime Bureau definition is wider: ‘The act of boarding any vessel 
with intent to commit theft or any other crime... and with the intent or capacity to use force in 
furtherance of that act.’ 
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other illicit maritime activities.152 The Gulf of Guinea Code of Conduct, drafted by the 
Economic Community of Central African States and the Economic Community of 
West African States, in partnership with the IMO, contains provisions for interdicting 
sea-and land-based vehicles engaged in illegal activities at sea, prosecuting suspected 
criminals, and sharing information among state parties. The code builds on several ex-
isting frameworks to create a sub-regional coast guard.153 
Furthermore, the IMO is reacting to the piracy threat, but the results should be 
critically observed. The IMO’s initiatives have resulted in the establishment of several 
regional and sub-regional arrangements aimed at preventing, deterring, and repressing 
piracy and armed robbery against ships.154In January 2009, the IMO held a meeting to 
draft four resolutions: The most critical of which is the Djibouti Code of Conduct (also, 
“Code of Conduct”) which requires cooperation in a manner consistent with Interna-
tional Law in the investigation, arrest, and prosecution of those reasonably suspected of 
having committed piracy, the interdiction and seizure of suspect ships, the rescue and 
care of ships, persons, and property subject to piracy, and a shared patrol.155 
In addition, in 2009 the IMO implemented two important sets of guidelines for 
a more effective suppression against piracy. One was an update of the IMO’s guidance 
                                               
152  Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 
1811 (2008), United Nations, 10 December 2008, available at: 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/604/73/PDF/N0860473.pdf?OpenElement. 
153  Principally, resolutions 1816(2008), 1838(2008), 1846(2008), and 1851(2008). 
154  Participants intend to fully co-operate in the arrest, investigation and prosecution of 
persons who have committed piracy or are reasonably suspected of having committed piracy; 
seize suspect ships and the property on board such ships; and rescue ships, persons, and proper-
ty subject to acts of piracy. These acts would be consistent with International Law. 
155  The Code of Conduct also covers the possibilities of shared operations, such as nomi-




on combating piracy and armed robbery against ships, and it adopted a set of best man-
agement practices to deter such attacks. These guidelines include several recommenda-
tions related to certain shipping routes, and more technical advice regarding preferred 
modes of communication and reporting, evasive maneuvering tactics, and other defen-
sive measures.156 The second set of guidelines was a guidance document in the form of 
a Code of Practice for the Investigation of Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery 
against Ships. The Code of Practice aimed to foster international cooperation and to 
coordinate governments’ actions.157  
1) International Cooperation 
That much-quoted provision, Article 100 of UNCLOS, requires States to cooperate ful-
ly in the repression of piracy.158  
   
2) Regional Cooperation  
UN Security Council resolutions have been adopted to facilitate international coopera-
tion in deterring and dealing with piracy. The original impetus was the need to prevent 
attacks on ships carrying World Food Program aid. The resolutions give cooperating 
                                               
156  The Code of Conduct further calls for the setting up of national focal points for piracy 
and armed robbery against ships and the sharing of information relating to incidents reported. 
The signatories intend to use piracy information exchange center in Kenya, United Republic of 
Tanzania and Yemen, to be located, respectively, in the regional Maritime Rescue Coordination 
Centre in Mombasa, the Sub-Regional Coordination Centre in Dar es Salaam, and a regional 
maritime information center, which is being established in Sana'a.” 
http://www.imo.org/about/mainframe.asp?topic_id=1773&doc_id=10933 
157  See, for example, Lucchini and Voelckel, Droit de la mer, Tome 2, vol. 2, 165. 
158  Articles 14 to 23 of the CHS which are reproduced almost verbatim in the articles 100 
to 107, 110 and 111 of the LOSC contain the provisions on maritime piracy. 
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States the right to pursue and capture pirates in territorial waters and, in the case of res-
olution 1851, on land. 159 
 Many UN bodies dealing with piracy have promoted international cooperation. 
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) primarily deals with the prevention of 
piracy, and works closely with UNODC (United Nations Organization on Drugs and 
Crime), which has primacy on transnational organized crime and legislative approach-
es, as well as procedures to assist naval vessels in investigations.160 
Regional cooperation among States has an important role in solving the prob-
lem of piracy and armed robbery against ships, as evidenced by the success of the re-
gional anti-piracy and armed robbery agreement and related operations in the Straits of 
Malacca and Singapore, to which IMO assists throughout the development and imple-
mentation processes.161  
 The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Rob-
bery against ships in Asia (RECAAP), concluded in November 2004 by sixteen coun-
tries in Asia, entered into force in September 2006 and encompasses the RECAAP In-
formation Sharing Centre (ISC) for facilitating the sharing of piracy and armed robbery 
related information, is a good model of a cohesive and successful regional cooperation 
structure, which IMO seeks to replicate elsewhere around the World.162 
                                               
159   Lucchini and Voelckel, Droit de la mer, Tome 2, vol. 2, 176. 
160  IMO Doc. PCUA 1/3 (3 February 1987), Annexe, paragraph 2. 
161  International Maritime Organization, MSC.4/Circ.180, Reports on acts of piracy and 
armed robbery against ships, annual report-2014, March 1, 2015, at annex 4. 
162  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Principles and framework for an interna-
tional classification of crimes for statistical purposes, Report of the UNODC/UNECE task force 
on crime classification to the conference of European statisticians, June 2015, p.7  
 
84 
 In recent years, particular focus has been placed on piracy and armed robbery at 
sea in the Gulf of Aden and the wider Western Indian Ocean, as well as on the Gulf of 
Guinea in West Africa. While progress has been made recently in those regions to erad-
icate piracy, armed robbery and other illicit maritime activities, ships are urged to re-
main vigilant when navigating through those regions, since the threat of piracy is not 
eliminated, noting the increasingly fragile situation ashore in Somalia.163 
 On the 16th of January 2009, the United States and Kenya signed a Memoran-
dum of Understanding (MOU). Kenya signed a similar memorandum with the Europe-
an Union. The U.S. and E.U. had provided Kenya with the necessary assistance.164 In 
this memorandum Kenya agreed to try suspected pirates captured by the U.S. One of 
the reasons for this is that other countries are reluctant to put pirates on trial because 
they are usually foreign nationals with no mailing addresses. Another reason is that it 
may be difficult finding a translator.165 
 Subsequently, the international community is stepping up its efforts in combat-
ing piracy by assisting through donations that will help to improve the security on its 
coastal lines and seas.166 As soon as there is another motive, e.g., a political one, then it 
                                               
163  Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 
1811 (2008), United Nations, 10 December 2008, available at:  
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/604/73/PDF/N0860473.pdf?OpenElement.  
164  For instance, Recommendations to Governments for Preventing and Suppressing Pira-
cy and Armed Robbery against Ships MSC/Circ.622/Rev.2. 
165  IMO Doc. PCUA 1/3 (3 February 1987), Annexe, paragraph 2. 
166  See, e.g.; Lucchini and Voelckel, Droit de la Mer, Tome 2, vol. 2, 165. 
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no longer constitutes “piracy jure gentium.”167 This, by itself does not automatically 
mean that the existence of a political motive justifies any acts of insurgency. 
  
(c) Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation 1988 
 
Rather than attempting to forge a rigid distinction between acts of terrorism and piracy, 
the ‘four circles’ model may be useful, which views terrorism, piracy, insurgency and 
organized crime as sometimes overlapping activities.168 The Convention for the Sup-
pression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Conven-
tion) was inspired by the Achille Lauro incident in which a vessel was internally hi-
jacked and hostages aboard were killed.169 The sponsoring governments that first intro-
duced a draft text for the Convention (Austria, Egypt and Italy), cited as part of their 
reason for doing so were the restrictions inherent within the definition of piracy. It is 
necessary to include an act for private end and in requiring that one vessel attack anoth-
er. This could not cover the internal seizure of a vessel.170 
The principal reasons that the SUA Convention was necessary were first, as 
noted above, the law of piracy did not cover internal hijacking of vessels and second, 
while there existed treaties concerning the hijacking and sabotage of airplanes no simi-
                                               
167  Privy Council, In re piracy jure genti-
um, http://www.uniset.ca/other/cs5/1934AC586.html , (09-20-2015). 
168  A small boat used by Somali pirates in attacks off the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of 
Aden. 
169  See SUA Convention, article 1. 
170  IMO Doc. PCUA 1/3 (3 February 1987), Annexe, paragraph 2. 
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lar conventions yet existed for the shipping industry.171 It is unsurprising, then, that the 
SUA Convention is closely modelled on the conventions concerning offenses aboard or 
against aircraft. The sponsors’ explicit aim was to devise a comprehensive convention 




The 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Mari-
time Navigation (SUA Convention) was developed as a reaction to the hijacking of the 
Achille Lauro by politically motivated militants. In 1985, the Palestine Liberation Or-
ganization (PLO) hijacked the Italian cruise liner, held its passengers hostage, and 
killed a Jewish-American passenger.173  
 This incident brought the relationship between piracy and maritime terrorism to 
light.174 Under UNCLOS, the hijacking of the Achille Lauro does not qualify as piracy, 
since the attack was not committed for private gain. The SUA Convention was devel-
oped to ensure that politically motivated attacks against ships could also be prosecuted, 
and is, thus, widely considered an anti-terrorism convention.175 
                                               
171  Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft 1970, 860 UNTS 105; 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation 1971, 974 
UNTS 177. 
172  Mejia, M., Maritime Gerrymandering: Dilemmas in Defining Piracy, Terrorism and 
other Acts of Maritime Violence, Journal of International Commercial Law 2(2), 153-175, 
2014, p.161. 
173  See SUA Convention, article 2, para (1) 
174  Supra note 33, article 39 commentary, para 1(i), p. 282. 
175  Id., para 1(vi) p.282. 
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The SUA Convention was adopted on the 10th March 1988 and entered en-
forcement on the 1st March 1992. There are 156 Contracting Parties representing 
94.62% of the world’s tonnage.176  Various protocols have been adopted, with those of 
2005 entering into force in 2010. The significant state adoption, particularly by those 
‘whose interests are specifically affected’ suggests a convention to prevent, punish and 
prosecute all forms of violence against shipping was needed.177Although the crimes 
under SUA Convention 1988 and piracy are not exclusive crimes, some authors have 
taken the adoption of the SUA Convention as evidence for the rules on piracy which 
did not cover terrorist’s acts and other politically motivated actors. This is supported by 
the fact that the convention was adopted in direct response to the “Achille Lauro inci-
dent.”178  
The sponsoring States that introduced the draft convention such as Austria, 
Egypt and Italy, cited the two-ship restriction and the private ends requirement as the 
reason why a new convention on terrorism was needed. Both Special Representative of 
the UN Secretary General for the Law of the Sea and the Italian Minister of Justice 
stated at the conference that the private end criterion would not be met by maritime ter-
                                               
176  As at 1 October 2015, 164 countries are party to the convention representing 83,67% 
of the countries in the world. 
177  Mejia, M., Maritime Gerrymandering: Dilemmas in Defining Piracy, Terrorism and 
other Acts of Maritime Violence, Journal of International Commercial Law 2(2), 153-175, 
2014, at p.161. 
178  On October 7, 1985, four men representing the Palestine Liberation 
Front (PLF) hijacked the Italian MS Achille Lauro liner off the coast of Egypt, as she was sail-
ing from Alexandria to Ashdod, Israel. The hijacking was organized by Muhammad Zaidan, 
leader of the PLF. One 69-year-old Jewish American man in a wheelchair, Leon Klinghoffer, 
was murdered by the hijackers and thrown overboard. 
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rorism, thereby making piracy inapplicable.179 The SUA Convention does appear to 
adopt the broader interpretation, covering the activity in Article 3 that lacks state sanc-
tioning.180 If piracy covered all violence on the high seas that lacked state sanctioning, 
the SUA Convention would be obsolete in that respect. All States would be able to ex-
ercise universal jurisdiction against such actors (put aside the two-ship requirement).181 
The SUA Convention provides that “Unlawfully and intentionally seiz[ing] or 
exercise[ing] control over a ship by force or the threat thereof or any other form of in-
timidation; or perform[ing] an act of violence against a person on board a ship if that 
                                               
179  Mukherjee, P.K. & Mejia, M. Jr. (2016). The SUA Convention 2005: acritical evalua-
tion of its effectiveness in suppressing maritime criminal acts, 2016, 12 JIML, at p.173. 
180   See SUA Convention, article 3 para. 1(a), 1(b), 1(c), 1(g). 
181  According to Article 3 para 1 of SUA 1988. 
1. Any person commits an offence if that person unlawfully and intentionally: 
(a) seizes or exercises control over a ship by force or threat thereof or any other form 
of intimidation; or  
(b) performs an act of violence against a person on board a ship if that act is likely to 
endanger the safe navigation of that ship; or 
(c) destroys a ship or causes damage to a ship or to its cargo which is likely to endan-
ger the safe navigation of that ship; or 
(d) places or causes to be placed on a ship, by any means whatsoever, a device or sub-
stance which is likely to destroy that ship, or cause damage to that ship or its cargo 
which endangers or is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship; or 
(e) destroys or seriously damages maritime navigational facilities or seriously inter-
feres with their operation, if any such act is likely to endanger the safe navigation of a 
ship; or 
(f) communicates information which he knows to be false, thereby endangering the 
safe navigation of a ship; or 
(g) injures or kills any person, in connection with the commission or the attempted 
commission of any of the offenses set forth in subparagraphs (a) to (f)64.” 
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act is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship”182 is an act of piracy under the 
term from this convention. The SUA Convention also applies to offenses that are com-
mitted in the territorial waters of States. While UNCLOS is based on universal jurisdic-
tion, only signatory States that are affected by the offense can prosecute under the SUA 
Convention. This can, for instance, be the flag state of an attacked ship or the state in 
whose territorial waters the attack took place.183  The SUA Convention has 164 state 
parties. Among its non-signatories are, however, Somalia, Indonesia, and Malaysia, 
three States that are significantly affected by maritime piracy.184 
 Article 3 of the SUA Convention creates many offenses. Most relevant for pre-
sent purposes is Article 3(1) (a), stating that “[a]ny person commits an offence if that 
person unlawfully and intentionally seizes or exercises control over a ship by force or 
threat thereof or any other form of intimidation.” There is no requirement that the sei-
zure must be internal or be politically motivated. Thus, any pirate seizure of a vessel 
will clearly fall within this definition. Attempting, abetting and threatening such an of-
fence are equally crimes under the Convention Article 3(2).185The only case in which 
the Convention would not apply is where the offence was committed solely within a 
single state’s territorial sea and the vessel was not scheduled to navigate beyond that 
                                               
182  (SUA Convention 1988, Article 3.1.1-2). 
183  Which prompted the drafting of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 1988, as discussed below. 
184  See SUA Convention, article 3 para. 1(a), 1(b), 1(c), 1(g). 
185  See SUA Convention, article 3 para. 2.  
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territorial sea and the suspected offender was subsequently found within that coastal 
state’s territory.186  
This follows from Article 4, which States that the SUA Convention applies ei-
ther “if the ship is navigating or is scheduled to navigate into, through or from waters 
beyond the outer limit of the territorial sea of a single state, or the lateral limits of its 
territorial sea with adjacent States” or “when the offender or the alleged offender is 
found in the territory of another state party.”187 
Yet the SUA Convention was introduced for covering politically motivated vio-
lence, which lacked state sanctioning and was considered by those States which are not 
covered by piracy as defined in the HSC.188 Guilfoyle however commented on the SUA 
Convention within its historical context and concluded that treaty represents state prac-
tice condoning the idea that political motives could exclude criminal responsibility. 
Later, terrorism suppression treaties exclude a ‘political offenses exception’ from ap-
plying to extradition requests.189 
Although the exception is not expressly excluded in the SUA Convention, this 
is due to the debate at the time, within the UN General Assembly, whether acts in fur-
therance of self-determination were legitimated acts of politically motivated violence, 
                                               
186  This prompted the drafting of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 1988, as discussed below.  
187  Id., article 4. 
188  Supra note 34, p.244.  
189  Guilfoyle, D., The legal Challenges in Fighting Piracy, in Van Ginkel, B. & Van der 
Putten, F.P. (Eds), The International Response to Somali Piracy: Challenges and opportunities, 
The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2015, at p. 132. The SUA Convention provision 
regarding delivery of suspected offender is recognized by UNSCR S/RES/1851 preamble at p.2, 
UNSCR S/RES/1846, paragraph 15. 
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or whether they were terrorist attacks.190  Since the 1994 Declaration on Measures to 
Eliminate International Terrorism the position has been settled, no such considerations 
can be considered, all such violent attacks being unjustifiable. The 2005 SUA protocol 
adopts this position, expressly excluding any ‘political offence’ ground to refuse extra-
dition.191 
It is reasonable to consider the other reasons for introducing the SUA Conven-
tion, which could explain the vast state practice beyond the three States that introduced 
the draft. The SUA Convention aims to suppress a broader number of acts equally dis-
ruptive to navigation, it provides a working regime applicable to a larger geographical 
area than piracy, and most importantly, it provides a duty to prosecute or extradite.192 
Such interpretations demonstrate the fundamentally different original point which each 
theory adopts. Academics set out to demonstrate solely on politically motivated vio-
lence is another form of public end. The ‘private ends’ requirement has not been ful-
filled and universal criminal jurisdiction should not be extended to their actions.193  
The piracy regime is in the interest of the freedom of high seas stated one of the 
exceptional cases which individuals are directly the objects of International Law. The 
freedom of navigation is upheld by the exclusive flag state jurisdiction, which prevents 
                                               
190  See SUA Convention, article 2, para (1).  
191   Supra n. 33, article 39 commentary, para (3), at p.282. 
192  The minimum guarantees include (a) prompt information and in detail in a language 
that the accused understands,(b) time and facilities for the preparation of defense and communi-
cation with own chosen counsel (c) trial without undue delay; (d) trial in the presence of the 
accused, self-defense or through legal assistance, be informed of rights, free legal assistance if 
no sufficient means to have on his own (e) right to examine the witnesses (f) free assistance of 
an interpreter, (g) no compelling to testify against oneself. 
193           See SUA, article 13 (1b), article 14, OCC, article 28. 
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unnecessary restrictions or impediments to navigation on the high seas.194 It cannot be 
taken for granted the remedies that States can take against the more traditional instanc-
es of maritime violence. These are also available in the case of maritime terrorism.195 
Therefore States turned to the SUA Convention to regulate violence that is not for pri-
vate ends or involving two ships, but necessarily required a further exception to flag 
state jurisdiction. 
The broad interpretation of piracy, however, is premised on the general rule that 
the freedom of navigation means ships should not be subjected to violence on high 
seas. Only States and belligerents or insurgents targeting state’s vessels are those who 
can legitimately use violence. The lack of state responsibility for the actions of private 
political organizations means States must turn to the criminal law to hold those respon-
sible offenses.196  
Thus, we turn to piracy law, as the general rule excludes all violence that occurs 
without state sanctioning (and responsibility). The private ends term is a limited excep-
tion applying to the facts of insurgency, and the argument holds that only political vio-
lence does not fall within this limited exception.197Those who see only political vio-
lence as a public end are asking whether political violence falls within the exception of 
piracy universal jurisdiction, while the broader opinion question is whether it falls 
                                               
194  See LOSC, article 111. 
195  Supra n. 34, p.250. 
196  The reference to “a place outside the jurisdiction of any State” in Article 101(a)(ii), 
UNCLOS is intended to cover events on islands which are terra nullius and not part of any 
State’s territory. See: [1956] II YbILC, 282. 




within the exception of non-private ends to the exercise of universal jurisdiction over 





Unlike the law of piracy, the SUA Convention creates an express obligation upon par-
ties to create appropriate domestic offenses. Under Article 6, State parties must make 
the offenses in Article 3 a crime under national law when committed: 199 
(a) Against or on board their flag vessels;  
(b) Within their territory, including their territorial sea; or  
(c) By one of their nationals.  
In addition, State parties may establish criminal jurisdiction where a relevant of-
fence is committed, inter alia, against one of their nationals or to compel their govern-
ment to do or abstain from doing any given act. The most important jurisdictional pro-
visions are those dealing with the obligation to either extradite or submit the case for 
consideration by prosecutorial authorities (commonly, if misleadingly, called an obliga-
tion to extradite or prosecute).200 Where a state subsequently finds a suspect or offender 
within its territory (the territorial state) and another state party or parties have jurisdic-
tion under Article 6, then the territorial state shall, if it does not extradite him, be 
obliged to submit the case without delay to its competent authorities for the purpose of 
                                               
198  Historically there was a debate about the status of insurgents in a civil war and whether 
they could be classed as pirates if they: (1) attacked the vessels of the government they were 
attempting to overthrow; or (2) enforced a blockade on government ports against ‘neutral’ ship-
ping. There is no suggestion pirates are insurgents engaged in either activity. 
199  See SUA Convention, article 6(1) & (2), OCC, article 15 (1) & (2), HC, article 5 (1). 
200  See SUA Convention, article 6(3), OCC, article 15 (3) & (4), HC, article 5(2). 
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prosecution, through proceedings in accordance with the laws of that state.201To this 
end, each party must establish jurisdiction over the offenses set forth in Article 3 in 
cases where the alleged offender is present in its territory and it does not extradite him 
to any of the state parties which have established their jurisdiction in accordance with 
the obligations.202 
Article 7 provides that a state finding a suspect on its territory is required to 
commence a preliminary investigation and, if it considers the circumstances so warrant, 
take the suspect into custody while a decision is made about extradition or prosecution. 
That investigating state is required to communicate with States having jurisdiction un-
der Article 6, but that state is not required to defer to their jurisdiction.  
Instead Article 7(5) provides that an investigating state party “shall promptly 
report its findings to those States and shall indicate whether it intends to exercise juris-
diction.”203These last words appear consistent with the view that a state has the free 
choice whether to extradite or prosecute. Article 7, therefore, supports the view that, 
absent an extradition request, a state could validly prosecute a person suspected of SUA 
Convention offence found within its territory.204 
 
                                               
201  Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft 1970, 860 UNTS 105; 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation 1971, 974 
UNTS 177. 
202  Article 6(4), SUA Convention. 
203  See SUA Convention, article 7. 







Article 8(1) of the SUA Convention provides that: “The master of a ship of a 
state party (the “flag state”) may deliver to the authorities of any other state party (the 
“receiving state”) any person whom he has reasonable grounds to believe has commit-
ted one of the offenses set forth in article 3. Nothing in this provision expressly requires 
that it be the master of the attacked ship that delivers a suspect to a receiving State un-
der Article 8.”205 
Indeed, the Security Council appears to have presumed that Article 8 would 
cover such delivery from a seizing warship to a receiving state.206 While Article 2 of 
the SUA Convention States that the Convention does not apply to a warship this provi-
sion was intended to prevent the Convention covering offenses against military disci-
pline. Neither the actual language used nor the intent behind it prevents this provision 
being applied by a warship.207 
A receiving state is under a primary obligation to accept delivery of a suspect. 
A receiving state may only refuse to accept delivery of a suspect under Article 8(3) of 
the SUA Convention where it has grounds to consider that the Convention is not appli-
cable to the acts giving rise to the delivery. In such a case, it must give a statement of 
                                               
205  See SUA Convention, article 8. 
206  UNSCR 1846; preamble, UNSCR 1851. To the extent that Article 2(1) 
(a) may suggest otherwise, the present report assumes that the Security Council has 
provided an authoritative interpretation. 
207  See SUA Convention, article 2, para (1). 
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the reasons for refusal. Once a delivered suspect is received within its territory, the ob-
ligations under Articles 7 and 10 described above apply.208 
Under Article 8(5), a receiving state may request that the flag state accept deliv-
ery of the suspect. Common sense would suggest the former is intended, but the word-
ing of Article 8(1) suggests the latter. In such cases, the relevant flag state shall consid-
er such a request, but has no primary obligation to accept delivery. If it declines to ac-
cept delivery, it must provide a statement of its reasons for doing so.209Jurists also re-
ferred to the SUA Convention, which provides extradition and jurisdiction possibilities, 
as evidence that maritime terrorists will be punished. Even the UN Secretary-General 
described the SUA Convention and its protocols as the more effective measures for 
prosecution than the nineteenth century piracy statutes.  
In the following case of politically motivated violence on the high seas, there 
seems to be a rare need to apply the piracy regime despite the threat posed to the com-
mon interest. Sufficient jurisdictional bases exist. However, the SUA Convention has 
not entered into Customary Law and still depends on flag-States signatories.210 Treaty 
law only requires contracting parties, including the SUA Convention obligations, to 
make such activities punishable under Customary Law, and subject to a ‘prosecutorial 
or extradition’ obligation.  
                                               
208  Article 10(1), SUA Convention. 
209  See supra n. 135 and CRC, article 8(5) 
210  While there has been some scholarly support for such a right, it has not found ac-
ceptance in State practice: Lucchini and Voelckel, Droit de la mer, Tome 2, vol. 2, 165; 
O’Connell, International Law of the Sea, vol. 2, 978. UNSCRs 1816 (operative paragraph 7), 
1846 (operative paragraph 10) and 1851 (operative paragraph 6) obviously provide a mecha-
nism for ‘co-operating States’ to enter the territorial waters and land territory of Somalia, based 
both on the consent of Somalia and, authority of Chapter VII. 
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 Furthermore, the SUA Convention only deals with adjudicative jurisdiction. It 
does not affect the rules of International Law pertaining to the competence of States to 
exercise investigative or enforcement jurisdiction on board ships which do not fly their 
flag. Thus, no jurisdiction to cease, search, arrest or seize is added by the SUA Conven-
tion for such offenses.211 Upon this request, the IMO adopted in 1988 the Convention 
for the Suppression of Unlawful acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation212 
whereby the IMO clearly endeavored to establish a legal basis for prosecuting maritime 
violence that did not fall within the UNCLOS's piracy framework. It became apparent 
that legal measures are necessary to prevent all modern-day piracy acts and to ensure 
that perpetrators of such acts are made duly accountable. There was an urgent need for 
piracy rules relating to the arrest, prosecution and subsequent detention of those re-
sponsible for acts of maritime terrorism.  
The SUA Convention applies to ships navigating or scheduled to navigate “into, 
through or from waters beyond the outer limit of the territorial sea of a single state, or 
the lateral limits of its territorial sea with adjacent States or when the alleged offender 
is found in the territory of a state party.”213The principal purpose of the SUA Conven-
tion was to enforce retribution and punishment for maritime crimes and to ensure that 
appropriate judicial actions are taken against persons committing unlawful acts against 
                                               
211  Which fact prompted the drafting of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 1988. 
212  (See also “Rome Convention”) The Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations 1980, or the "Rome Convention", is a measure in private International 
Law or conflict of laws which creates a common choice of law system in contracts within the 
European Union. The convention determines which law should be used, but does not harmonize 
the substance (the actual law). It was signed in Rome, Italy on 19 June 1980 and entered into 
force in 1991. 
213  See SUA Convention, article 8. 
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ships, which includes the seizure of ships by force, acts of violence against persons on 
board ships, and the placing of devices on board a ship that are likely to destroy or 
damage it.  
Rather, Article 9 of the SUA Convention provides that “nothing in this Conven-
tion shall affect in any way the rules of International Law pertaining to the competence 
of States to exercise investigative or enforcement jurisdiction on board ships not flying 
their flag.”214 Thus, the SUA Convention is applicable to ships on an international voy-
age operating or scheduled to operate seaward of any state’s territorial sea. It expands 
thereby the definition of UNCLOS on piracy as it applies to any ship navigating to, or 
from territorial seas. Unlike UNCLOS, the SUA Convention encompasses criminal ac-
tions committed during international transit, in ports, coastal zones or territorial wa-
ters.215 
There are also legal issues dealing with the SUA Convention. An issue that 
arises out of the SUA Convention is its extradite or prosecute provision, which requires 
that the countries that apprehend the offenders are restricted to perform either extradi-
tion or prosecution. Malvina Halberstam States that most legal writers consider this re-
quirement the core of the SUA Convention.216 The extradition or prosecute requirement 
is regulated in Article 10 part 1 of the SUA Convention and narrated below:217  
                                               
214  Id. 
215  See SUA Convention, OCC, article 16, HC, article 9 &10. 
216  Article 10(1), SUA Convention. 
217  Id.  
1. Each State Party shall take measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the 




1. The state party in the territory of which the offender or the al-
leged offender is found shall, in cases to which Article 6 applies, if 
it does not extradite him, be obliged, without exception whatsoever 
and whether or not the offence was committed in its territory, to 
submit the case without delay to its competent authorities for the 
purpose of prosecution, through proceedings in accordance with the 
laws of that state. Those authorities shall take their decision in the 
same manner as in the case of any other offence of a grave nature 
under the law of the state.218 
 
According to the use of “shall” within this statement, the decision to prosecute and 
thereby enforce the SUA Convention is discretionary for the States. There is no abso-
lute obligation to extradite. It seems like the possibility of non-extradition for political 
offenses as well as the right to grant asylum are maintained. With regards to the ques-
tion whether the SUA Convention covers all acts of modern-day piracy, it must be con-
sidered, as well, as Article 6 of the SUA Convention.219  
 
4)	Protocol	of	2005	to	the	SUA	Convention	
In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, it became obvious that the 
1988 SUA Convention required revision and updating because the SUA Convention 
was focusing more on reactions to a terrorist attack rather than preventing it. The IMO 
                                                                                                                                        
ing the flag of the State at the time the offence is committed; or (b) in the territory of that State, 
including its territorial sea; or (c) by a national of that State. 
2. A State Party may also establish its jurisdiction over any such offence when: (a) it is commit-
ted by a stateless person whose habitual residence is in that State; or (b) during its commission a 
national of that State is seized, threatened, injured or killed; or (c) it is committed in an attempt 






decided in November 2001 to update the SUA Convention. So, the original 1988 SUA 
Convention and Protocol, were amended respectively by two of 2005 SUA Proto-
cols.220  
The legal framework of that Protocol is set by the relevant international legal 
instruments against terrorism as well as UNCLOS and the customary International Law 
of the sea. With this wording and the reference to Customary Law, the drafters wanted 
to enlarge the scope of the SUA Convention so that the regulations are applicable as 
well to States that have not yet signed or ratified the SUA Convention.221 
The critical regulation of the 2005 Protocol to the 1988 SUA Convention is Article 3 
(1a) which is narrated as following: 
1. Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that 
person unlawfully and intentionally: (a) when the purpose of the act, by its na-
ture or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an 
international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act:  
(i) uses against or on a ship or discharging from a ship any explo-
sive, radioactive material or BCN weapon and other nuclear explo-
sive devices in a manner that causes or is likely to cause death or se-
rious injury or damage; 
 
(ii) discharges, from a ship, oil, liquefied natural gas, or other haz-
ardous or noxious substance, in such quantity or concentration that 
causes or is likely to cause death or serious injury or damage;  
 
(iii) uses a ship in a manner that causes death or serious injury or 
damage; or  
 
(iv) threatens to commit any of these offenses.”222  
                                               
220  Bailet, F.N., Crickard, F.W, & Herbert, G.J, Integrated maritime enforcement : A 
handbook, Halifax: Dalhousie University, 2014, p.6 . 
221  Hirsi, A., Sea-Piracy: Business model or resource conflict?, Wardheer News, 2014, 
p.22 




This protocol has raised awareness within the shipping industry, including the shipmas-
ter, ship-owner, insurance companies, traders, etc., of the areas of high risk associated 
with piratical attacks or specific ports and anchorages associated with armed robberies 
on board ships.”223 This information sharing via this protocol aims at understanding the 
nature of piracy and reducing its effects on crew and cargo through self-regulation by 
the shipping industry.224 
Warships that have reasonable grounds for suspecting that a ship (other than 
another warship) is engaging in piracy, have a right to board the suspected ship if it is 
on the high seas. A similar right of boarding exists against the so-called pirate broad-
casters, which undertake unauthorized broadcasting based from positions on the high 
seas. This broadcasting, which is not piracy per se, is of a class of prohibited activities 
akin to piracy.225 These and other treaties which may, dependent on the circumstances, 
be relevant to piracy (treaties on hostage-taking and transnational organized crime) are 
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2013, at p.161  
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Nationality of ships 
1. Every State shall fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality to 
ships, for the registration of ships in its territory, and for the right to fly its 
flag. Ships have the nationality of the State whose flag they are entitled to 
fly. There must exist a genuine link between the State and the ship. 
 
2. Every State shall issue to ships to which it has granted the right to fly its 
flag documents to that effect.226 
Article94 
Duties of the flag State 
1. Every State shall effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in ad-
ministrative, technical and social matters over ships flying its flag. 
 
2. In particular every State shall: 
(a) maintain a register of ships containing the names and particulars 
of ships flying its flag, except those which are excluded from gener-
ally accepted international regulations on account of their small 
size; and 
(b) assume jurisdiction under its internal law over each ship flying 
its flag and its master, officers and crew in respect of administra-
tive, technical and social matters concerning the ship. 
 
3. Every State shall take such measures for ships flying its flag as are nec-
essary to ensure safety at sea with regard, inter alia, to: 
(a) the construction, equipment and seaworthiness of ships; 
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(b) the manning of ships, labour conditions and the training of 
crews, taking into account the applicable international instruments; 
(c) the use of signals, the maintenance of communications and the 
prevention of collisions. 
 
4. Such measures shall include those necessary to ensure: 
(a) that each ship, before registration and thereafter at appropriate 
intervals, is surveyed by a qualified surveyor of ships, and has on 
board such charts, nautical publications and navigational equipment 
and instruments as are appropriate for the safe navigation of the 
ship; 
(b) that each ship is in the charge of a master and officers who pos-
sess appropriate qualifications, in particular in seamanship, naviga-
tion, communications and marine engineering, and that the crew is 
appropriate in qualification and numbers for the type, size, machin-
ery and equipment of the ship; 
(c) that the master, officers and, to the extent appropriate, the crew 
are fully conversant with and required to observe the applicable in-
ternational regulations concerning the safety of life at sea, the pre-
vention of collisions, the prevention, reduction and control of ma-
rine pollution, and the maintenance of communications by radio. 
 
5. In taking the measures called for in paragraphs 3 and 4 each State is re-
quired to conform to generally accepted international regulations, proce-
dures and practices and to take any steps which may be necessary to secure 
their observance. 
6. A State which has clear grounds to believe that proper jurisdiction and 
control with respect to a ship have not been exercised may report the facts 
to the flag State. Upon receiving such a report, the flag State shall investi-
gate the matter and, if appropriate, take any action necessary to remedy the 
situation. 
 
7. Each State shall cause an inquiry to be held by or before a suitably quali-
fied person or persons into every marine casualty or incident of navigation 
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on the high seas involving a ship flying its flag and causing loss of life or 
serious injury to nationals of another State or serious damage to ships or in-
stallations of another State or to the marine environment. The flag State and 
the other State shall cooperate in the conduct of any inquiry held by that 
other State into any such marine casualty or incident of navigation.227 
 
Article111 
Right of hot pursuit 
1. The hot pursuit of a foreign ship may be undertaken when the competent 
authorities of the coastal State have good reason to believe that the ship has 
violated the laws and regulations of that State. Such pursuit must be com-
menced when the foreign ship or one of its boats is within the internal wa-
ters, the archipelagic waters, the territorial sea or the contiguous zone of the 
pursuing State, and may only be continued outside the territorial sea or the 
contiguous zone if the pursuit has not been interrupted. It is not necessary 
that, at the time when the foreign ship within the territorial sea or the con-
tiguous zone receives the order to stop, the ship giving the order should 
likewise be within the territorial sea or the contiguous zone. If the foreign 
ship is within a contiguous zone, as defined in article 33, the pursuit may 
only be undertaken if there has been a violation of the rights for the protec-
tion of which the zone was established. 
2. The right of hot pursuit shall apply mutatis mutandis to violations in the 
exclusive economic zone or on the continental shelf, including safety zones 
around continental shelf installations, of the laws and regulations of the 
coastal State applicable in accordance with this Convention to the exclusive 
economic zone or the continental shelf, including such safety zones. 
3. The right of hot pursuit ceases as soon as the ship pursued enters the ter-
ritorial sea of its own State or of a third State. 
4. Hot pursuit is not deemed to have begun unless the pursuing ship has sat-
isfied itself by such practicable means as may be available that the ship 
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pursued or one of its boats or other craft working as a team and using the 
ship pursued as a mother ship is within the limits of the territorial sea, or 
within the contiguous zone or the exclusive economic zone or above the 
continental shelf. The pursuit may only be commenced after a visual or au-
ditory signal to stop has been given at a distance which enables it to be seen 
or heard by the foreign ship. 
5. The right of hot pursuit may be exercised only by warships or military 
aircraft, or other ships or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being 
on government service and authorized to that effect. 
 
6. Where hot pursuit is effected by an aircraft: 
(a) the provisions of paragraphs 1 to 4 shall apply mutatis mutandis; 
(b) the aircraft giving the order to stop must itself actively pursue 
the ship until a ship or another aircraft of the coastal State, sum-
moned by the aircraft, arrives to take over the pursuit, unless the 
aircraft is itself able to arrest the ship. It does not suffice to justify 
an arrest outside the territorial sea that the ship was merely sighted 
by the aircraft as an offender or suspected offender, if it was not 
both ordered to stop and pursued by the aircraft itself or other air-
craft or ships which continue the pursuit without interruption. 
 
7. The release of a ship arrested within the jurisdiction of a State and es-
corted to a port of that State for the purposes of an inquiry before the com-
petent authorities may not be claimed solely on the ground that the ship, in 
the course of its voyage, was escorted across a portion of the exclusive 
economic zone or the high seas, if the circumstances rendered this neces-
sary. 
8. Where a ship has been stopped or arrested outside the territorial sea in 
circumstances which do not justify the exercise of the right of hot pursuit, it 
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shall be compensated for any loss or damage that may have been thereby 
sustained.228 
 
(d) International Convention against the Taking of Hostages 1979   
Article 1 of the Hostage Taking Convention States that:  
 
Any person who seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure or to con-
tinue to detain another person (the ‘hostage’) in order to compel a third par-
ty including a natural or juridical person, or a group of persons, to do or ab-
stain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for release of 
the hostage. . . commits the offence of hostage-taking. 
 
This definition is clearly met where a hostage is detained, threatened with continued 
detention, and a condition of his or her release is that a private person or company pay 
a ransom. The typical piracy offenses being committed off the coast involving holding 
crews for ransom could thus clearly fall within the Convention definition. 
The Convention contains no express territorial limitations,229 a point made clear 
by Article 5 under which each party is obliged to establish jurisdiction over the offence 
defined in Article 1 where committed, inter alia:230 
(a) In its territory or on board a ship or aircraft registered in that State;  
(b) By any of its nationals; [or] 
                                               
228  Id.Art. 111. 
229  The Convention does place an additional obligation upon a territorial state within 
which Hostage-Taking has been committed to "take all measures it considers appropriate to ease 
the situation of hostage, in particular, to secure his release article5(1). 
230  Id. 
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(d) With respect to a hostage who is a national of that State, if that State 
considers it appropriate. The Convention is thus clearly capable of ap-
plying to events occurring at sea. 
(e) UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 2000 (‘UNTOC’) 
The UNTOC is in force for many States which are active in efforts to suppress piracy. 
Under Article 3, paragraph 1, UNTOC covers a number of crimes including serious 
crimes punishable by at least four years’ deprivation of liberty or more serious penal-
ties,231 thus potentially encompassing many acts of piracy. To fall within Article 3(1) a 
crime must be transnational in nature and committed by an organized criminal group. 
 Under Article 3, paragraph 2, a crime is “transnational in nature” when it is: 
(a) “committed in more than one State”; 
(b) “committed in one State but a substantial part of its preparation, 
planning, direction or control takes place in another State”; and 
(d) “committed in one State but has substantial effects in another State.” 
 
Can these provisions extend to crimes committed on the high seas? Under Article 15(b) 
States must criminalize conduct prohibited by UNTOC “committed on board a vessel 
that is flying the flag of that State Party”.232 Thus a pirate raid planned in and carried 
out aboard a foreign flag vessel would appear, for the purposes of the Convention, to 
involve one or more serious crimes prepared in one State and committed in another 
state (in the sense of being committed in the flag state’s jurisdiction) and carried out by 
                                               
231  Articles 2(b) and 3(1)(b), UNTOC. 
232  Article 2(a), UNTOC. See also Id Art. 15(b), UNTOC. 
 
108 
an organized criminal group.233 It is no obstacle to the application of these principles 
that some States are not a party to the Convention. 
UNTOC may thus provide a common framework for facilitating mutual legal 
assistance in relation to the prosecution of pirates, although that is already happening 
under more specific instruments such as the Exchange of Letters between the European 
Union and Kenya.234 UNTOC also provides for criminalizing and taking action to sup-
press money laundering (Articles 6 and 7); measures to confiscate money, property or 
other benefits deriving from a crime covered by the Convention (Articles 12 and 14) 
and international co-operation to that end (Article 13);235 and measures for assistance to 
and protection of both witnesses and victims (Articles 24 and 25).236 
(f) Conduct Concerning Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in the 
Western Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden 2009   
The Djibouti Code of Conduct is not a legally binding instrument and applies only as 
between the participants (Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Maldives, Sey-
chelles, Somalia, United Republic of Tanzania and Yemen).237 The Code of Conduct 
spells out how the participants intend to give effect to their existing duty of cooperation 
                                               
233  This should not be taken as meaning a flag vessel is territory; a flag vessel is, however, 
subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of its flag State on the high seas: Article 92(1), UNCLOS. 
234  Ship-riders need not be law-enforcement personnel. The present author understands 
that EUNAVFOR has used ship-riding translators, for example. 
235  Id. 
236  This is the interpretation put forward in the UNODC’s Legislative Guide for the Im-
plementation of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, para-
graph 416(b). While practical, this interpretation is not necessarily obvious on the face of the 
text, see e.g. David McClean, Transnational Organized Crime: A Commentary on the United 
Nations Convention and its Protocols (Oxford University Press, 2015), p.177, or from the 
travaux préparatoires. However,the UNODC approach is strengthened by Article 34(2), UN-
TOC which expressly excludes the “transnational nature” from being an element of national 
offenses. 
237  Article 4(6), Djibouti Code of Conduct. See also Article 105, UNCLOS. 
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to suppress piracy, consistently with applicable rules of International Law and available 
resources, by inter alia (under Article 2(1)).238  
E-1.   Enhancing national legislation 
 The signatory States to the Code undertook to review their national legislation 
with a view to ensuring that there are laws in place to criminalize piracy and armed 
robbery against ships and to make adequate provision for the exercise of jurisdiction, 
conduct of investigations and prosecution of alleged offenders.239 
 IMO is working closely with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC) as well as other international organizations and development partners to as-
sess and assist with upgrading national legislation, focusing on empowering States' 
law-enforcement forces to conduct arrests and criminal investigations.240 
E-2.   Information sharing and Maritime Domain Awareness 
 The Code provides for sharing of piracy-related information, through its infor-
mation sharing network established in 2011. The network is centered on the three In-
formation Sharing Center: The Regional Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre 
(RMRCC) in Mombasa, Kenya, Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) in 
Dar es Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania and the Regional Maritime Information 
Sharing Centre (ReMISC) in Sana'a, Yemen. It is used to exchange information on pi-
                                               
238  Id. Art. 2(1) 
239  Id. 
240  See supra n. 155 at 32. 
 
110 
racy incidents across the region and other relevant information to help shipping and 
signatory States to act to mitigate piracy threats.241 
 Since its establishment, the information sharing network has played a signifi-
cant role in countering piracy. The IMO will continue to support the capacity of the re-
gional network to counter piracy as well as other illicit activities at sea. The IMO is al-
so working to develop signatory States' maritime domain awareness. Projects to in-
crease the use of terrestrial automatic identification systems (AIS), long-range identifi-
cation and tracking of ships (LRIT), coastal radar and other sensors and systems have 
been undertaken and continue to be implemented.242 
E-3.   Building Counter Piracy Capacity 
 The IMO has been working with partners to boost the capacity of States in the 
Western Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden region to suppress piracy by supporting de-
velopment of maritime infrastructure, law enforcement and implementation of the Dji-
bouti Code of Conduct. In its endeavor to strengthen capacity in the region, IMO has 
signed five strategic partnerships with UN agencies and the EU. These joint agreements 
to combat piracy, reaffirms the mutual commitments to improving coordination at all 
levels and across all relevant programs and activities, with a view to strengthening the 
capacity of States in the region to deal with piracy, as well as to help develop viable 
and sustainable alternatives to piracy.243  
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E-4. Evolution of the Djibouti Code of Conduct 
 Since it was signed in 2009, the Code has evolved to become the major focus 
for facilitating transnational communication, coordination and cooperation within the 
region, creating a basis for technical cooperation between the signatory States, IMO 
and international partners that is trusted, effective and popular. The IMO continues to 
support Member States to implement the Djibouti Code of Conduct through its Inte-
grated Technical Cooperation Program (ITCP) and activities funded by the Djibouti 
Code Trust Fund. It also maintains a presence in the region, focused on the Code, with 
two staff members based in Nairobi, Kenya, whose primary role is training.244  
 
2.4 - Conclusion 
 
Piracy continues to be a threat to international prosperity and security. Vessels all over 
the world navigate the ocean daily. International Law of the sea is in many ways an 
evolution of ideas and norms regarding the sea as a common heritage of mankind.  
More importantly, the International Law of the sea is the result of a century’s long ne-
gotiating process.  It took States centuries to reach a consensus and create a document 
that would provide a legal framework and establish rights of States regarding the sea. It 
took States centuries to create the International Law of the sea mainly because of two 
reasons.  
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Firstly, International Law differs from national law in a fundamental way. In-
ternational Law sometimes cannot be enforced trough the state’s law.  It is based on 
treaties and conventions and on state consensus. There is no real authority in the inter-
national system that could enforce the law in the same way that there is no real law-
making organ. Thus, all rights and responsibilities of the States and the rules regarding 
the sea which are stipulated in the International Law of the sea had to be based on the 
consent of States. It comes to no surprise that reaching such consent was a process that 
needed time.  However, the main problem in the establishment of the International Law 
of the sea was the controversial debate on the dominion of the sea.  
 States were divided over two main principles. One group of States has defended 
the principle of territorial integrity and sovereignty over the sea. The other group of 
States had advocated the importance of the principle of free navigation. The Interna-
tional Law of the sea had to find a balance between these two principles. 
  The significance of piracy as a research topic is that it adds to the sanctity of 
their sovereignty. The case of piracy provides a challenge to this legal order. It is the 
debate on the International Law of the sea that provides for regulations regarding pira-
cy. At the same time, it establishes the rights of coastal States regarding the integrity of 
their territoriality a case where International Law of the sea fails to work, but most im-
portantly is that it is a case where the presumed sanctity of territoriality and sovereignty 
over the sea can be questioned. 
 









The Emergence of Somali Piracy 
 
 
I think the guys . . . in Somali piracy are not unlike low-level drug dea-
lers in urban areas in America, who see it as, . . . not having many other 
options. I think it comes down to money and needing to survive.1 
 
3.0 Introduction  
 
International Law, it might be argued, is a legal system directed toward to assist the 
defeat or suppression of a category of violators known as “enemies of mankind,” or 
hosti humanis generis.2 Sometimes these are war criminals, sometimes they are terror-
ists or slave traders. As had been aptly said, “The original enemy of all mankind was 
the pirate.”  
Since the early 1990s, rampant piracy off the coast of Somalia has become a 
major issue for global trade and security, prompting strong responses from the interna-
tional community. In 2014 alone, the collective cost of ransom money, military protec-
tion and cargo insurance because of piracy is estimated to have been between seven and 
                                               
1  Hodierne, Cutter. Read more at: https://www.brainyquote.com/authors/cutter_hodierne 
(Assessed, 11/25/17 0). 
2   Sanayo. "Piracy in Somali Waters: Rising attacks impede delivery of humanitarian 
assistance". UN Chronicle Journal. United Nations Department of Public Information, Out-
reach, Division, vol.3 ed. 15, 2015. 
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twelve billion dollars.3 This number doesn’t include the collective loss of trade revenue 
from nearby countries such as Egypt, Kenya, Yemen and Nigeria, estimated to be at 
least $1.25 billion annually.4 
Bands of pirates on small speedboats patrol the waters in the Gulf of Aden and 
the Suez Canal targeting any ship that enter their “hunting grounds.”5 These pirates 
seize the ship, most of the crew and demand a ransom from the shipping company.6 
Piracy of this nature has become a lucrative business for Somali pirates, despite the 
numerous patrol ships sent in from the United States of America, China and other 
western countries, and the breathtaking rescues carried out by the crews on board these 
patrol vessels.7 These events have had spill-over effects into other businesses. Shipping 
insurance premiums have skyrocketed for ships travelling through the dangerous wa-
ters; private military contractors have begun hiring out security teams to accompany 
ships and their cargos as they travel through the Gulf of Aden.8 
Pirate attacks have occurred from as close as the Somali coast line to the Arabi-
an Sea, which lies close to the coast line of India. When the Somali Democratic Repub-
lic collapsed in 1991, during the outbreak of a civil war, Somalia's navy fell into disre-
                                               
3  Megalommatis, Muhammad (29 March 2016). "Ecoterra Press Release, p.257 – The 
Somalia Chronicle June – December 2016, no. 70" buzzle.com. 
4  Dagne, Ted (2014), Somalia: Conditions and Prospects for Lasting Peace, American 
press, p.107-109. 
5  Id. 
6  "The Advantage of Piracy". 15th ed. German-foreign-policy.com Review. Retrieved17 
December 2015. 
7  Anna, Bowden. "The Economic Cost of Somali Piracy 2015". Oceans beyond Piracy, 
p.1145-1149. 




pair and was disbanded. This left Somalia's coast line unprotected, and fishing vessels 
from other countries started to poach fish in the region.9Somali piracy began when So-
malis were unable to find a remedy from the international community; local Somali 
fishermen took up arms and attempted to protect their waters from the illegal fishing 
(IUU) and illegal dumping of toxic waste. They were compelled to arm themselves be-
cause the country lacked political stability and a central government, resulting in no 
security agency in the form of navy or coast guard to patrol the waters and prevent 
these illegal activities. Some pirates consider themselves the coast guard of Somalia. 
The lack of a government created a perfect environment for piracy to thrive. 
The initial segment of this chapter narrates how important it is for companies all 
over the world to use the Gulf of Aden marine route, specifically within each men-
tioned area. What are the reasons for eliminating Somali pirates instead of changing 
maritime routes? Further, this chapter shows the process of the Somali pirate growth, 
how it endangers the peace of the sea, and its history. Furthermore, this chapter catego-
rizes the acts of Somali pirates by aspect and deed, and discusses the impacts of their 
actions. The collapse of the Somali government, which contributed to the failure of 
administration in Somali, is the pivotal event to be analyzed under this chapter. 
                                               
9  Waldo, Mohamed (8 January 2016). "The Two Piracies in Somalia: Why the World 
Ignores the Other". WardheerNews.com. Retrieved 22 January 2017.  
9    "Analysis: Somalia Piracy Began in Response to Illegal Fishing and Toxic Dumping 
by Western Ships off Somali Coast". Democracy Now! Vol.55 ed.16. Retrieved20 May 2016. 
10  "Toxic Waste Behind Somali Pirates." Top 25th ed. of 2014. Project Censored. 2014. 






3.1 History and Evolution of Somali Piracy 
 
 
The map immediately above depicts the Horn of Africa, Somalia and its extensive 
coastline, and the region of the Indian Ocean that is subject to Somali piracy. 
For thousands of years, the climate and currents of the Indian Ocean have transported 
watercraft from Africa to Arabia, Arabia into the Persian Gulf, then off to the west 
coast of India, and back again. Trade with the Mediterranean world sailed south on the 
Red Sea, through the Bab el Mandeb, into the Indian Ocean and beyond.10  
The travel guide, Periplus of the Erythrean Sea,11 which was written in Greek 
in the first century AD by an anonymous merchant, noted the richness of the maritime 
trade. He also warned that along the coast of Azania (which is now Somalia) "live men 
                                               
10  "Somali piracy becoming criminal enterprise". Reuters Journal. Vol.25 ed.14, 16 Feb-
ruary 2014. 
11  Wilfred H. Schoff, trans, The Periplus of the Erythraean Sea: Travel and Trade in the 
Indian Ocean by a Merchant of the First Century (New Delhi, 1974). 
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of piratical habit." Claudius Ptolemy, in Geographia, first published in 150 AD, identi-
fied the Horn region south of Cape Guardafui as "the Gulf of Barbaria." "Men of the 
greatest stature, who are pirates, inhabit the whole coast and at place have set up 
chiefs."12 One thousand years later, in 1854, when the great British explorer, Richard 
Burton, embarked on a Royal Geographic Society trip to the port of Berbera, the British 
officials in Aden were concerned for his safety13 because attacks on ships in the Gulf of 
Aden were common. In fact, Major Gordon Laing was murdered when leaving Harar in 
1826.14 
As Burton himself noted, in First Footsteps in East Africa,15 "the more adven-
turous Abyssinian travelers not to mention diverse Roman Catholic Missioners at-
tempted Harar, but attempted it in vain." With a well-armed retinue and dressed as an 
Arab trader, Burton and his caravan succeeded in getting to Harar and back. In April of 
1855, however, as they prepared to leave Berbera, their party was attacked by a group 
of “Bedouin brigands." Lieutenant Stoyan was killed and John Speke and Richard Bur-
ton suffered severe injuries.16 
 
                                               
12  "How Somalia's Fishermen Became Pirates". TIME.com., p.14-15, 18 April 2015. Re-
trieved 20 May 2016. 
13  "Hijackings cut aid access to south Somalia, lives at risk". Vol.31, World Food Pro-
grame Journal, 2016. 
14  Ioan Lewis, Understanding Somalia and Somaliland (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2015) ISBN 1-0000568923.  
15  Kenneth J. Menkhaus, "The Somali Catastrophe, Bigger than the Horn—and Not Over 
Yet, “Current History Law Reviews (March 2016 ed.). 
16  ICC Commercial Crime Services Journal, Piracy figures for 20th centuries surpass 
those for ancient years (Vol.42, 23 September 2016). 
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3.2 Piracy off the Coast of Somalia 
 
 As of 2005, the pirate threat region mostly included the area closest to the So-
mali coast line. This area, as the map above depicts, was adjacent to Yemen and Oman, 
which borders Saudi Arabia. It also involved the Gulf of Aden,17 where over 30,000 
commercial ships pass. These include oil tankers as well as other forms of commercial 
shipping.18  
One out of every ten gallons of oil shipped in tankers, passes through this re-
gion. Over the years, however, pirate attacks have spread far beyond the Somali coast 
line, toward the Maldives islands and the Indian Ocean as of 2013.19After the collapse 
of the central government during the ensuing civil war, the Somali navy disbanded.20 
With Somali territorial waters undefended, foreign fishing trawlers began illegally fish-
                                               
17  Jeffrey Gettleman, "Somalia's Pirates Flourish in a Lawless Nation," The New York 
Times Journal, vol.41, October 31, 2015.  
18  Dagne, Ted (2014), Somalia: Conditions and Prospects for Lasting Peace, p.144, 
Yankie Press. 
19  Washington Times, (11 April 2015). "Somali pirates a far cry from buccaneers of old". 
Washingtontimes.com. Vol. 32 16th ed., Retrieved 17 December 2016. 
20  Jeffrey Gettleman, "Pirates Tell Their Side," The New York Times Journal, Vol.76, 
October 1, 2014. 
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ing on the Somali seaboard and ships from big companies started dumping waste off 
the coast of Somalia. This led to the erosion of the fish stock.21  
Local fishermen subsequently started banding together to protect their resources. 22 Af-
ter seeing the profitability of ransom payments, some financiers and former militiamen 
later began to fund pirate activities,23 splitting the profits evenly with the pirates. In 
most of the hijackings, the pirates have not harmed their prisoners.24  
A United Nations report and several news sources have suggested that the pira-
cy off the coast of Somalia was caused in part by illegal fishing, but also by foreign 
boats taking advantage of the war, which resulted in lost fishing income to local com-
munities. According to the German Institute for Economic Research and the US House 
Armed Services Committee,25 the dumping of toxic waste in Somali waters by foreign 
vessels also severely constrained the ability of local fishermen to earn a living.26  
In response, the fishermen began forming armed groups to stop the foreign 
ships. They eventually turned to hijacking commercial vessels for ransom as an alterna-
                                               
21  "Marine Fisheries Review, Somali fishery industry has potential for growth, December 
1982, p. 44 (12th ed.)" . Retrieved 27 March 2014. 
22  The Washington Times, (11 April 2014). "Somali pirates a far cry from buccaneers of 
old". Washingtontimes.com. Vol. 57 14th ed. (Retrieved 17 December 2014). 
23   Westcott, Kathryn (23 April 2015). "Somalia's pirates face battles at sea". BBC News. 
Retrieved 2 May 2016. 
24  “Somali Pirates Seize Two Ships” Vol.45 16th ed. P.11, Sky News Journal, 15 August 
2015. 
25  Niall Ferguson, "The Axis of Upheaval," Foreign Policy Journal, Vol. 21 14th ed. 
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tive source of income. In 2012,27 a survey by Wardheer News found that approximately 
70 percent of the local coastal communities at the time strongly support piracy as a 
form of national defense of the country's territorial waters.28  
The pirates also believed that they were protecting their fishing grounds, justice 
and compensation for the stolen marine resources.29 In the absence of an effective na-
tional coast guard following by the outbreak of the civil war and the subsequent disin-
tegration of the Armed Forces, local fishermen formed organized groups in order to 
protect their waters. Their belief is reflected in the names adopted by some of the pirate 
networks, such as the National Volunteer Coast Guard, which are testimony to the pi-
rates' initial motivations. However, as piracy became substantially more lucrative, other 
reports have speculated that financial gained became the primary motivation for the 
pirates.30 
 
3.2.1 Weapons and Methodology 
 
The first organized pirate attack carried out by Somali pirates started shortly after the 
start of the second phase of the Somali Civil War in 2005.31 As time went by, more pi-
rates started attacking shipping lanes from the Suez to India, and vice versa. This in-
                                               
27  Jeffrey Gettleman and Mohammed Ibrahim, "Somali Pirates Get Ransom and Leave 
Arms Freighter," The New York Times Journal, Vol. 84, February 6, 2015. 
28   Najad Abdullahi (11 October 2015). "Toxic waste' behind Somali piracy", October 
2015". English.aljazeera.net. Retrieved 27 March 2016. 
29   "Piracy ransom cash ends up with Somali militants." Reuters Journal. Vol. 8 15th ed. 
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creased activity suggested that Somali piracy was supported by large segments of the 
Somali population. 
According to 2015 reports, Somali pirates were attacking ships with Russian 
made 82mm mortars that can target a ship as far as five kilometers from shore. Modern 
pirates are part of organized crime groups that target big and small cargo vessels, and 
even cruise ships and private yachts.32As international warships became more present, 
Somalia pirates started using more advanced techniques (as of now, they use naval 
mother ships that allow them to organize large scale attacks on distant targets on open 
sea).  
Typically, Somali pirate attacks involve attacking commercial ships, taking hos-
tages, and demanding high ransoms, often in the millions of dollars.33 The attacks in-
volve fishing trawlers that launch small attack boats, known as skiffs, to seize larger 
cargo ships. Somali pirates are often armed with rocket-propelled grenade launchers 
and assault rifles.34 When confronted with a modern naval force,35 the pirates will 
throw their weapons overboard to destroy evidence. This has made it difficult to prose-
cute them in international courts of law. Pirates receive funding from various sources, 
including from within Somali itself, but also from Yemen and other countries. Pirate 
operations have been so successful that they have been receiving funding from local 
                                               
32  Leeson, Peter T. "The Law of Pirate Organization." Journal of Political Economy 115, 
no. 6 (2015): 1049–1094. pg. 1066 University of Chicago. 
33  Charbonneau, Louis (18 March 2015). "UN cites reports of gov. links to Somalia pi-
rates". Vol.14 15th ed. Reuters. 
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stock exchanges, where investors would trade shares in pirate groups.36 In a curious 
twist of fate, therefore, Somali piracy has metastasized into the country's only boom 
industry. Most pirates, observers have noted, are not former fishermen, but just poor 
folk seeking their fortune. Recently, pirates held 18 cargo ships and 300 sailors hostage 
because of the work of a sophisticated and well-funded operation.37  
 Small groups of armed former fishermen and militia men use small speedboats 
to capture a fishing ship. They use these ships as mother ships, which can withstand 
extreme weather conditions, to sail farther out to sea in search of cargo ships,38 and 
these large are also used to carry men, fuel, equipment and the speedboats that enable 
the pirates to operate within a large area.39 These conditions have resulted in the prolif-
eration of armed militia groups and warlords, a motley group that engages in piracy, 
and provide intelligence for pirates.40 The circulation of weapons has made it easier for 
Somali youth to obtain firearms. Finally, the lack of a Somali national government has 
resulted in the emergence of a criminal economy that has extended out to the sea.41 Let 
us now consider tactics that pirates use to further their nefarious trade. 
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After seizing and taking control of the ship, they usually sail it to the north-
eastern coast. From there, negotiators take over and start negotiating for ransom.42 
What is interesting is that these negotiators are often members of the coastal communi-
ties or literate citizens of the pirates’ safe havens. Technically, they do not operate as 
pirates in the sense that they do not go out to sea and attack ships.43 They are, however 
part of a complex system that has made it nearly impossible to pinpoint the pirates, and 
prevent their attacks on ocean commerce.44 
Most attacks, however, do not result in physically harming hostages. However, 
Somali pirates are suspected in the killing of four Americans on board a yacht in 
2012,45 and they allegedly killed a Chinese sailor in 2013 when their ransom demands 
were not met. There have also been reported incidents of torture, and the use of hostag-
es as shields against defensive fire.46  
The main goal of pirates has remained the same throughout all these years. In 
2010, over 1100 hostages were captured by Somali pirates, and by the fall of 2011 they 
had captured 300 more. Pirates also collected various amounts of ransom for captured 
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ships47 ranging from 500,000 to 2,000,000 dollars. Even though pirates try to keep their 
captives alive in the hope of receiving ransom, over 60 seafarers have died in pirate 
prisons. 
The intertwining of the pirate activities with those of ‘citizens’ could be made 
clear based on the estimates of piracy revenues. The International Maritime Organiza-
tion estimated that ransom payments to recover the retained ships brought in 40 million 
dollars in 2008 alone.48 This was a significant sum of revenue for Somalia which earns 
100 million dollars from its exports and livestock yearly.49 This also equals the same 
amount that Somaliland earns in a year. This has attracted the attention of many reli-
gious and clan leaders, many of whom receive a cut of the ransom money. It is difficult 
to discover where the money has gone since it passes through so many hands in central 
and northeastern Somalia. The fear has been recently that a large part of Puntland is 
becoming a pirate version of a narco-state.50 This is further complicated by the Somali 
coast guard. In fact, the groups who conducted the first attacks in the mid-nineties 
called themselves the ‘coast guard,’ because they were patrolling their territorial wa-
ters.51   
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Effectively, this meant that they were funding and speculating on the success of 
future pirate attacks. The profits from pirate attacks rose to an estimated $200 million 
as of 2013.52 The benefits of piracy to local Somali communities have manifested in the 
form of business from pirates spending their money at local businesses. In addition, 
pirate attacks have succeeded in fending off illegal foreign fishing in some places, re-
sulting in improved fishing harvests for local fishermen.53 
3.2.2 Structural Causes of Somali Piracy 
 
What began as an angry reaction of the fishermen became an enterprise lead by militia 
leaders who demanded cash from the foreign vessels as a form of ‘taxes,’ if those ves-
sels wished to fish in waters the pirates controlled. If crew refused to pay, they risked 
kidnapping. The militia leaders did not concern themselves with the coastal communi-
ties and the loss of Somalia’s fisheries.54 
The root causes of maritime piracy in the Horn of Africa are not yet fully under-
stood. Greed and grievance are two explanatory variables that are often examined in 
relation to piracy. While proponents of the greed hypothesis believe that piracy is an act 
of personal enrichment, advocates of the grievance hypothesis see piracy as a desper-
ate, yet legitimate response to injustice. In this regard, critics consider the presence of 
illegal fishing vessels and the dumping of toxic materials in Somali waters as damaging 
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livelihoods and prompting “local fishermen to ‘police’ the coast and extract ‘taxes’ 
from foreign vessels.”55  
The fall of Said Barre’s dictatorship in 1991, which led to the complete break-
down of Somali coercive authority and territorial jurisdiction, provided one enabling 
condition for the emergence of increased pirate attacks.56 In the absence of any policing 
or judicial institutions, pirates operated with impunity. Percy and Shortland saw five 
obstacles standing in the way of effectively controlling Somali piracy, where were the 
lack of alternate employment, local corruption, the nature of the victims of piracy (i.e. 
outsiders to the community), the practices of some shipping companies and insurers 
(e.g. poor safety practices), and the fact that enforcement efforts push pirates to inno-
vate, the latter phenomenon makes the problem even more difficult.57 
 The growth of piracy attacks off the coast of Somalia has been a culmination of 
various factors; for instance, the failure of the international community and domestic 
effort to create a central and functional government in Somalia; the historical back-
ground of the country that included a civil war and was filled with violence, the severe 
poverty of the country, and the geographical location of Somalia.58 Creating a consen-
sus on power sharing has been an enormous difficulty in the state-building process in 
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Somalia partly because the country is divided along lines of close-knit groups and 
clans.59  
 Though the Somali people belong to one ethnic group and have the same reli-
gion, might lead one to suppose that state building in Somalia should have been man-
ageable. This might have been a correct assessment were it not for the fact that the So-
mali people are divided along clans and tribes.60 Seventy five percent of the citizens 
belong to the six largest clans: the Darod, the Digil, the Dir, the Hawiye, the Isaaq and 
the Rahanwein.61  
These clans are based on lineage and kinships all of which forms the basis of 
identity formation in Somalia.62 While Somalia may seem to be anarchic at first sight, 
the opposite is true. There are well-developed and functional legal norms. Fights be-
tween the clans are mostly caused by scarce resources. These fights have traditionally 
resolved by clan elders. The elders have enjoyed a representative role.  Over the years, 
they would gather in meetings and negotiate until a consensus was reached.63 It was the 
Cold War, however, that undermined this system of rule. Colonialism sabotaged the 
system of self-rule and the authority of the ‘uneducated’ elders.  
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Being a client of the Soviet Union and switching to the side of the United States 
later during the Cold War resulted in weapon proliferation in Somalia. General Siad 
Barre came into power after a coup in 1969.64 He created a centralized and authoritari-
an government. Corruption, the disastrous economy, the collapse of institutions and the 
height of clannism paved the way to the collapse of the regime.65 The current crisis in 
Somalia started in 1992 with the fall of the Siad Barre regime.66  
 The Somali clans are nowadays divided over three major territories: the South, 
where most combat occurs, Somaliland and Puntland. The latter two are state-like enti-
ties in the north, though they are not recognized internationally.67 South and Central 
Somalia have no economy and their people live in severe conditions. The north is better 
off economically, but suffers from a high rate of criminality and lack of law enforce-
ment; additionally, tensions between Somaliland and Puntland are militarized and often 
lead to violent confrontations.68  
In 2009, an initiative taken by the regional African countries and sponsored by 
the European Union had to ensure the training of 500 sailors to build a Somali Coast 
Guard. This initiative was developed in the hope that the guard would be a valued asset 
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in combating piracy.69 However, the sophistication of the pirate attacks indicated that 
pirates were receiving intelligence form the coast guard. Furthermore, many of them 
leave the coast guard and become pirates.70 Thus, answering the question of who are 
the Somali pirates becomes much more complicated.  
The lack of strong government, poverty and pervasive crime created conditions 
in which pirates, under the guise of serving as coast guards, started working for local 
crime lords. Successful pirates live much better than the remainder of the country. This 
apparent, though relative affluence, fuels the constant arrival of new pirates hungry for 
glory and wealth. According to some pools, over 70 percent of the local Somali popula-
tion supports their pirate fleet as one of the main protectors of the nation fishing 
grounds.71 
Because globalization is not a homogenous process throughout, it is easier to 
explain why certain regions are more susceptible to developing piracy than others. In 
the case of Somalia, there is not a central government that has the resources, or even 
the will to combat the pirates, yet the pirates do have the technological advancements at 
their disposal to pose a threat. 
The autonomous state of Puntland72 is located at the very tip of the Horn of Af-
rica, between Somalia to the south and the Somaliland Republic (formerly British So-
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maliland) to the west. Unlike Somaliland, which has for years, been seeking interna-
tional recognition as an independent state, Puntland envisions itself as a federal but 
self-governing division of Somalia.73 
Monitoring and combating any of these misdeeds is next to impossible. Soma-
lia's current government can barely find its own feet in the wake of the 2016 U.S.-
backed Ethiopian invasion. Furthermore, many Somali citizens, along with outside ob-
servers, suspect local officials in Mogadishu, and in ports in semi-autonomous Punt-
land further north, of accepting bribes from foreign fishermen as well as from pirate 
elders.74 U.N. monitors in 2015 and 2016 suggested an embargo on fish taken from 
Somali waters, but their proposals were shot down by members of the Security Coun-
cil.75 
In contrast, and in keeping with the Southwest Monsoon period in the Horn of 
Africa, the high wind speeds and waves more than five meters per-hour in the Indian 
Ocean / Arabian Sea and Gulf of Aden has precluded Somali piracy operations. How-
ever, the monsoon conditions have not affected the Southern Red Sea and the Gulf of 
Aden with sixteen reported approaches, none of which has been categorized as piracy.76 
 With calm seas and light winds forecast over the next few months, conditions 
will be more favorable for pirate operations. However, a lack of funding, equipment 
                                               
73  Metzler, John (Feb 2015). "Piracy surges despite defense measures". vol.331, Korea 
Times Reviews. 
74  Axe, David (2015), Somalia Redux: a more hands-off approach, Vol.32, ABC News 
Journal. 
75  Dagne,Ted (2016), Somalia: Conditions and Prospects for Lasting Peace, Vol.87, 
Douglas Reports, 16th ed. 




and man power is likely to limit the number of Pirate Action Groups at sea. There is 
potential for pirate operations to commit in the southern regions of Somalia, where the 
advantage of relatively easy access to the southern Somali Basin and areas off Momba-
sa and Dar es Salaam and the distance from concentrations of naval forces in the Gulf 
of Aden,77 make this a more likely hunting ground.  
 
3.2.3 Invasion of Somali Piracy 
  
The One Earth Future Foundation estimated that in 2011 Somali piracy cost between 
$6.6 and $6.9 billion, of which the shipping industry bore more than 80 percent.78 Be-
tween 2005 and 2016, Somalia-based pirates took a total of 3,923 seafarers hostage. 
Starting in 2004, piracy attacks in the Gulf of Aden increased yearly, reaching the 
highest point in 2009 with 158 reported incidents.79 After 152 attacks in 2011, the 
numbers had fallen to 58 in the year of 2012 and only 13 in 2013.80 This sharp decrease 
of attacks can, inter alia, be attributed to the multilateral naval missions organized by 
the UN, NATO, and the EU that have been dispatched to the Gulf of Aden.  
 In 2003, fishing ships became targets of pirate attacks on the Coast of Somalia 
and the Gulf of Aden. The frequency of these attacks increased gradually over time.81 
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These attacks have been a concern for the international community ever since the pi-
rates began targeting commercial ships in the beginning of 2005. Data from the Interna-
tional Maritime Organization showed that twenty-two attacks occurred in the year 
2000.82 In 2008, this number increased to 108 attacks. In the first half of 2009 alone 
this number rose again to 143 attacks.83   
Because of the power and reach of the United States Navy and other naval forc-
es of the world, attacks on ships and international shipping lanes by pirates, also known 
as sea bandits, are rare.84 However, one major exception are the waters near Somalia, 
where pirates have been attacking and hijacking ships since the turn of the 21st century. 
Pirate attacks have occurred from as close as the Somali coast line to the Arabian Sea, 
close to the coastline of India. Somali piracy has cost the world between $6 and $12 
billion per year.85 
Today's pirates pursue their prey with outboard motors instead of oars and tote 
rocket-propelled grenades instead of cutlasses. With upgraded equipment and loftier 
stakes, they demanded $20 million in ransom for the ships’ return, a figure that report-
edly plunged to $5 million on Oct. 1 — these 21st century buccaneers, like their peg-
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legged predecessors, are economic opportunists exploiting the largely unpatrolled wa-
terways through which 90% of global trade flows.86 
By the first half of 2010, these increased policing efforts by Somali government 
authorities on land and international naval vessels at sea reportedly contributed to a 
drop in pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden from eighty-six a year prior, to thirty-three, 
forcing pirates to shift attention to other areas such as the Somali Basin and the wider 
Indian Ocean.87 88 By the end of 2011, pirates had  seized only four ships off the coast 
of Somalia, twenty-two fewer than the twenty-six they had captured in each of the two 
previous years. They also attempted unsuccessful attacks on fifty-two other vessels, 
sixteen fewer than the year prior.89 As of 27 February 2015, the pirates were holding no 
major vessels for ransom, although there were twenty-six hostages remaining in their 
custody from a previous merchant hijacking.90  
Over the years, pirate attacks skyrocketed, reaching a peak of 151 known at-
tacks in the beginning of 2010. International naval interception efforts have led to a 
drop in pirate activities. The lack of success has also dried up the various sources of 
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funding that pirates have been able to secure for their operations.91 Overall, Somali pi-
racy has experienced a pattern of rapid decline since 2012. By February 2012, 1,000 
pirates had been captured and were going through legal processes in twenty-two coun-
tries. 92 According to the International Maritime Bureau, pirate attacks in the Indian 
Ocean, had by October 2012, dropped to a six-year low.93 Attempted hijackings fell 
from 237 in 2011 to 75 the following year, with successful attacks plummeting from 
twenty-eight in 2011 to fourteen in 2012. Additionally, only one ship was attacked in 
the third quarter of 2012 compared to 36 during the same period in 2011. 94 
By September 2015, the heyday of piracy in the Indian Ocean was reportedly 
dwindling to a close. Backers were now reportedly reluctant to finance pirate expedi-
tions due to the low rate of success, and pirates were no longer able to reimburse their 
creditors.95 According to the International Maritime Bureau reports, pirate attacks, had 
by October 2015, dropped with only one ship attacked in the third quarter compared to 
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thirty-six during the same period in 2009.96 However, according to the IMO’s data, the 
pirate groups in the Gulf of Aden are still active in the year of 2015.97 
 
3.2.4 The Impact of Somali Piracy 
 
Although piracy has existed nearly as long as people have used the oceans for traveling 
and transport, in the modern era, the phenomenon has, however, not held high im-
portance on the international agenda. A sharp increase in the number of attacks on 
ships, especially on those crossing the Gulf of Aden, has brought to the attention of the 
world, the impact of piracy on commerce, food aid, and seafarer welfare. 
The total damage of Somali piracy for international trade is given by a sum of 
connected elements. There is not just the cost of ransom to take into account, but a lot 
of different additional costs, such as those of long and expensive ransom negotiations, 
higher risk premiums on insurance, defensive measures (security equipment and 
guards, modification of ships to make them less likely to be hijacked), increased fuel 
consumption as a consequence of increased travel speed and/or re-routing, increased 
labor force costs (wages and benefits to pay crews as a result of risk to be taken hostage 
or killed) and running counter-piracy organizations and military operations. 
According to the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW), a veritable 
industry of profiteers also arose around the piracy. Insurance companies significantly 
increased their profits from the pirate attacks, as the firms hiked rate premiums in re-
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sponse.98 International Implications of the maritime piracy attacks that transpire off the 
Horn of Africa are severely disrupting international trade. The Far East-Europe route is 
one of the world’s most active transcontinental maritime routes, as it receives nearly 20 
percent of all global trading activities and more than 80 percent of trade moves through 
the Gulf of Aden.99  
More specifically, more than 20,000 ships carrying most of the world’s afforda-
ble clothing, crude oil, and dry commodities pass through this route annually. However, 
on this route, there is an important barrier by the Puntland area in northeast Somalia. 
As self-ruling clans and warlords govern that unstable region, the adjacent Gulf of 
Aden harbors many Somali pirates.100Consequently, this route adequately reflects the 
significant impact of maritime piracy on global shipping and world development, for 
instance, the financial implications of maritime piracy are widespread. With a lack of 
central government, Somali pirates exploit their surrounding waters, leaving the cargo 
frequently transported between Europe and Asia endangered.101  
One major implication is that the attacks have forced major shipping companies 
to adjust their routes from the Far East to Europe. Many companies have altered their 
courses from the Gulf of Aden to the Cape of Good Hope or the Suez Canal to decrease 
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the likelihood of pirate attacks. Such changes add significant additional costs. It is es-
timated that if one-third of the Far-East European cargo routes were diverted via the 
Cape of Good Hope, it would trigger $7.5 billion extra in expenses worldwide.102 
The main consequence of higher costs of insurance, armed guards and defense 
measures connected to piracy might be the substitution of trade routes transiting via the 
Gulf of Aden with others contemplating the circumnavigation of Africa. From an eco-
nomical point of view, this could lead to an increase in travel prices, and therefore to 
more expensive goods for consumers. The reorientation of maritime traffic from Suez 
could favor seaports, to the detriment of economies.103  
It is also true that there is no evidence of a close connection between the rise of 
Somali piracy and the decrease in trade flow over the high seas. In the period of 2008-
2009, maritime transport has shown alarming signs of vulnerability, but it could have 
been due to the financial crisis.104 The costs of circumnavigating Africa depend on dy-
namic factors, such as the variations in fuel price; thus, trade routes via Suez would be 
more suitable when the fuel price is high, despite the cost of piracy.105 
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However, should the circumnavigation of Africa become a more practicable op-
tion, such a change would specifically damage several countries 's economies, due to 
around 80% of international trade passing through the Gulf of Aden having a variation 
country as its destination.106 The timeliness of shipments and delayed delivery of trans-
ported cargo is another consequence that stems from pirate attacks and the necessity of 
rerouting vessels.  
Unfortunately, the uncertainty of receiving scheduled cargo creates often deters 
companies, thus significantly decreasing trade opportunities. While it is difficult to 
study the effects of insecurity, many studies have been demonstrated that more trans-
parency about the measures being used to combat piracy will result in higher volumes 
of trade. Ultimately, piracy can significantly affect the gross domestic product of coun-
tries whose trade it disrupts.107 
 The impact of Somali piracy on the international level, can also affect maritime 
industry, such as ports and terminals, cargo owners, seafarers, and environment, to list 
a few. Also shipping companies considered facing one of the great impacts as it is re-
sponsible for international trade between countries in the world. Ship owners with ships 
transiting the Gulf of Aden are exposed to direct and indirect impact, which add addi-
tional costs to shipping companies, such as operational costs, and insurance costs.108  
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To avoid the pirate attacks, an increasing number of ship owners are altering 
their fleets from the traditional trading routes, Gulf of Aden and Suez Canal to the Cape 
of Good Hope. Therefore, as more vessels begin to avoid the area, an imminent impact 
on cargo delivery times can be expected to take place, which have a direct impact on 
the cargo owners as well as the consumers, and may place the market out of balance 
and cause the freight rates to be increased.109 
 There are other direct impacts on shipping companies, such as, delays due to 
escape maneuvers, damage to the ship and cargo, loss of money, loss of cargo, loss of 
hire, loss of operation during the attack, investigation procedures, loss of the whole 
ship as a cause of hijacking, cost of ransom, negotiating and delivering the money for 
ship and seafarers’ release, investigation costs, and contractual penalties due to delayed 
or damaged delivery.110 Indirect impacts on shipping companies are, for instance, secu-
rity costs incurred in the fight against piracy, insurance costs due to the Gulf of Aden 
considered being a high risk area, and change in Trade Routes.111 
 
3.3 Contemporary Anti-Somali Piracy Efforts and the UN’s Response  
 
Somalia has been an ongoing concern for the Security Council since the early 1990s. 
The UN has been working with the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in the 
failed State to bring about a restoration of law and order not only within Somalia itself 
but also in relation to its territorial waters. 
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Mindful of the growing incidence of pirate attacks in waters off the coast of 
Somalia since 2005, in June 2008, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1816 which 
directly sought to address the threat posed by Somali piracy.112 Recognizing the inca-
pacity of the TFG to interdict pirates and secure offshore shipping lanes, and that pirate 
attacks were a threat to international peace and security in the region, the Security 
Council authorized States acting in cooperation with the TFG to enter the territorial wa-
ters of Somalia to undertake enforcement actions against piracy and armed robbery.113 
In addition to the human toll, pervasive piracy can have significant economic 
ramifications. According to a report by the World Bank, the global economy is losing 
18 billion dollars per year due to the increased costs of trade caused by Somali piracy. 
Sustained international coordination and cooperation is essential to preventing and 
prosecuting piracy.114 Recognizing this imperative, countries around the world have 
shown unprecedented cooperation in combating piracy, particularly near the Gulf of 
Aden. In August 2009, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) commenced 
Operation Ocean Shield in the horn of Africa, where piracy increased close to 200 per-
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cent between 2007 and 2009.115 This effort built upon Operation Allied Protector and 
consisted of two standing maritime groups with contributions from allied nations.  
In taking this unprecedented action, the Security Council was recognizing the 
reality of Somalia’s inability to provide maritime security within its own waters and the 
need for the international community to effectively undertake ‘national-type’ policing 
and enforcement operations within Somali waters. Resolution 1816 was effectively re-
newed on 2 December 2008 with the adoption of Resolution 1846 which extended the 
international community’s mandate for an additional twelve months.116 
This seems to be recognized by the international community. There are three 
multinational naval operations trying to suppress piracy acts along the coast of Soma-
lia.117 The first multinational operation was the European Union operation launched in 
November 2008 and is called Operation Atlanta. The operation’s main aim is to ensure 
the safety of ships in the region and to make sure that the UN World Food Program 
(WFP) ships can provide aid to Somalia.118 
On 5 October 2008, the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 
1838119  calling on nations with vessels in the area to apply military force to repress the 
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acts of piracy.120 At the 101st council of the International Maritime Organization, India 
called for a United Nations peacekeeping force under unified command to tackle piracy 
off Somalia.121 (There has been a general and complete arms embargo against Somalia 
since 1992). 
The second operation was an NATO operation started in October 2008.122 This 
operation acted under the same mandate as the EU’s. Its primary goal was to protect the 
WFP. The operation was replaced by Operation Allied Provider in March 2009 and its 
mandate had been extended to include counter-piracy measures.123 In response to these 
developments, the EU launched Operation Atlanta in December 2008 to combat piracy 
off the coast of Somalia, with NATO handing over its UN-requested counter-piracy 
operation named ‘Allied Provider’ to the EU on 14 December 2008. Other States offer-
ing support include Russia, Malaysia, India, Iran, China, Turkey, South Korea, and 
Singapore.124 
According to the European Union Naval Force (EU NAVFOR), intensified na-
val operations had by February 2012 led to a further drop in successful pirate attacks in 
the Indian Ocean, with the pirates' movements in the region at large also significantly 
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constrained.125 About 25 military vessels from EU and NATO countries, China, Russia, 
India and Japan patrolled approximately 8.3 million km2 (3.2 million square miles) of 
ocean, an area about a quarter the size of Africa. On 16 July 2012, the EU launched a 
new operation, EUCAP Nestor.126 
The Indian Navy responded to these concerns by deploying warships in the re-
gion on October 2012. In September 2012, Russia announced that it too would join in-
ternational efforts to combat piracy.127 Some reports have also accused certain govern-
ment officials in Somalia of complicity with the pirates,128 with authorities from the 
Galmudug administration in the north-central Hobyo district reportedly attempting to 
use pirate groups as a bulwark129 against Islamist insurgents from the nation's southern 
conflict zones. 130 An analysis by the Brussels-based Global Governance Institute urged 
the EU to commit onshore to prevent piracy over this area.131  
                                               
125  "Inside The EU's Anti-Piracy Nerve Centre". 16th ed. Sky News Law Reviews. 23 Feb-
ruary 2016. 
126  Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against 
Ships in Africa (28 April 2015) 44 ILM 829 [hereinafter ReCAAP], see Appendix 4; Zou 
Keyuan, New Developments in the International Law of Piracy (2016) Vol.8 Chinese J. Int’l L. 
323, [p. 9]. 
127  "Russia to fight piracy off Somalia coast". Vol.94, RIA Novosti Journal. 23 September 
2014.  
128  Charbonneau, Louis (18 March 2015). "UN cites reports of gov. links to Somalia pi-
rates". Vol.32, Reuters Law Journal.  
129  A defensive wall. 
130  Gettleman, Jeffrey (1 September 2015). "In Somali Civil War, Both Sides Embrace 
Pirates". Vol.3, New York Times Journal.  




By December 2013, the US Office of Naval Intelligence reported that pirates 
had attacked only two vessels during the year, with zero successful hijackings.132 Con-
trol Risks attributed this 90% decline in pirate activities from the corresponding period 
in 2012 to the adoption of best management practices by vessel owners and crews, 
armed private security onboard ships, a significant naval presence, and the development 
of onshore security forces.133 The decline in pirate activity has allowed foreign fishing 
corporations to renew their extraction from Somali fisheries.134 
Another significant step was taken by the UN Security Council with the adop-
tion of Resolution 1851 on 16 December 2008 that authorizes ‘ship rider’ agreements 
to facilitate more effective law enforcement capability.135 The Resolution also permits 
the international community to operate not only within Somali waters, but also within 
the land territory of Somalia, which is used to plan, facilitate or undertake acts of piracy 
and armed robbery at sea. 
Following Resolution 1851, then US Secretary of State announced that the US 
was creating a ‘Contact Group on Somali piracy’ so as to establish a mechanism for 
sharing intelligence, coordination of activities, and co-operation with partners in the 
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shipping and insurance industries.136 These initiatives reflect the growing body of opin-
ion that piracy is intrinsically linked to the economic and political crisis in Somalia. 
Albeit limited to the situation in Somalia, these measures also represent some of the 
most extensive maritime security powers conferred upon States to deal with piracy in 
the modern law of the sea era. 
Although the efforts concentrate on protecting ships passing through the Gulf of 
Aden, they also renewed focus on helping countries, specifically Somalia, prevent pira-
cy and secure their ports. Meanwhile, the United States helped establish Combined 
Task Force 151 to coordinate the various maritime patrols in East Africa. Other coun-
tries including Russia, India, China, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, and South Korea, have 
also sent naval vessels to this region.137 
 The last operation, Combined Task Force 151, started in 2009 and aimed to de-
ter, disrupt and prosecute pirates. The operation’s contributors were Britain, France, 
Germany, the United States, Turkey, the Netherlands and Australia. Combined Task 
Force conducted patrols on the Gulf of Aden, the Gulf of Oman, the Red Sea and other 
strategically important waterways. The operations mentioned above are backed up by 
the authority of the UN Security Council.138 Combined Task Force 150, a multinational 
coalition task force, took on the role of fighting piracy off the coast of Somalia by es-
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tablishing a Maritime Security Patrol Area (MSPA) within the Gulf of Aden.139 The 
increasing threat posed by piracy has also caused concern in India since most of its 
shipping trade routes pass through the Gulf of Aden.  
 The international community has struggled to deal with the piracy problem, 
but has made appreciable progress. The United States, Russia and India,140 among other 
nations, have fielded warships and Navy special forces teams to deal directly with pi-
rates and pirate ships. Various government entities in Somalia have also worked to stop 
piracy by attacking their bases on land.141 However, according to UN Secretary-
General, both the former and current administrations of the autonomous Puntland re-
gion in northeastern Somalia appear to be more actively involved in combating piracy. 
The latter measures include on-land raids on pirate hideouts,142 and the construction of 
a new naval base in conjunction with Saracen International, the UK-based South Afri-
can private military contractor described by the UN Security Council as the "most 
egregious threat" to peace and security in Somalia.143  
To address this, in June 2008, following a letter from the Somalian Transitional 
Federal Government (TFG) to the President of the UN Security Council requesting as-
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sistance for the TFG's efforts to tackle acts of piracy off the coast of Somalia, the UN 
Security Council unanimously passed a declaration authorizing nations that have the 
consent of the Transitional Federal Government to enter Somali territorial waters to 
deal with pirates.144 On the advice of lawyers, the Royal Navy and other international 
naval forces have often released suspected pirates they have captured because, although 
the men are frequently armed, they have not been caught engaging in acts of piracy and 
have not committed a crime. 145 
 
3.4 Scrutinizing Somali Piracy Incidents 
 
While piracy off the Horn of Africa has recently gained significant press, it is not a new 
phenomenon. From the beginning of the Common Era, travelers have consistently 
warned of the dangers of pirates in this region. Recent political unrest and a demo-
graphic146 explosion in Somalia have breathed new life into this long history of mari-
time piracy. 
Somali pirates have attacked hundreds of vessels in the Arabian Sea and Indian 
Ocean region, though most attacks do not result in a successful hijacking.147 In 2008, 
there were 111 attacks which included 42 successful hijackings. However, this was on-
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ly a fraction of the up to 30,000 merchant vessels that pass through that area.148 The 
rate of attacks in January and February 2009 was about 10 times higher than during the 
same period in 2008 and there have been almost daily attacks in March, with 79 at-
tacks,149 with 21 being successful, by mid-April in the same year.  
Most of these attacks occurred in the Gulf of Aden, but subsequently the pirates 
increased their range and started attacking ships as far south as off the coast of Kenya 
in the Indian Ocean.150 Below are some notable pirate incidents that have garnered sig-
nificant media coverage since 2007.151 
On 28 May 2007, a Chinese sailor was killed by the pirates because the ship's 
owners failed to meet their ransom demand.152 On 19 November 2008, the Indian Navy 
warship INS Tabar sank a suspected pirate mothership.153 Later, it was claimed to be a 
Thai trawler being hijacked by pirates.154 The Indian Navy later defended its actions by 
stating that they were fired upon first.155 On 21 November 2008, BBC News reported 
that the Indian Navy had received United Nations approval to enter Somali waters to 
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combat piracy.156By 2008, after decades in which the Straits of Malacca, the Caribbean, 
and the Nigerian coast consistently witnessed the most incidents of maritime piracy—a 
full 111 out of the total 293 pirate attacks worldwide happened off the coast of Somalia 
alone.157 By the end of 2008, Somali pirates had collected more than $150 million in 
ransom, and had even hijacked two unlikely targets: a Ukrainian vessel carrying 30 
tanks,158 and a Saudi supertanker filled with about two million barrels of oil.  
Perhaps the most spectacular attack came on November 15, 2008, when 833 
kilometers off the coast of Kenya, pirates attacked the Saudi Arabia owned Sirius 
Star,159 a 330-meter tanker carrying over $100 million of oil.160 The pirates used a 
mother ship, disguised as a fishing trawler, to launch small boats that overtook the Siri-
us Star. Cyrus Mody of the International Maritime Bureau characterized the incident as 
historic: "It was the first attack of its kind in which such a big vessel had been hijacked 
so far away from the coast. It shows that the pirates now have the capability and capaci-
ty to sustain themselves in deep sea until the vessel comes by."161 Under the pirates' 
command, the Sirius Star sailed to a mooring off the coast of an area known as the 
Puntland region where it joined a dozen other hijacked ships. 
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In the case of the Sirius Star, ransom negotiations took about two months—the 
original $25 million demand fell to $3 million.162 The negotiations for the Ukrainian 
ship Faina, which was transporting 33 T-72 tanks, 150 grenade launchers, 6 antiaircraft 
guns, and ammunition to Kenya and Southern Sudan, took five months.  
The crews survived their ordeal, the exception being the captain of the Faina, 
who died of a stroke soon after his capture.163On 8 April 2009, four Somali pirates 
seized the Maersk Alabama 240 nautical miles  southeast of the Somalia port city of 
Eyl.164 The ship was carrying 17,000 metric tons of cargo, of which 5,000 metric tons 
were relief supplies bound for Somalia, Uganda, and Kenya.165  
On 12 April 2009, United States Navy SEAL snipers killed the three pirates that 
were holding Captain Richard Phillips hostage aboard a lifeboat from the Maersk Ala-
bama after determining that Captain Phillips' life was in immediate danger.166 A fourth 
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pirate, Abdul Wali Muse, surrendered and was taken into custody.167 On 18 May, a 
federal grand jury in New York returned a ten-count indictment against him.168  
On 20 April 2009, United States Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton 
commented on the capture and release of 7 Somali pirates by Dutch 
Naval forces who were on a NATO mission.169 After an attack on 
the Handytankers Magic, a petroleum tanker, the Dutch frigate De 
Zeven Provinciën tracked the pirates back to a pirate "mother ship" 
and captured them.170  
Dutch Naval forces confiscated the pirates' weapons and freed 20 Yemeni fishermen 
whom the pirates had kidnapped and who had been forced to sail the pirate "mother 
ship." Since the Dutch Naval Forces were part of a NATO exercise, but not on an EU 
mission, they lacked legal jurisdiction to keep the pirates, so they released them. Clin-
ton stated that this action sent the wrong signal and that additional coordination was 
needed among nations.171  
On 2 May 2009, Somali pirates captured the MV Ariana with its 24-man 
Ukrainian crew. 172The ship was released on 10 December 2009 after a ransom of al-
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most US$3,000,000 was paid. 173 After the MV Ariana was taken, the vessel's crew 
members opened fire on U.S. Navy ships and the ship's crew members returned fire. 
One suspected pirate was killed and 12 were taken into custody. 
On 8 November 2009, Somali pirates threatened that a kidnapped British cou-
ple, the Chandlers, would be "punished" if a German warship did not release seven pi-
rates.174 Omer, one of the pirates holding the British couple, claimed the seven men 
were fishermen, but a European Union Naval Force spokesman stated they were cap-
tured as they fired AK-47 assault rifles at a French fishing vessel. The Chandlers were 
released on 14 November 2010 after 388 days of captivity.175 At least two ransom 
payments, reportedly over GBP 500 000, had been made.  
 
In early May 2010, Russian special forces retook a Russian oil tanker 
that had been hijacked by 11 pirates. One died in the assault, and a week 
later, Russian military officials reported that the remainder were freed 
due to weaknesses in International Law but died before reaching the 
Somali coast. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev had announced the 
day the ship was retaken that “We'll have to do what our forefathers did 
when they met the pirates” until a suitable way of prosecuting them was 
available. 176  
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On 11 May 2010, Somali pirates seized a Bulgarian-flagged ship in the Gulf of Aden. 
The Panega, with 15 Bulgarian crew members aboard, was enroute from the Red Sea 
to India or Pakistan.177 This was the first such hijacking of a Bulgarian-flagged ship. 
On 12 May 2010, Athens announced that Somali pirates had seized a Greek vessel in 
the Gulf of Aden with at least 24 people on board, including two Greek citizens and 
some Filipinos. The vessel, sailing under the Liberian flag, was transporting iron from 
Ukraine to China.178 
On 14 January 2011, while speaking to reporters, Commodore Michiel Hijmans 
of the Royal Netherlands Navy stated that the use of hijacked vessels in more recent 
hijackings had led to the increase range of piratical activities, as well as difficulty to 
actively thwart future events due to the use of kidnapped sailors as human shields.179 
On 15 January 2011, thirteen Somali pirates seized the Samho Jewelry, a Maltese-
flagged chemical carrier operated by Samho Shipping, 650 km southeast of Muscat. 
The Republic of Korea Navy destroyer Choi Young shadowed the Samho Jewlry for 
several days. In the early morning of 21 January 2011, 25 ROK Navy SEALs on small 
boats launched from the Choi Young boarded the Samho Jewelry while the Choi 
Youngs Westland Super Lynx provided covering fire. Eight pirates were killed and five 
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captured in the operation; the crew of 21 was freed with the Captain suffering a gunshot 
wound to the stomach.180 
On 28 January 2011, an Indian Coast Guard aircraft while responding to a dis-
tress call from the CMA, CGM Verdi, located two skiffs attempting a piracy attack near 
Lakshadweep. Seeing the aircraft, the skiffs immediately aborted their piracy attempt 
and dashed towards the mother vessel, MV Prantalay 14 – a hijacked Thai trawler, 
which hurriedly hoisted the two skiffs on board and moved westward.181  
The Indian Navy deployed the INS Cankarso which located and engaged the mother-
ship 100 nautical miles north of the Minicoy Island. Ten pirates were killed while fif-
teen were apprehended and twenty Thai and Burmese fishermen were held aboard the 
ship as hostages were rescued.182 
Within a week of its previous success, the Indian Navy captured another hi-
jacked Thai trawler, MV Prantalay 11 and captured twenty-eight pirates aboard in an 
operation undertaken by the INS Tir183 pursuant to receiving information that a Greek 
merchant ship had been attacked by pirates on board high-speed boats, although it had 
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managed to avoid capture. When INS Tir ordered the pirate ship to stop and be boarded 
for inspection, it was fired upon.184  
The INS Tir returned fire in which three pirates were injured and caused the pi-
rates to raise a white flag indicating their surrender. The INS Tir subsequently was 
joined by CGS Samar of the Indian Coast Guard. Officials from the Indian Navy re-
ported that a total of fifty-two men were apprehended, but that twenty-four were be-
lieved to be Thai fishermen who were hostages of the twenty-eight African pirates.185 
In late February 2011, pirates targeting smaller yachts and collecting ransom 
made headlines when four Americans were killed aboard their vessel, the Quest, by 
their captors, while a military ship shadowed them.186 A federal court in Norfolk, Vir-
ginia, sentenced three members of the group that seized the yacht to life imprison-
ment.187 On 24 February 2011, a Danish family on a yacht was captured by pirates.188  
In March 2011, the Indian Navy intercepted a pirate mother vessel 600 nautical miles 
west of the Indian coast in the Arabian Sea and rescued thirteen hostages. Sixty-one 
pirates have also been caught in the operation carried out by Navy's  
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INS Kalpeni.189 In late March 2011, the Indian Navy seized 16 suspected pirates 
after a three-hour-long battle in the Arabian seas. The navy also rescued 16 crew mem-
bers of a hijacked Iranian ship west of the Lakshadweep Islands. The crew included 12 
Iranians and four Pakistanis.190  On 5 January 2012, an SH-60S Seahawk from the 
guided-missile destroyer USS Kidd, part of the USS John C Stennis Carrier Strike 
Group, detected a suspected pirate skiff alongside the Iranian-flagged fishing boat, Al 
Molai. The master of the Al Molai sent a distress call about the same time reporting pi-
rates were holding him captive.191 
A visit, board, search and seizure team from the Kidd boarded the dhow, a tradi-
tional Arabian sailing vessel, and detained fifteen suspected pirates who had been hold-
ing a 13-member Iranian crew hostage for several weeks. The Al Molai had been hi-
jacked and used as a "mother ship" for pirate operations throughout the Persian Gulf, 
members of the Iranian vessel's crew reported.192 
With the increase in illegal fishing off Somalia after the 2013 decline in piracy, 
fishing vessels became targets in a few incidents in 2015. In March 2015, two Iranian 
vessels and a Thai vessel were attacked.193 The collapse of the government left Soma-
lia’s coastlines unguarded, creating a perfect opportunity for piracy.  
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3.5 Somali Domestic Law 
The federal and regional parliament did not adopt any international anti-piracy law. 
Puntland’s legislation is not compatible with the definition of piracy of UNCLOS 1982. 
However, the federal parliament is expected to adopt an anti-piracy legislation which 
would allow prosecuting and imprisoning convicted pirates.194 
Somaliland’s New Anti-Piracy Law 
 Somaliland has recently adopted a new law on piracy.  The Law for Combating 
Piracy (or the Piracy Law) - Law No. 52/2012–has been passed by both Houses of Par-
liament and signed, on 21 March 2012, into law by the President of the Republic. The 
semi-autonomous region of Somaliland has become an increasingly important ally to 
shipping States in resolving the present quagmire in piracy prosecutions in the Gulf of 
Aden.195  
 In the buildup to the recent London Conference on Somalia, Somaliland passed 
legislation criminalizing piracy within its judicial system. The legislation is based to a 
large degree on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea definition of piracy with 
some important differences.196 The Anti-Piracy Law, together with legislation contem-
plating the transfer to Somaliland from other States of convicted offenders, was signed 
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into law by Somaliland’s President last couple of years.197 
 While not directly referring to piracy repression measures, the Prisoners Trans-
fer Law already facilitated the transfer of several convicted Somali pirates from other 
countries in the Gulf of Aden region currently carrying out piracy prosecutions, particu-
larly the Somalia. The passing of both laws signals Somaliland’s commitment to com-
bat maritime piracy off its coast and elsewhere in the region in its growing engagement 
with the international community in a quest for international recognition.198  
More importantly, the laws fill a lacuna in Somalia’s out-of-date and politically-
motivated legal framework, as applicable to Somaliland pursuant to Article 130(5) of 
its 2001 Constitution. The new law is a case study in the potential hazards in partial 
implementation of UNCLOS 1982 legal terms.199 
 
3.5.1 Somaliland Territorial Jurisdiction 
 
Further, concerning the abandonment of the customary term of “armed robbery at sea,” 
and pursuant to Article 5 of this law, Somaliland Courts will have jurisdiction over any 
offence of piracy committed within Somaliland sea or in an area outside the territorial 
waters of any other country.200 In this regard, pursuant to Article 8, the Somaliland 
Coast Guard has the power to seize ships and to arrest and investigate suspected pi-
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3.5.2 Confiscation of Pirate Property 
 
Article 11 of this law, provides for the confiscation of property seized from pirates.202 
The main goal of this provision, also contemplated by the UNCLOS 1982, is to drain 
off the resources of pirates’ cartels by removing their main revenues, including equip-
ment and paid ransoms.203 However, further consideration has to be given to the  full 
extent of application of this rule, particularly with regard to ships seized by pirates and 
subsequently used in connection with pirate attacks, for instance, as mother ships.204  
 The strict application of this norm risks further depriving, even if just temporar-
ily, the legitimate ship owners of costly assets, as well as of their cargo, upon it and its 
crews have been freed from captivity.205 Crucial in this regard will be the interpretation 
of Articles 6(2) and 7 of this law which, respectively refers to the status and the owner-
ship of a pirated ship.206 
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Somali piracy continues to seriously threaten international security. Chokepoints such 
as the Gulf of Aden are one of the busiest chokepoints in the world, and Somali pirates 
are a threat to these vessels, their crew and tourists.  The failure of the international 
community and domestic effort to create a central, functional and internally recognized 
government, the severe poverty that the Somali people live in, the geographical loca-
tion of the country and the history filled with violence, which include civil wars, all 
contribute to creating an environment and opportunity where piracy prospers.  
 The situation in Somalia makes it difficult for the central government to combat 
piracy. The fact that the country is divided among different clans complicates matters. 
Furthermore, the central government has trouble enforcing anti-piracy measures be-
cause the country is divided over quasi separate provinces. Both Somaliland and Punt-
land have claimed sovereignty and while this sovereignty is not recognized, both terri-
tories enjoy a degree of self-rule. Tensions between Somaliland and Puntland have 
caused many violent confrontations. Militarization led to the proliferation of arms and 
to the growing power of militia groups and warlords. These militia groups and warlords 
are for a large part a significant factor behind the piracy attacks. Piracy in Somalia is 
becoming so intertwined with the Somali society that we can speak of a “Somali crimi-
nal economy.” Warlords and chieftains continue to finance the attacks to receive part of 
the ransom money. Ex-fisherman, militias and ex-coast guardsmen continue to execute 
the attacks.  
 Teachers and bureaucrats continue to operate as negotiators and everybody is 
protected by the Somali communities. The lack of Somali effective government had 
made it impossible to solve all these dynamics. Thus, the economic, political and hu-
manitarian situation in Somalia is the root cause of the piracy while the same situation 
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makes it impossible to create national approach to solve the problem. 
 While the Djibouti code provides rules of conduct when a country encounters 
pirates, it is only signed by a minority of countries. The largest obstacle to an African 
approach to the Somali piracy however, is the lack of resources of many African coun-
tries. This is illustrated by the Kenya’s incapability to prosecute all the captured Somali 
pirates. This leaves the international approach as the only possible option.  
 Finally, the international community has an interest in resolving the Somali pi-
racy problem because costs of Somali piracy affect the whole community in the form of 
lost revenue, ransom payments, high insurance and threats to their citizens. This is 
something that the international community acknowledges along with the fact that it is 
the international community that must come up with a solution. The following chapter 
discusses the discourse analysis and evaluation of the International Law applicable to 
Somali piracy. 
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Although there are many international legal regimes and institutional bodies designed 
to deal with maritime piracy, the framework is complex and fragmented, which leads to 
deficiencies in monitoring, as well as an uncoordinated global response to piracy. Until 
recently, Somali pirates have been successful in exploiting these inadequacies.1  
A significant decrease of piracy attacks in the Horn of Africa after 2014 indi-
cates,2 however, that the time in which pirates can act unaffectedly and with impunity, 
will end no time in the foreseeable future. By establishing a cooperative forum, the in-
ternational community has increased information sharing among its participants, and 
has created new models of cooperative and soft law, which provide a framework for 
improved prosecution of Somali pirates. 
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 While the above commentary shows that International Law has long recognized 
maritime piracy as a crime and has provided tools for its universal suppression, it yet 
persists. Struett, et al. (2013) argue that the institutional structure of the different re-
gimes affected, impedes effective cooperation. This is because each regime provides 
diverging definitions of the targets, pushes different actors to different behaviors, 
thereby, creating conflicting norms that make it difficult to effectively address maritime 
piracy as an issue of global governance.3  
 Many scholars agree that the confusion about the appropriate legal response to 
piracy has impeded anti-piracy cooperation and has resulted in a governance gap lead-
ing to low prosecution rates.4 When looking at the various anti-piracy regimes, there 
are three potential tensions: the definition of the target and the locus delicti, the tension 
between the right and the duty of a state to suppress piracy, and the tension among pub-
lic and private governance institutions.5 
 The main body of this chapter consists of two central sections. Firstly, it will 
assess the various international regime complexes and institutional bodies that attempt 
to govern maritime piracy to examine the overlaps and legal gaps among these mecha-
nisms of governance. The second central section is a brief overview of the domestic 
legal regimes will, afterwards, explore the mechanisms through which it is closing the 
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legal gaps of the international anti-piracy regimes. The last section looks at the trans-
ferability of this model to other affected world regions. 
This chapter also examines the discrepancy in the offense of piracy under inter-
national and national laws and how this offense is prosecuted and punished under do-
mestic laws of coastal States. Furthermore, essential existing legal regulations with re-
gards to piracy will be examined and the possible gaps within these regulations will be 
discussed. According to these concerns, it is questionable whether there is international 
piracy law in place that can properly contend with the current level of modern-day pi-
racy and terror on sea. The following section will examine the important international 
anti-piracy regulations such as the SUA Convention with its supplemented Protocol 
and will clarify whether they encompass modern-day piracy and terror on sea or wheth-
er there are legal gaps in these regulations. 
 
4.1 International Law Regarding Somali Piracy 
 
The UN Security Council has issued ten resolutions dealing specifically with piracy off 
the coast of Somalia.6 There has since been a growing concern among international, 
regional and maritime actors about the potential threats posed by Somali piracy and the 
lawlessness that cultivates it. Academics and international maritime actors have ana-
lyzed the several dimensions of the threat to the global economy and global security 
that piracy off the Horn of Africa constitutes.  
 However, there is a considerable gap in analyzing the implications of piracy 
within Somalia and the broader local consequences. Many Scholars address this gap 
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165 
and offers a Somali perspective on the dynamic challenges of piracy.7 Such analysis 
will elucidate the issues and sharpen the debate on prospects for long-term eradication 
of Somali piracy and propose pragmatic local solutions to confront the piracy problem 
within Somalia.  
Piracy gave rise to a highly specialized form of international jurisdiction known 
as universal jurisdiction. Because pirates were a threat to the global order (particularly 
global sea trade), or because they committed particularly heinous acts, or because their 
acts were committed in a place beyond the territorial jurisdiction or sovereignty of any 
state, they were subject to the jurisdiction of any state that happened to identify them, 
engage them, and capture them.8  
 
4.1.1 International Rules of Law 
 
(a) UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS): Analysis of Substantive 
Provisions  
 
While the preceding discussion seems abstract and theoretical, the past has shown that 
the existence of various conventions and institutional bodies, which complement each 
other, but, overlap in certain aspects, has generated confusion regarding the powers and 
jurisdictions of the States.9 The problem is, for example, that International Law defines 
                                               
7  Report of the Monitoring Group pursuant to Security Council resolution 1811 (2015), 
United Nations, 10 December 2015. 
8  Kissinger, Henry (July–August 2016). "The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction". De-
partment of Foreign Affairs. Document No. 1307 p.148-188. 
9That body of peremptory principles or norms from which no derogation is permitted; 
norms recognized by the international  communi-
ty as a whole as being fundamental to the maintenance of an international legal order. Jus Co-
gens, (n.d.) West's Encyclopedia of American Law, edition 2. (2008). Retrieved January 23, 
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piracy as an international crime, which is subject to universal jurisdiction, but that the 
practical trial and conviction of pirates is tied to domestic courts.10 The execution of 
prosecution of Somali pirates was, therefore, quite challenging and not always politi-
cally wanted: 
“For a variety of reasons (primarily the high cost of trials and incar-
ceration, and the unwelcome specter of asylum-seekers among the 
ranks of the convicted), many nations were loath to bring large 




The first problem that arises when we discuss Somali pirates is defining what we con-
sider to be piracy. Definition of piracy is important because it creates a link to the poli-
tics behind the law of the sea.12  As has been acknowledged throughout this work, pira-
cy is an ancient phenomenon. According to the writer Benton, piracy has been histori-
cally not only a challenge to the established order, but furthermore, a link to questions 
of legitimate sponsorship and sovereignty.13 The term piracy was applied to an array of 
actions that varied from mutiny, shipboard felonies and various kinds of raiding. This 
resulted in a blurry distinction between pirates and privateers, even though privateers 
                                               
10  Ocean development & International Law, 33:343-358, 2012 copyright 2012 Taylor & 
Francis, 0090-8320/12, Vol.5 edit. 2012. 
11  International Maritime Bureau. (2014). Weekly Piracy Report." List of ship attacked " 
Vol.2, Edit.2014:www.icc-ccs.org/imb. 
12  D. Archibugi, M. Chiarugi "Piracy challenges global governance" (April 9, 
2015). IMO Journal, Vol.2A p.284-401. 
13  Goodman, Timothy H. 'Leaving the Corsair's name to other times:' How to enforce the 
law of sea piracy in the 21st century through regional international agreements /Timothy H. 




were state authorized as these sovereigns went about the business of accomplishing 
some stated mission.14 
 Highly reputable scholars and jurists stand on different sides of this debate, due 
in large part to a lack of context surrounding UNCLOS Art. 101, which provides the 
definition of piracy. Professor Douglas Guilfoyle takes the more expansive view that 
facilitation can take place within the jurisdiction of a state because UNCLOS Art. 
101(c), the section concerning facilitation, does not contain an explicit high seas limita-
tion, as does Art. 101(a) (1), which deals with the direct commission of piracy.15This 
distinguishes piracy from naval warfare or recognized belligerency on the high seas, 
but it has complicated efforts to apply the law of piracy to terrorists (who, after all, act 
for political ends, and most commonly in the territory of sovereign States) and it has 
meant that acts of piracy committed in the territorial waters of States are not subject to 
the International Law of piracy. 
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Conven-
tion) provides general rules for the interpretation of treaties like UNCLOS. Thereby 
Article 31 paragraph 1 of the Vienna Convention States that “a treaty shall be interpret-
ed in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the 
treaty in the context and in the light of its object and purpose.”16 
To examine the “object and purpose” of Article 101, it must be considered from 
the point of its creation. The requirement of “private ends” in Article 101 has historical 
roots. As mentioned in “Chapter One” of this work, in the past, pirates were not always 
                                               
14  Modern Piracy. Naval Forces, 2015, Vol. 26 Issue 5, pp. 20–31, 7p; (AN 18506590). 
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16  Id. 
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frowned upon. To illustrate, States used pirates to protect themselves against enemies, 
such as other States.17 Due to this historical prospect of pirates, some scholars argue 
that, it is the very nature of piracy, that pirates must not be acting for any recognized 
state, therefore, any incident with political intention is excluded even if pirates are not 
acting for a state directly, but for their own political goals. It was, however, never ex-
pressly suggested by anyone in the past, that the” private ends” requirement would ex-
empt terrorist acts or the kind of modern day piracy occurring today. 18 
Article 31 para 2 of the Vienna Convention requires an interpretation of treaties 
with regards to  
a) any instrument relating to the treaty which was made between all the 
parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty; 
 
b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection 
with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an 
instrument related to the treaty.19  
The complexities of modern day shipping broaden the possible States to be threatened. 
Such a theory fits much better with the territorial waters distinction whereby activity, 
within twelve nautical miles, is not under International Law classified as piracy. Thus, 
subsequent state practice confirms that political motivation cannot excuse the criminal 
                                               
17  Id. 
18  Dangerous Waters, Modern Piracy and Terror on the High Seas, by John S. Burnett. 
Dutton, 2013, Plume 
19  Id. 
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acts.20 The private ends requirement of piracy should not, therefore, be interpreted as 
excluding action because of its being politically motivated. 
Furthermore, although the States introducing the SUA Convention believed that 
politically motivated attacks were excluded from the definition of piracy, their belief is 
mere opinion. It should be borne in mind as state practice and opinion juris to the effect 
political ends are excluded, but this is hardly a uniform practice shared by all States. It 
seems that the writers of the Harvard Draft failed to include a definition of piracy that 
would meet the political and social needs of the late twentieth century—because they 
were not aware of these problems because the worldwide community had not dealt with 
them when the Harvard Draft was created.  
Therefore, I agree with the legal writer George Constantinople who States that 
the drafters of the Harvard Draft gave no attention to acts of violence committed on the 
high seas for public ends, and thus they ignored the possibility that organized insur-
gents, national liberation organizations and their splinter groups, informal groups and 
isolated individuals would attack and seize ships on the high seas.21 According to the 
intention and the purpose of that wording in the Harvard Draft, it would be erroneous to 
conclude that the drafters, being politically motivated, deliberately excluded piracy 
acts. We might agree with Douglas Guilfoyle’s opinion that, if the wording of “private 
ends” is construed so that a political motive could exclude an act from the definition of 
                                               
20  Contemporary Maritime Piracy. By: Chalk, Peter. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 
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21  Dangerous Waters, Modern Piracy and Terror on the High Seas, by John S. Burnett. 
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piracy, it would be a mistake to distinguish the applicable concept of “public” and “pri-
vate” acts.22  
As well, when looking at the later definitions of piracy which came up during 
the SUA Convention and the IMB definition, at present, the traditional definition of 
piracy and interpretation of private ends in UNCLOS is too narrow to meet the prevail-
ing political and social needs with regards to the international fight against piracy. 
UNCLOS and the SUA Convention differ in their definition of piracy and the location 
of the crime. In this regard, various scholars have criticized UNCLOS as being insuffi-
cient.23 It clearly limits piracy to international waters and excludes piratical acts in the 
territorial waters of a state, leaving said acts to national jurisdiction without creating 
any obligations on how States must regulate piracy in their own waters.  
 This provision is especially problematic when the coast state is considered a 
weak or a failed state that is unwilling or unable to address piratical activities. Moreo-
ver, including the requirement of “private ends” disregards politically motivated 
crimes, and the “two vessels” requirement excludes the option that crewmembers of the 
boat revolt and, subsequently, use the cargo for private gain.24 The SUA Convention, 
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23  "Bento, Lucas, 'Toward An International Law of Piracy Sui Generis: How the Dual 
Nature of Maritime Piracy Law Enables Piracy to Flourish' Berkeley Journal of International 
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on the other hand, has a much broader definition of unlawful acts at sea and “creates an 
obligation for States to regulate piracy in their territorial waters.”25  
 Because of the absence of historical insight into the bounds of universal juris-
diction over facilitators of piracy, most commentary to date has tended towards policy-
heavy speculation based primarily on the text of UNCLOS itself. It appears, however, 
that the Harvard’s 1932 Draft Convention on Piracy has provided a much-needed con-
text for the debate. According to the Harvard Draft Convention on Piracy, all individu-
als–perpetrators and facilitators alike–must be physically present on the high seas dur-
ing the commission of the actus reus to be guilty of piracy jure gentium. The definition 
of piracy contained in the Geneva Conventions, including its provision on facilitators, 
was later copied verbatim into UNCLOS where it remains untouched. If the genealogy 
connecting the 1932 Harvard Draft Convention to UNCLOS is relatively straightfor-
ward, the Harvard Convention’s mandates on piracy facilitation are even more explicit. 
The explanatory note on Art. 3 makes a high seas requirement for facilitators even 
more clear.26 
 To be clear, it may be the case that the UNCLOS drafters did not consider the 
issue of a high seas requirement for facilitators when copying the 1958 definition of 
piracy into UNCLOS, almost twenty-five years later. There is even the possibility that 
the Harvard Draft Convention’s pronouncements on facilitators was an area where the 
members of the ILC departed from Harvard’s conclusions, though such a departure 
would likely have merited mention in the ILC’s commentary. 
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 Nonetheless, the Harvard Draft Convention’s unequivocal statement that facili-
tators must be physically present on the high seas to commit piracy under the law of 
nations should color the contemporary debate over pirate negotiators, and its historical 
connection to UNCLOS merits further investigation. Reasonable minds may disagree 
as to whether the conception of facilitation for piracy should be extended to acts occur-
ring within a nation’s territory, but if the Harvard Draft Convention is to be a guide, 
common jurisdiction over facilitators stops at the edge of a state’s territorial waters.27 
 The drafters thereby ignored the fact that there can be differences in the degree 
of state involvement, and political groups and their acts. While being drafted, the Har-
vard Draft, the exclusion of political activities made sense. Piracy was only a concern 
because it interfered with commercial shipping and transportation. However, they did 
not want to limit piracy to acts motivated by the intent to commit robbery. It may be 
agreed that the threat of international peace and stability could be significant, if a state 
whose interests has not been directly infringed, sought to punish a state that authorized 
an act of piracy. Therefore, it is reasonable to opt for the rule that state acts will not be 
within the definition of piracy, however, this should not mean that all acts with political 
goals should be excluded.  
 The wording of “private ends” must be understood and interpreted as “private 
acts” or “private interests,” so that all acts of violence that lack state sanction are acts 
undertaken “for private ends.”28 Based upon this inclusion of political motive for pri-
vate gains of pirates, the private ends requirement of Article 101 UNCLOS should be 
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interpreted with an extension to acts of terrorism on the sea. This view of interpretation 




In the two years since the United States Justice Department began prosecuting Somalis 
for their alleged roles as pirate hostage negotiators, a debate has emerged about wheth-
er UNCLOS requires facilitators of piracy to be physically present on the high seas to 
have committed piracy jure gentium, and thus be subject to universal jurisdiction.29 
Therefore, a pirate could be prosecuted in every state’s courts. The contemporary law 
of piracy, embodied in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, has de-
fined piracy as an act of violence or depredation committed on the high seas by a pri-
vate actor acting for private ends.30Although it is a well-known principle of sovereignty 
that each state has universal jurisdiction to prosecute pirates, the above mentioned pre-
ponderance of attacks near States, which lack resources to effectively prosecute pirates, 
creates a gap within the international cooperation framework. Piracy is a crime under 
both the municipal law of individual States and is crime under International Law.  
 
(1) Ship Registration and Nationality of the Ship 
 
While maritime piracy long seemed to be a problem of the past, it is now recognized as 
a major challenge for international security. When a group of pirates captures a vessel, 
holds its crew hostage for ransom, or sells its cargo, a significant number of actors are 
                                               
29  Keith, A. B., Wheaton's Elements of International Law, 6th Ed. (London: Stevens and 
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affected, making modern day piracy a global issue: “It is not uncommon for a ship to 
be owned by a national of one country, crewed by nationals of a second, registered to a 
third state, and carrying cargo owned by nationals of a fourth”.31 
If one adds the pirates themselves and the navies from a capturing state, the list 
easily extends to six States that are involved, which makes the practical prosecution of 
maritime piracy highly challenging. But it is not only States’ interests that are affected, 
other stakeholders such as private shipping companies, insurance companies, prospec-
tive recipients of food aid, or the individual seafarer suffer from piracy attacks. Given 
this broad number of actors–both public and private–have an interest in suppressing 
and governing the negative consequences of piracy. 
One may argue the same position exists under Customary Law, with universal 
jurisdiction controlling, regardless of the position or the nationality of the ship. Dena-
tionalization clearly cannot be the rationale. Rather the correct rationale for universal 
jurisdiction over piracy seems to be the ‘common interest of all States. This involves 
two elements. Firstly, pirate attacks, particularly when looked at, threaten the common 
interest of all States in the freedom of the high seas, most notable the freedom of navi-
gation. Secondly, despite the threat of piracy to the common interests of all States, the 
locus delicti of piracy (the high seas) leads to a lack of state jurisdiction and the possi-
bility of the crime going unpunished. Because piracy can target any state, and every 
state benefits from maritime commerce, “every state has an interest in its own safety, 
but none has jurisdiction.”32  
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(2) Power of Flag States and Coastal States 
 
“Flags of convenience” present a problem in that large merchant fleets are reliant on 
States with little power, whether military or in political weight. “Assuming that negoti-
ations fail in such cases, the acts of violence might go un-redressed” In addition to this 
interpretation, some States have indicated that under their domestic law, they cannot 
prosecute without a request for extradition. Halberstam States that the result of this 
opinion is that if jurisdiction is limited to the state of nationality and to the flag state, 
and these States do not request extradition, the offender may escape punishment, even 
if found in a state that would like to see him brought to justice.33  
Despite significant, unprecedented moves by the international community to 
address the growing threat posed by maritime piracy, considerable legal challenges re-
main. The current legal regime is not comprehensive with respect to the enforcement of 
either International Law or domestic criminal law against those responsible for pirate 
attacks. The jurisdiction of a state over acts of piracy is based upon nationality or terri-
toriality. That is, there must be a genuine link between the State and the ship, or be-
tween the State and the waters on which the offences take place. Unless Somali courts 
are willing and able to conduct prosecutions, the responsibility for enforcement will 
predominantly fall upon those members of the international community whose ships 
are currently patrolling off the coast of Somalia. 
The ability of a State, with a ship in Somali waters to apply and enforce its own 
laws with respect to piracy and sea robbery, will depend on whether the pirate ship or 
the pirates are nationals of that State, or it may rely on the degree to which the national 
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law of the enforcing State makes piracy a universal crime that is subject prosecution 
anywhere in the world.34 This creates confusion on the matter of responsibility. For in-
stance, it is confusing whether the commander of the warship who captured the pirates 
should make the decision for detainment, or whether it should be the national authori-
ties of the capturing ship who make that decision.35 These problems have opened a de-
bate about the possibility of the creation of an international court or tribunal that to 
manage the detention and prosecution of pirates.36   
Of course, the creation of such a tribunal brings a lot of difficulties. There is a 
debate concerning which treaty the tribunal should be based upon. Creating a new trea-
ty takes a long time because ratifications go through many complex procedures. In ad-
dition, there is an uncertainty as to whether the tribunal should prosecute Somali pirates 
only, or other pirates as well.37 These challenges have resulted in many navy com-
manders releasing pirates after arresting them. 
 
(3) Right of hot pursuit: Search and Seizure 
 
Despite these efforts, State response to Somali piracy is inefficient because of the legal 
framework that covers the prosecution of piracy on the sea. The legal framework that 
deals with piracy in International Law is based on the United Nations Convention on 
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the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).38 Articles 100 to 107 and Article 107 of the UNCLOS 
deal with aspects of piracy. Furthermore, The UNCLOS regulates the seizure of pirates 
on the high sea or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of a state.  
 The problem with the UNCLOS is that it considers piracy as violent acts on the 
high seas and encourages States to pursue pirates on those waters. By doing so, the 
UNCLOS excludes piratical acts on territorial waters. Article 58 of the UNCLOS em-
phasizes the sovereign rights and jurisdiction of a coastal state that must be respected 
by States engaged in counter piracy.39 Article 56 underlines the enforcement rights of a 
coastal state in suppressing piracy in its economic water zone.  
 Thus, International Law of piracy does not apply to the sovereign waters of a 
state. This led to the adoption of Resolution 1816 by the Security Council in June 
2008.40 This Resolution authorizes States to take the same action against piracy in the 
territorial waters of Somalia as the law of sea normally permits on the high seas. This 
Resolution was, however, passed under a major objection. Indonesia for example in-
sisted that this will not be the basis for new customary International Law.41 
That means that States will act according to the interest of their national securi-
ty. Sovereignty over their territories is directly linked to control over the national secu-
rity.42 The same principle is true for territorial waters. States will recognize that their 
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sovereignty over their territorial waters must stay undisputed. Moreover, territorial wa-
ters provide important economical recourses that benefit States. Territoriality and sov-
ereignty are thus crucial elements in power relations.43  
 The international community will not accept a modification of the UNCLOS 
that would permit States to pursue pirates in territorial waters. Two security strategies 
will clash in this case. On the one hand, there is the need to combat a non-state security 
threat such as piracy. The international community would realize that interstate action 
is necessary to deal with this threat in an effective way. They would recognize that a 
national approach to the Somali piracy to do this is not sufficient. Therefore, action to 
change the definition of piracy and to permit States to enter territorial waters without 
permission is necessary. On the other hand, they are bound by their need to ensure their 
sovereignty over their territories.  
I argue that the second need will overcome the first one. Changing the UN-
CLOS in a way that defines piracy as acts of robbery on the high seas, as well as on the 
territorial waters, and permitting States to pursue them on these waters, would create a 
possibility where they could lose authority and sovereignty in their territory in the fu-
ture. This is something States can never accept according to the realist theories. There-
fore, I expect that the international community will block any attempt to change the 
International Law of the sea to permit States to pursue pirates in territorial waters with-
out the permission of the coastal States. 
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(3) Handing over and transferring Somali Pirate Prisoners 
 
Further complications are caused by the legal aftermath.44 Many States do not know 
what to do with the pirates when they capture them. The navy commanders have three 
options when they capture pirates. They could arrest them and deliver them to their 
country to prosecute them. They could transport them to another country to be prose-
cuted or they could release them.45  
Taking them to Somalia to be prosecuted is not feasible. First, Somalia does not 
have the resources to conduct a fair trial, and secondly International Law dictates that 
prisoners cannot be transported to a country where their human rights would be endan-
gered, which would be the case if the pirates were returned to Somalia.46 Regional 
States such as Kenya have made it known that they are prepared to prosecute captured 
Somali pirates. This does, however, burden, their national legal system, because Kenya, 
like many States in the region, lack the recourses to prosecute the Somali pirates. The 
international community recognized that countries such as Kenya could not become a 
“dumping ground” for prosecuting pirates.47 Moreover, it does not mean that other 
countries do not have responsibility to prosecute, even if the matter of prosecution is 
solved. The country that captures the offenders must provide evidence, and witnesses 
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for the procedures.48  
In addition, Western countries feel that they have the responsibility to ensure 
that the human rights of the pirates are not violated. To this day, NATO has no deten-
tion policy regarding the Somali pirates. NATO States that countries that are engaged 
in counter piracy operations must refer to their national procedures.49  
 Consequently, States were especially disinterested in intervening against crimi-
nal ships of a different nationality. This unwillingness to prosecute pirates led to the 
infamous “catch and release” practice; apprehended pirates were simply returned to the 
shore and released without charge. They could, hence, act free form prosecution and 
with impunity. In their empirical study of the universal jurisdiction for piracy between 
1998 and 2016, Kontorovich and Art find that international prosecution occurred in on-
ly 1.47 percent.50 
(b)	Identifying	Gaps	in	the	SUA	Convention	
 
The same attempt was followed by the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlaw-
ful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA) which entered into force 
1992. The SUA avoids the word “piracy” itself to broaden the entire definition of it as 
well as for maritime terrorism.51 According to the SUA “definition,” piracy is not lim-
ited to criminal actions on the high seas, but also focuses on criminal actions during 
international transits, in ports, coastal zones or territorial waters. Also, SUA does not 
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make any distinction between private, commercial or political motivations. Whether 
this regulation is enough to encompass all occurring piracy and maritime terrorist acts 
of today is questionable.52  
Interestingly, the SUA Convention does not use the word “piracy,” but has a 
broader definition of illegal acts at sea than UNCLOS. Still, some of the listed criminal 
offenses are particularly relevant to maritime piracy. “Private ends” is a requirement for 
the exercise of universal jurisdiction, or it is an exception to the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction if the other elements of piracy exist.53 The answer turns on how the defini-
tion of piracy operates in terms of policy, and the justification for the exercise of uni-
versal jurisdiction. This question is dealt with in the Policy Section below, the answer 
that determines how the SUA Convention should be interpreted. 
Furthermore, it is questionable whether the definition of piracy in the SUA 
Convention and from the IMB implies that the definition of Article 101 of UNCLOS 
must be interpreted differently in the light of legal development. UNCLOS does not 
define what is meant under “private ends,” nor does the Convention on the High Seas. 
As there is no definition existing, the wording, respectively the objective, of the “pri-
vate ends” requirement in Article 101 must be interpreted according to International 
Law.54  
Thus far, there are 156 countries that have subscribed to SUA, but in fact this 
mandatory extradites or prosecute requirement deters many Southeast Asian States 
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from ratifying it. Apart of – for instance the Southeast Asian countries – there is also a 
general lack of willingness by many other countries to sign the SUA Convention. For 
example, general “piracy-countries” like Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines did 
not ratify the Convention.55 Therefore, in case pirates will stay out of the range of these 
countries which are not a party to the SUA Convention, they can avoid any prosecution 
or extradition for those offenses committed.  
Furthermore, according to the legal writer Eugene Kontorovich and his re-
search, even the States that signed the SUA Convention, do not apply it. The SUA 
Convention has apparently only been used in one incident since its existence. Another 
problem with the interpretation and application of the treaty, stated by Malvina Hal-
berstam, is that some States interpret Article 10 of the SUA Convention so, that the 
state, in which the offender is found, has an obligation to prosecute only if a request for 
extradition is received.56 Another problem with the interpretation and application of the 
treaty stated by Malvina Halberstam is that some States interpret Article 10 of the SUA 
Convention so, the state, in which the offender is found, has an obligation to prosecute 
only if a request for extradition is received.57 In addition, some States have indicated 
that under their domestic law they cannot prosecute without a request for extradition.  
Halberstam States that the result of this opinion is that if jurisdiction is limited 
to the state of nationality and to the flag state, and these States do not request extradi-
tion, the offender may escape punishment, even if found in a state that would like to see 
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him brought to justice.58 According to the intention of the SUA Convention, which is 
expressly mentioned in its preamble, this cannot be the case. Halberstam’s view is cor-
rect as it is very certain that this interpretation is not consistent with the legislative his-
tory of the SUA Convention. During the negotiation process of the Convention, there 
has been made proposals with regards to such a requirement, but it was rejected. So, the 
legislative history does not leave any doubt that the obligation to submit the offender to 
competent authorities is not dependent on a request for extradition. 
Even when this interpretation is wrong, it does not help if States are not willing 
to become a party of the SUA Convention and ratify it, or if the affected state refuses to 
start any action. This, in my opinion is very unsatisfactory. I agree with Halberstam 
that a multilateral convention that is designed to deter and punish pirates and terrorists, 
should provide the jurisdictional bases necessary to ensure that a state whose funda-
mental interests are threatened by a maritime terrorist or piracy act, has the right to 
prosecute the perpetrators and that those who commit such acts do not escape punish-
ment for lack of jurisdiction by an interested state. 
From my perspective, the wording of Article 10 of the SUA Convention does 
not impose an absolute duty to punish because the state in whose territory the offender 
is found is only required “to submit the case without delay to its competent authorities 
for the purpose of prosecution,” which “shall take their decision in the same manner as 
in the case of any other offence of a grave nature under the law of that state.”  
So, the punishment and enforcement of such piracy incidents is left with the 
States as described by the legal writer Carlo Tiribelli: “States make the law, States 
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break the law, States enforce the law.59 But the law of nations can only be as strong as 
the States themselves want it to be. Article 3 of the SUA Convention deals with offenc-
es committed by natural persons. It does not deal with offenses that might be commit-
ted by Governments or States-sponsored terrorism.60 This is another lack in the regula-
tions of the SUA Convention as it should pursue all kind of piracy activities.  
Furthermore, it should eliminate the three above-mentioned issues of Article 
101 of UNCLOS. The preamble of the Convention thereby expresses a deep concern 
about the world-wide escalation of acts of terrorism in all its forms, which endanger or 
take innocent human lives, jeopardize fundamental freedoms and seriously impair the 
dignity of human beings and the SUA Convention is therefore considered seen “genu-
ine” anti-terrorism Convention.61 It addressed terrorism at sea for the first time. 
To fulfill the gaps of UNCLOS, as mentioned, Article 3 of the SUA Conven-
tion62 contains a definition of piracy as an offense where a person unlawfully and inten-
tionally seizes or exercises control over a ship, performs an act of violence against a 
person on board a ship, destroys a ship or causes damage to a ship or to its cargo, also 
including destruction or damage to navigational facilities, or threatens to do so. Notice-
ably, Article 3 does not contain any provision for jurisdictional limitation for special 
maritime zones. In addition, the motive requirement that UNCLOS contains in its “pri-
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vate end” element is left out. It can be agreed with other legal writers that the wording 
in the SUA Convention makes no distinction between commercial or political motives. 
With regards to the question whether the SUA Convention covers all acts of modern-
day piracy, it must be considered as well as Article 6 of the SUA Convention, which 
provides the following:   
1. Each State Party shall take measures as may be necessary to establish its ju-
risdiction over the offences set forth in article 3 when the offence is committed: 
(a) against or on board a ship flying the flag of the State at the time the 
offence is committed; or 
(b) in the territory of that State, including its territorial sea; or (c) by a 
national of that State. 
2. A State Party may also establish its jurisdiction over any such offence when:  
(a) it is committed by a stateless person whose habitual residence is in 
that State; or  
(b) during its commission, a national of that State is seized, threatened, 
injured or killed; or  
(c) it is committed in an attempt to compel that State to do or abstain 
from doing any act.”63 
According to this statement, all these offences mentioned in Article 6 are lim-
ited to activities that are directed against the ship per se (including its cargo), the safe 
navigation of that ship, persons on board and maritime navigational facilities. But this 
list does not include activities on the high seas which are simply supportive of terrorist 
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acts. Hence, it does not affect terrorist activities which are not sufficiently precise to be 
considered as piracy.  
The problem is that there is not yet an internationally uniform definition of pi-
racy which could be included in the wording of Article 6 of the SUA Convention. The 
core regulation of the 2005 Protocol to the 1988 SUA Convention is Article 3 which 
reads as following: 
1. Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that 
person unlawfully and intentionally:  
(a) when the purpose of the act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate 
a population, or to compel a government or an international organization 
to do or to abstain from doing any act:  
(i) uses against or on a ship or discharging from a ship any ex-
plosive, radioactive material or BCN167 weapon and other nu-
clear explosive devices – in a manner that causes or is likely to 
cause death or serious injury or damage; 
(ii) discharges, from a ship, oil, liquefied natural gas, or other 
hazardous or noxious substance, in such quantity or concentra-
tion that causes or is likely to cause death or serious injury or 
damage;  
(iii) uses a ship in a manner that causes death or serious injury or 
damage; or  
(iv) threatens to commit any of these offences.” 64 
 
Another problem of this core regulation is that its wording just attempts to define some 
aspects of international terrorism on sea “to intimidate a population, or to compel a 
                                               
64  Id. 
 
187 
government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act”, but 
there is still no comprehensive definition of maritime terrorism or modern-day piracy.  
Also, the wording “unlawfully and intentionally” is not defined. Again, this is 
leading to interpretation problems and legal issues. For example, the question is, “what 
is meant by ‘intentionally’” when it comes to seizure of ships by force, acts of violence 
against persons on board ships, and the placing of devices on board a ship which is 
likely to destroy or damage it. The same happens with the wording “unlawfully.” 
It is not clear whether “unlawfully” refers to unlawful acts under international 
or national laws. Like the SUA Convention, also the 2005 Protocol to the 1988 SUA 
Convention is only binding to state parties who signed it. The maritime States that are 
most affected by piracy are non-signatories to either the SUA Convention or its proto-
cols, or none of the instruments at all.65  
Therefore, like the SUA Convention, according to my opinion, the amendments 
with the 2005 Protocol are so long ineffective as it does not bind the entire international 
community. So, its impact to the international suppression against piracy is very little 
and - apart from that, the SUA Convention and its 2005 Protocol remain still more a 
reactive rather than a preventative nature with regards to piracy and maritime terrorism. 
 
(b) Identifying Gaps in National Law 
 
Since piratical activities occur generally within regional boundaries, a logical counter 
would be to establish regional international agreements to combat piracy. However, the 
ability of States to suppress piracy is limited by International Law, which promotes on-
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ly individual state actions against pirates and makes no provision to encourage, much 
less coordinate, effective anti-piracy enforcement.  
Although UNCLOS requires that “all States shall cooperate to the fullest possi-
ble extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas,”66 no such an international au-
thority has been named or established to ascertain whether a state meets its obligation. 
As mentioned above, from a national perspective, due to the location of the piracy act, 
national criminal codes of each state could apply as far as there are regulations included 
regarding piracy.  
On the territorial seas, States other than the coastal States, do not have any ju-
risdiction for enforcement measures against piracy. One legal problem is that many 
criminal codes do not themselves define “piracy” or the “piracy act,” but merely pro-
vide for jurisdictions over those committing piracy “as defined by the law of the na-
tions.” For example, China has no special anti-piracy laws, but prosecutes piracy under 
its general criminal code.67  
Australia has–contrary to China–incorporated all UNCLOS’s piracy provisions 
into Part IV of its Crimes Act of 1914182 same did the United States. They have enact-
ed most of the provisions of SUA in their 18 U.S.C.§ 2280183.68 But when the national 
criminal code does not define the act of piracy or does not provide a separate single 
regulation for piracy acts, other existing criminal code regulations must be interpreted 
by States.  
                                               
66  Id. 
67  Girard, Geoffrey (2016). Tales of the Pirates. Middle Atlantic Press. ISBN 0-9754419-
5-7  
68  Menefee, Samuel (2016). Trends in Maritime Violence. Jane's Information 
Group. ISBN 0-7106-1403-9 
 
189 
These gaps in national criminal laws put the burden of interpretation and defini-
tion of piracy upon national judges respectively the municipal legal systems. As cus-
tomary International Law provides no agreed-upon definition for what acts constitute 
the international crime of piracy, the affected States must decide and interpret the inter-
nationally orientated definition of the offence and they do it differently. 
Furthermore, national courts may not have sufficient legal capacity or expertise 
to adjudicate serious crimes of international concern. Another legal problem is occur-
ring in regions that involve a multitude of coastal States, pirates may escape a patrol 
boat of one coastal state simply by entering the territorial seas of another coastal state 
which is maybe unwilling to respond to a pirate attack and would then object to any 
enforcement measure by other States. Therefore, even States which have the necessary 
resources and procedures to prosecute piracy, political reasons may prevent a pirates’ 
prosecution. For example, the States bordering the Malacca Strait are very reluctant to 
let other States undertake patrols in their territorial sea (especially patrols of the US na-
vy and coast guard).69  
In Somalia, an area where currently most of pirate attacks occur, no governmen-
tal patrol boats are controlling its coastal waters although piracy represents a consider-
able international problem in its waters. As Christopher Joyner States correctly in his 
legal article, with no operating official maritime policy presence at all – i.e., no coast 
guard, naval presence, patrol boats, defensive armaments, or staff training – the level of 
lawlessness in Somali waters is bound to grow.70  
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Besides, it can be reported that even in such States like the United Kingdom, pi-
rates of certain nationalities will not be prosecuted, as the United Kingdom asylum 
laws might allow the offender to remain in the country indefinitely after trial. The Brit-
ish Foreign Office in London has stated in a legal opinion that Somalian pirates who 
would be subject to harsh treatment in Somalia cannot be deported as this would be 
against the British Human Rights Act.71  
The same rules applied to Portugal. The Portuguese government only arrests pi-
rates when Portuguese nationals or ships are involved.72 Thus, instead of bringing pi-
rates to justice, a tradition of impunity reigns, with captured pirates being released and 
permitted to continue their illegal activities, has been performed. Particularly Western 
States are avoiding their duty to prosecute pirates because of fears that, if convicted, 
those pirates will then seek political asylum for themselves and their families. Though, 
no country would be eager to have to import pirate clans. Due to these facts and situa-
tion, it is obvious that, besides the international regulations on piracy, neither the na-
tional systems do work and are not prepared to combat the new developments of mod-
ern-day piracy.  
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4.2.1 States that allow Prosecution of Somali Piracy as a Crime Under Universal 
Jurisdiction 
 
As examined in the previous section, many States do not have law that permits 
them to prosecute piracy offenses, either because they have not incorporated the provi-
sions of UNCLOS or the SUA Convention, or because they do not have domestic laws 
that criminalize piracy. In both documents – UNCLOS and the SUA Convention, the 
United Nations have limited its member nations’ ability to respond to pirate attacks by 
preventing foreign incursions into the sovereign waters of another nation and thereby 
effectively crippling any opportunity to wage a fight against piracy.73 
Another reason is that they are unwilling to prosecute piracy. Besides, the cur-
rent international regulations with regards to piracy have failed to evolve to reflect the 
times and places limitations on those who can best combat the pirate crisis, the pirate’ 
victims and private entrepreneurs.  
Milena Sterio states in her legal article, that the reasons for this vary, but often 
there is only domestic criminal prosecution of pirates in place, the cost factors are too 
high for many States or States just simply want to avoid the hassle associated with 
prosecuting pirates because of fear that piracy trials will be difficult, lengthy, and bur-
densome on that nation’s judiciary.74 It is usual behavior of nations not to be interested 
to play the role of the global policeman on piracy and to takeover sole responsibility.  
Therefore, in recent years, several ad hoc tribunals have been established and 
some nations transferred captured pirates to regional partners like Kenya. But the ac-
ceptance of ad hoc tribunals for piracy prosecution is still questionable. With regards to 
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transfer of captured pirates to regional partnerships for their prosecution, the legality of 
such transfers to third parties is not given under International Law as it is not provided 
for in Article 105 of UNCLOS.75 The courts of the State which carried out the seizure 
may decide upon the penalties to be imposed, and may also determine the action to be 
take.  
While the SUA Convention allows such transfers of pirates to third-party States, 
there is again the problem that many countries are not members of the SUA Conven-
tion.76 Besides, I see the problem that it could be, that the capturing nation is bound by 
various human rights conventions and therefore may not transfer pirates to third States 
if there is a risk that pirates will be tortured in such third-party States, or that they will 
not receive a fair trial. 
The UN Security Council (UNSC) passed several resolutions in 2007 and 2008 
regarding piracy in Somalia. Resolution 1772 of 2007 stresses the importance of coop-
eration between the opposing factions in Somalia and reiterates the need for compre-
hensive and lasting cessation of hostilities.77 However, the most significant resolution 
of the UNSC was resolution 1816 that authorizes any, and all countries combating pira-
cy off the Somali coast to engage pirates on land or sea provided that there is advance 
consent by the Somali Transitional Federal Government (hereby it has to be mentioned 
that the Somali TGF is nearly non-functional, therefore it is very questionable whether 
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this condition of advance consent is sensible, it seems to be more a political diplomati-
cally action).78  
According to these facts, it seems like most States are shunning their judicial re-
sponsibility to prosecute the pirates who commit crimes in their territory or against 
their ships and crews. The reasons for this refusal are, as mentioned above, many: inad-
equate or non-existent national laws criminalizing the acts committed, concerns about 
the safety and impartiality of local judges, the difficulties of obtaining and preserving 
evidence, and fears that if convicted, the pirates would remain in the country where 
they are prosecuted.  
In addition to the need of a revision of international regulations on piracy, it is 
considered in the International Law community to establish a coinciding international 
crimes court just for piracy acts, an international court of justice for piracy. Article 105 
of UNCLOS provides thereby the following provision: “On the high seas, or in any 
other place outside the jurisdiction of any State, every State may seize a pirate ship or 
aircraft, or a ship or aircraft taken by piracy and under the control of pirates, and arrest 
the persons and seize the property on board."79  
The courts of the State which carried out the seizure may decide upon the penal-
ties to be imposed, and may also determine the action to be taken with regard to the 
ships, aircraft or property, subject to the rights of third parties acting in good faith.” and 
authorizes with it for any state to seize a pirate ship or aircraft and its property on 
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board, arrest the crew, and prosecute them through its own courts, as long as the seizure 
is on the high seas or on waters outside the jurisdiction of any state.  
Therefore, with this resolution, the UNSC made a legal exception by authoriz-
ing cooperating States to take the same steps with respect to piracy in the Somali terri-
torial sea as the law of piracy permits on the high seas. Furthermore, the UNSC has en-
dorsed actions by Canada, Denmark, France, India, the Netherlands, Russia, Spain, the 
United Kingdom, the United States, and other NATO forces to send warships to the 
Gulf of Aden region to combat pirates.80  
As well in Resolution 1846, the UNSC noted that the SUA Convention “pro-
vides for parties to create criminal offenses, establish jurisdiction, and accept the deliv-
ery of persons responsible for or suspected of seizing or exercising control over a ship 
by force or threat [of force] or any other form of intimidation” and thus urged state par-
ties to the SUA Convention to fully implement their obligations under the Convention, 
including cooperating with the IMO to “build judicial capacity for the successful prose-
cution of persons suspected of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Soma-
lia.”81 With regards to these recent and ongoing resolutions of the UNSC, the UNSC 
has been successful in identifying the scope of Somali piracy and encouraging a coor-
dinated international response, but its “real” effectiveness is still unobvious. While the 
UNSC resolutions have been helpful in combating piracy in some respects, they have 
not been provided adequate legal guideposts to foreign navies.  
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Accordingly, there is still the legal issue whether Western navies can act over 
the International Law and the permissible extent of the use of their force. The UNSC 
resolutions treat the enforcement jurisdiction exercised by foreign navies over pirates in 
Somali territorial seas is an exception to international Customary Law and not status 
quo.  
In addition, these naval operations tend to be ad hoc and defensive in nature, but 
they fail to focus on remedying the political instability that allows piracy in these most 
affected regions. Whether States which are parties to the SUA Convention are coopera-
tive enough to establish a regional tribunal court based on multilateral agreements and 
with the UN participation is as well more than unambiguous. 
 Problematic in this regard is also that, “the mere existence of universal jurisdic-
tion does not mean in national law a court may prosecute: that court will usually need a 
national law implementing the jurisdiction permitted by International Law.” Yet, only 
few signatory States have incorporated relevant UNCLOS provisions in their respective 
national laws.82 In case of the SUA Convention, however, States must establish the var-
ious acts, which the convention identifies as crimes in their domestic legal systems. 
The SUA Convention, moreover, places a clear duty on the capturing States to prose-
cute or turn in the accused. 
Struett et al. (2013) also observe a tension between public and private govern-
ance. Both UNCLOS and the SUA Convention clearly try to regulate States’ behavior 
when interacting with pirates, while the IMO promotes standards for both public and 
private actors. The IMB, on the other hand, “effectively has reconstructed the counter 
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piracy regime complex into a more neoliberal model in which the role of state actors is 
minimized.”83  
 However, such cooperative efforts face several legal challenges. The United 
States has not ratified the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which governs 
crimes, including piracy, in international waters. More broadly, the international legal 
regime continues to rely on individual countries to prosecute pirates, and governments 
have been reluctant to take on this burden. Accordingly, many pirates are apprehended, 
only to be quickly released. In addition, many large commercial vessels rely on private 
armed guards to prevent pirate attacks, but the legal foundations governing such a force 
are shaky at best.  
4.2.2 Armed Guards on Board 
  
As was mentioned above, there are various military multinational operations 
conducted in the Gulf of Aden. Many countries have sent warships to patrol this area 
and other important checkpoints. Not only do government vessels conduct these pa-
trols, but private military companies have been acting as security escorts of commercial 
vessels. These escorts include the presence of helicopters and armed security personnel 
who can operate from small inflatable boats.84  Private military companies are one 
of the many private military companies in the world that could take over this task. Still, 
these efforts have limited success. For instance, in November 2014 Russia, Britain and 
India managed to stop multiple piracy attacks separately. In the same year the US’s 
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fleet stopped 24 attacks.85  In spite of these successes, there are many pirate attacks that 
go undeterred.  
In fact, pirates seem to be growing bolder. Once they seize a ship, they take the 
crew hostage and threaten to sink the ship. This limits the possible action of the war-
ships.86  The warships do face complications other than the threat of sinking the ships. 
For instance, if the navy boards the hostage ship, do they fire and use military force and 
risk harming the crew or should they take all security risk reducing steps to avoid un-
necessary harm? Although Article 100 of UNCLOS imposes one duty alone on States 
regarding piracy: “Cooperation,” this, does not provide any detail on the nature of such 
cooperation. Without any guidance of cooperation by an international body, States will 
have difficulties organizing global cooperation to combat piracy. 
Therefore, there are discussions to amend the provisions of UNCLOS, and al-
low crews on vessels to arm themselves, and allow them to use similar weapons like 
those the pirates use. This view is supported by the IMB as they believe that ships and 
crews must be armed in proportion to the seriousness of the piracy threat the waters 
pose.87 They propose to include to UNCLOS the following provision, “A State shall 
have the right to arm any ship flying its flag with sufficient arms to protect its ships in 
any territory governed by this Convention.” Apart of this, if such a provision would be 
included in UNCLOS regulations upon piracy, it needs also to provide limitation and 
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guidance on this privilege to bear arms on vessels which are not warships or naval ves-
sels.  
Ethan C. Stiles States that by allowing an arming of crews, there should be a le-
gal requirement to file an inventory, to send inspectors to board and inspect the ship’s 
weapon inventories, and some further control actions need to be implemented to pre-
vent misuse of arms and weapons on board and in ports as well as any damage to third 
parties.88 The danger that such kind of weapons could be misused and usually violation 
will be answered with violation.  
It could be that arming ship crews could cause an escalation of violence in pira-
cy incidents. Therefore, I have doubts whether such measures would help limit the in-
crease in the piracy threat. A General Assessment of Past and Future Legal Develop-
ments and Regulations After all, the international community appears to understand the 
severity of the problem of modern piracy and that it will not disappear unless the inter-
national community takes aggressive action to combat it. 
As stated above, at present, no treaty expressly requires States to criminalize pi-
racy, no agreement has been reached on what such laws should contain, and no interna-
tional court has overall jurisdiction to try pirates.89 The existing International Law of 
piracy imposes no specific duties to prosecute or enact domestic law criminalizing pi-
racy, tough it does provide States with various kinds of authority to assist in the repres-
sion of piracy.  
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The IMB stated that its Piracy Reporting Centre is increasingly seen as among 
the primary authorities in the world of counter-piracy. The IMB acknowledges and 
promotes the increasing role for private security firms on board, supplanting the tradi-
tional approach to the state as the sole provider of security. It focuses the actors’ atten-
tion on immediate questions such as how to protect cargo rather than on a long-term 
political or legal approach to maritime piracy.90 
4.2.3 Response to Somali Piracy 
 
The Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia 
Not only has the confusion about the appropriate (legal) response to maritime piracy 
resulted in an ineffective prosecution of pirates, the global response to piracy prior to 
2009 was also poorly coordinated.91 Witnessing the deteriorating circumstances for 
shipping off the coast of Somalia in the mid-2000s, the international community at-
tempted to address the shortcomings in the governance of maritime piracy.  
The most significant step towards global coordination was the establishment of 
the Contact Group on Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS), which originated 
from UN Security Council Resolution 1851 (2008). This resolution acknowledged the 
need for collective problem solving and encouraged: 
…all States and regional organizations fighting piracy and armed 
robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia to establish an international 
cooperation mechanism to act as a common point of contact be-
tween and among States, regional and international organizations on 
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all aspects of combating piracy and armed robbery at sea off Soma-
lia’s coast.”92  
 
While the UN called for the establishment of a cooperative forum, the CGPCS is not 
formally a UN Contact group, which allows it to act independently and to be more flex-
ible in terms of bureaucracy and procedure.93 
 The Actors in the CGPCS are intentionally described as “participants,” not as 
“members,” in order “to sidestep thorny diplomatic issues, such as clashes between tra-
ditional rivals over the inclusion of a contested territory”.94 The inclusion of new par-
ticipants is very flexible, States or organizations can simply apply to be the chairman of 
the Contact Group. 
 The CGPCS must be understood as a coordinating body, it is not a formal insti-
tution. Hence, it does not possess a secretary, bureaucracy, or budget. It works in three 
types of formats: a plenary, five working groups, and various ad-hoc sub-groups and 
ad-hoc meetings.95 The communiqué of the second plenary details that the decisions of 
the Contact Group are “taken by consensus” and that working groups “do not take deci-
sions, but only make recommendations through Chairmen’s summaries for considera-
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tion by the CGPCS”.96 The chairmanship of the plenary and the working groups is vol-
untary and rotates; the European Union chairs the CGPCS in 2014. The five CGPCS 
Working Groups work on narrowly defined topics with clearly separated areas. 
 
4.3 Somali Domestic Law  
 
4.3.1 Inadequacy of old Criminal Laws in Tackling Piracy (2012) 
 
Prosecutions for acts of piracy have so far been conducted unsatisfactorily un-
der the outdated Somali Republic laws.  The 1959 Somalia Maritime Code (which with 
slight modifications still applies to Somaliland since 1967) deals with piracy and muti-
ny by masters or crews of ships under Article 205 and 206 as follows: 
Article 205 – Piracy: The master or officer of Somaliland or foreign vessels 
who commits acts of depredation to the damage of a Somaliland or foreign ves-
sel or its cargo, or for this purpose commit violence against persons on board 
Somaliland or foreign vessels, are punished by imprisonment from 10 to 20 
years. 
Article 206 - Taking Possession of the Vessel: Crew members of a vessel who 
take possession of the same are punished: - 
1. by imprisonment from 10 to 20 years if the fact is committed with vi-
olence or threat against the master the other officers. 
2. by imprisonment from 3 to 10 years if the fact is committed clandes-
tinely or by fraudulent means. 
For promoters and heads, the punishment is increased up to one third. 
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If the fact is committed by a person extraneous to the crew the punishment is 
reduced by one third.”97 
 
It is not possible, however, for Article 205 of this Code to be used to prosecute the use 
of skiffs and other small or large ships by pirates as we have witnessed in the Gulf of 
Aden and the coasts off Somalia, because the Articles apply only to masters of ships or 
boats and their crew whose employment status is regulated under the Code. The ap-
pointment and duties of ship masters, the recruitment and contracts and duties of the 
crew and the supervisory role of the Maritime Authority over all these matters are all 
set out in Articles 92 to 110 of this Code.  
 The 1962 Penal Code has been used in the piracy cases that have been prosecut-
ed so far, but the Code which does not include piracy as a crime has considerable under 
limitations. Article 486 of the Code States that, the detention of a person with the ob-
ject of obtaining a wrongful releasing him (Kidnapping) shall incur punishment of 8 to 
15 years or 12 to 18 years if the crime is successful.  
Article 486 is relevant to situations where persons are held as hostages until 
payments by them or by third parties are made but does not apply to the holding of 
ships or other vessels. In contrast Article 485 covers the more general crime of extor-
tion - compelling someone to do or refrain from doing an act so that a wrongful gain 
may be obtained, and carries punishment of 3 to 10 years imprisonment, which can be 
increased by one third or a half where there are aggravating circumstances.98  
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Article 485 is more applicable to the threat of or violence being directed at any 
person who is then made to do the act that the offender wanted to do (and not necessari-
ly to someone who is detained).99  The threat or the violence can relate to persons or to 
any kind of property, including a ship.  It differs from the general offence of robbery 
(in Article 484) in that, the latter specifically applies the taking of any movable proper-
ty from a person by means of, or by threat of, violence, which is more immediate. 
 In short, taking away the personal belongings and a yacht from its owners by 
means of force  in the territorial seas (although there are of course problems with So-
malia’s 1972 Law which defines the territorial sea as 200 nautical miles, a distance 
that, for various reasons,  is not applicable to Somaliland) could amount to robbery un-
der Article 484; compelling them (or others) to pay more money by means of violence 
or threats can amount to extortion under Article 485 and holding them until they or an-
yone else makes a payment would bring Article 486 into the role of the law applicable. 
In the more common cases, involving ship crews who are detained by force, the more 
relevant provision is likely to be Article 486.100 
  It is worth noting that one of the many draconian criminal laws enacted during 
the Somalian military dictatorship (between 1969 to 1990) was the 1975 Kidnapping 
Law (Law No. 36 of 30 April 1975) which repealed Article 486 of the Penal Code and 
replaced it with a narrow and specific offence of kidnapping and/or hijacking. The Law 
covered all such acts committed in the territory of the Somali Democratic Republic or 
“abroad” but, unlike Article 7 of the Penal Code, 101 did not specify that the act should 
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have been committed in the territory of another country.   
Article 1 of this Law States that,  
1. Any person who kidnaps a person, [or hijacks] an aircraft or any 
other type of transport with the intention of securing payment of 
money or property or of gaining political benefit which is contrary 
to the public interest of the state of Somalia, its peace and the So-
mali Revolutionary policies shall be punished by death. 
 
2. Any other persons involved in the organization of this offence 
shall also incur the same punishment referred to in clause 1 of this 
Article.”102  
The law also adds that any person who was aware of such offences and did not inform 
the security forces would incur imprisonment of 20 to 30 years (Article 5).  All the of-
fences in this Law were tried at the special National Security Court (Article 6) from 
which there was no appeal against its decisions, (and not at the ordinary courts), and 
the Supreme Revolutionary Council had the power (under Article 2) to decide the fate 
of the offenders if the offences were not “against the public interest, independence, uni-
ty or the general policies of the Revolution.”103 Understandably, this Code (and other 
similar security related laws passed by the military dictatorship between 1969 to 1990) 
is considered in Somaliland as not compatible with Article 130(5) of the Constitution 
which allows the continued use and implementation of the pre-1991 laws unless they 
conflict with fundamental rights and freedoms or with the provisions of the Constitu-
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Indeed the 1993 Somaliland National Charter which preceded the Constitution 
that was initially adopted in 1997 (prior to its adoption after a national referendum) on-
ly authorized the use of pre-1969 laws which predated the military regime, but the Arti-
cle 130(5) formula was adopted in 1997 to avoid too many gaps in the legislation until 
new laws are promulgated.  The 1975 Kidnapping Law is therefore considered as hav-
ing been no longer applied and is no longer in use in Somaliland.105  It is unlikely that 
this law will be used in areas of Somalia (such as Puntland) where the Penal Code is 
currently used. 
The Penal Code, pursuant to its civil law tradition, addresses attempt and insti-
gation, but does not deal with other inchoate crimes adequately in the same manner as 
is normally dealt with in the common law countries. Attempts are defined in Article 17 
of this Code as acts “unequivocally directed towards causing the event which has not 
be entirely completed or where the event has not resulted” and the reduced punishments 
are set out in Article 125.106  
 Although the joint participation in an offence that is committed or attempted is 
covered by Articles 71 and 73, agreements (conspiracy, in common law countries) to 
commit an offence which has not been committed are not punishable with imprison-
ment, unless they are “political conspiracies” to commit offences against the state (Ar-
ticle 232).  Instead Article 76 (which is identical to Article 115 of the pre-1962 Italian 
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Penal Code) States that, except as otherwise provided by law, where two or more per-
sons agree to commit an offence which is not committed, they shall not be punished for 
making the agreement, but the Court may apply security measures (police surveillance) 
to them. The same applies to situations where in cases of instigation (or incitement) to 
commit an offence but the offence was not committed (Article 76(2)).107  
 As part of the public order offences, however, if the instigation or incitement 
was done publicly in an open place, it is a public order offence under Article 320 pun-
ishable with imprisonment from one to five years.  Another public order offence of as-
sociation under Article 322 may be used to prosecute any group associating to commit 
more than one crime and if they roam about carrying arms, they may incur punishment 
from five to fifteen years.108   
 There is no offence in the Penal Code comparable to “going equipped” to com-
mit acts of theft or robbery, and, unless the matter can be dealt with as an attempt, pre-
paratory acts of mere possession of skiffs or boats for piracy may be difficult to prose-
cute adequately under the Penal Code.109  There is also no general offence of conspira-
cy to commit a crime separate from the actual commission as a part of group which is 
adequately covered and can increase the individual sentences incurred (as set out in Ar-
ticles 71, 73 and 74 of the Code). 
Because of these shortcomings of the Penal Code, it has been reported that other 
less relevant articles of the Penal Code may have been used.  The provisions mentioned 
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were Article 230 (instigation to commit crimes against the personality of the state), Ar-
ticle 234 (participation in armed groups to commit crimes referred to in Article 230), 
Articles 222 (Devastation, Pillage and Slaughter whilst trying against the state); and 
324 (Devastation and Pillage).110  This simply underlined the inadequacy of the Penal 
Code in addressing acts of piracy and the crimes arising from them. 
 There is also the issue of territoriality.  There are only a few crimes listed in Ar-
ticle 7 (and 8) of the Penal Code, such as crimes against the state, which can be tried in 
Somaliland/Somalia even though they were committed “abroad” (i.e. outside the terri-
tory of the state).111 Any offences in respect of (the) Somali penal Code are made ap-
plicable by international conventions (Article 7).   
 The reference to a foreign territory means, however, that crimes committed on 
the high seas cannot be brought within the purview of Article 7 even though the acts 
may be covered by an international convention, such as UN Convention of the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS) which was ratified by the pre-1991 Somali Democratic Republic in 
1989. Incidentally the 1975 Kidnapping Law applied simply to the crimes committed 
“abroad” and did not confine them to those committed in foreign countries.112 
    Under the previous applicable legislation, particularly Somalia’s 1962 Penal 
Code, acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea where arguably punishable as armed 
robbery (Article 484), extortion (Article 485) and kidnapping (Article 486). Additional 
issues arose regarding the applicable forms of participation to these crimes as well as 
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the punishment of inchoate crimes.113 Recourse to the 1975 Kidnapping Law, adopted 
during the military dictatorship, was particularly problematic due to the possible un-
constitutionally breach of fundamental human rights by its provisions, which also in-
cluded the jurisdiction over this crime by a special national security court.  
 Finally, Articles 205-206 of the 1959 Somalia Maritime Code criminalize pira-
cy and mutiny carried out by ship masters and crews.114 However, these articles do not 
provide sufficient legal basis to contrast the current pirate modus operandi in the Gulf 
of Aden, where pirates often operate off small and unregistered skiffs and without a 
formalized chain of command.  
 It must be noted how the Anti-Piracy Law eliminates within its judicial system 
the Customary Law distinction between piracy and armed robbery at sea, defining any 
attack within Somaliland territorial waters as “piracy” (Article 2(1)(c)). The new law 
also repels Articles 205-206 of the 1959 Maritime Code (Article 13, see also Article 9) 
and affirms the applicability of the 1962 Penal Code for matters not specifically dealt 
with within the law (Article 14), for instance regarding forms of participation in the 
commission of the crime.115  
 More importantly, the law introduces a term of imprisonment of 5 to 20 years 
(Article 4) without the possibility of conversion of a sentence into a fine (Article 10). In 
the case of murder, the provisions of Article 434 of the Penal Code, which provides for 
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the death penalty, will apply.116 In addition, the law has expanded the definition of pi-
racy set forth in UNCLOS by adding two forms of participation: ‘willful participation’ 




With a significant increase of attacks in the mid-2000s, piracy off the Somali 
coast became a relevant issue on the international agenda. While there are various in-
ternational regimes and institutional bodies attempting to govern piracy, they do not 
constitute a cohesive framework.117 UNCLOS, the SUA Convention, IMO, and IMB 
offer diverging norms and expose many tensions regarding the definition of the target 
and the location of the crime, the duty of collaboration, and the responsibility for gov-
ernance. These inter-regime tensions and the lack of cooperation between the affected 
actors gave Somali pirates the opportunity to operate with impunity. 
 The rights of coastal States over their territorial waters are the result of a long-
fought battle. The debate on the freedom of navigation and the sovereignty of States 
over their waters ended in the establishment of certain zones where States enjoyed ex-
clusive jurisdiction. This was a necessary development since States felt there was a 
need to protect their coastal communities. Moreover, States began to link sovereignty 
over their territorial waters with the protection of their national security.  
 The road to the UNCLOS was a long road filled with many complications and 
disagreements. Changing the UNCLOS in a way that makes States able to pursue pi-
rates in the territorial waters of other States would mean a violation of rights the inter-
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national community has fought for.  Defining piracy as an act that can occur in territo-
rial waters and urging all States to use all necessary means to stop piracy acts would 
mean that it would be perfectly normal for States to enter each other’s territorial waters 
under the guise of pursuing pirates. This can be ultimately perceived as threat to a 
state’s national security.  
 Many nations, such as Somalia, that are in “piracy territories” are ill-equipped 
to prosecute piracy cases even if they had sufficient domestic laws. Further, they do not 
have the political stability, institutions, or personnel to allow them to investigate and 
fairly adjudicate such matters. The problem of defining piracy is significant for the case 
of the Somali pirates because it implicates that it is a matter of degree and not of char-
acterization what differentiates the activities of pirates.118   
 For instance, Somali piracy can be considered a consequence of the lack of law 
enforcement, political disorder and severe impoverishment in the country. Political and 
economic instability with the proliferation of weapons led to an environment that en-
courages and nourishes piracy. As a result, it became difficult to pinpoint the Somali 
pirates.119  
 However, the main problem in the establishment of the International Law of the 
sea was the controversial debate on the dominion of the sea. States were divided over 
two main principles. One group of States defended the principle of territorial integrity 
and sovereignty over the sea. The other group of States advocated the importance of the 
principle of free navigation. The International Law of the sea had to ascertain a balance 
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between these two principles. 
The significance of Somali piracy as a research topic is that it adds to the debate 
on the International Law of the sea. The law provides for regulations regarding piracy. 
At the same time, it establishes the rights of coastal States regarding the integrity of 
their territoriality and the sanctity of their sovereignty. The case of Somali piracy pro-
vides a challenge to this legal order. It is a case where International Law of the sea fails 
to work, but most importantly is it is a case where the presumed sanctity of territoriality 
and sovereignty over the sea can be put under question.   
 
 















The international community is facing the danger of sea piracy on an unprecedented 
scale. The vessels of all States, their crews and the economies of all sea-faring States, 
are at great risk because of the pervasiveness of modern piracy, which is employing 
advanced technology and even loopholes in the law, to carry out its nefarious objec-
tives. A deep study illustrates that the waters around the Somali coast, and other parts 
of Africa, are in great danger because of piracy. That is the reason the United Nations 
Security Council has declared piracy a threat to the international maritime security and 
peace. 
 As noted throughout this work, sea piracy has enjoyed a long history. Major 
global powers such as Great Britain, the United States, France, and Holland have put 
great efforts into eliminating piracy and maintain control over the shipping lanes of the 
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oceans. After fifteen years of Cold War, however, and the desolation of the former So-
viet Union, we must accept the fact that sea piracy has been increasing since 1980.1
 Since 1982, there has been a trend towards globalization and liberalization, also 
it had stipulated the sea trade throughout the world in the other hand provide an oppor-
tunity for pirates to extend their nefarious activities on the high seas. In the early day, 
ship owners ordered their crews not to report pirate attacks, because the legal action 
could be tedious and cumbersome. Instead, they restricted their ships from areas subject 
to piracy. As piracy has become a main concern for seafarers, depriving them of at 1% 
of their total income, all the major shipping companies have put the piracy issue on the 
international agenda.2 
Nevertheless, the need for regional cooperation with respect to greater efforts 
toward coordinated anti-piracy patrols is one universally agreed upon goal. After all, 
the question is whether an international “criminal code” for piracy needs to be estab-
lished. Besides, to successfully combat piracy and maritime terrorism, international co-
operation is also required. Current legal development and discussions from a global 
perspective is desired.  
After a long discussion, the conclusion of all piracy situation would be placed in 
this last chapter. According to previous chapters, from the history to the recent situa-
tions also the law enforcement which have governed Somali acts of Pirates, many prob-
lems and legal loop hole were illustrated. There are several comments and recommen-
dations provided to solve the imperfect structure, yet Somali acts of piracy are still ac-
                                               
1  Id. 
2  Id. 
 
214 
tive and not completely eradicated. The last part of this chapter presents the best solu-




In the nineteenth century, piracy was not much of a concern for maritime security. This 
was because of the Declaration Respecting Maritime Law that was signed in Paris in 
1856. This declaration outlawed state-sponsored piracy, which meant that privateering 
became illegal. However, the resurgence of piracy in the late twentieth century and es-
pecially in the last decade in South-East Africa has made a sophisticated international 
legal framework for piracy necessary.3  
 As discussed in the first chapter, “Piracy: the world’s oldest crime against the 
law of nations,” does not have a universal definition, which in my opinion is one of the 
core problems. As described in the second chapter of this thesis, international treaty 
and Customary Law provide a narrow basis under which pirates can be apprehended on 
the high seas or elsewhere. As discussed in Chapter Two, whether a pirate can be pros-
ecuted depends on where he is captured, his nationality, the nationality of the ship that 
arrests him and the circumstances under which he is arrested. Therefore, the interna-
tional community has discussed whether an international new treaty regarding piracy is 
required and whether it could solve these problems.  
As described before, lacking national and regional enforcement capability, pa-
trol navies are necessary to quell the rise of piracy. The United Nations Security Coun-
cil, as well as the IMO oversees organizing and implementing naval control and en-
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forcement measures, especially for certain piracy affected regions and they should also 
use this capacity more effectively. The lawlessness of the sea made this possible.4 An 
ad hoc piracy tribunal requires an appropriate housing and detention facility, a well-
train judiciary, prosecution and defense counsel, and a uniform piracy law which would 
be applicable to all captured pirates. 
 
 
5.1.1 Overview of Piracy and International Law 
 
Piracy was first codified in the 1958 Geneva Convention. According to the 1958 Con-
vention, piracy contained various acts including robbery and acts of terrorism.5 As 
mentioned in Chapter Two, in 1932 the Harvard Research Group (HRG) drafted a con-
vention that examined the many definitions of piracy, as well as the views of various 
legal jurists and municipal laws that addressed the question whether piracy could be 
considered an offense against all nations. 
 The HRG sought to develop a definition that would be acceptable to all States 
of the international community.6 They did this in reaction to the report of the subcom-
mittee of the League of Nations Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification 
of International Law, which States that  “it would be preferable for the Committee to 
adopt a clear definition of piracy applicable to all States in virtue of International Law 
in general.”7  
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The HRG first concluded that because the definitional characteristics of piracy 
varied in municipal law, convictions and punishment could likewise vary depending on 
the state that enforced the law. The HRG stated that within the international community 
there was no authority that could coordinate piracy enforcement.8 Thus, while the pos-
sibility of criminal acts occurring in international zones exist, the only available legal 
tools to address these acts were municipal, and lacked an international authority to co-
ordinate them.9   
 The problems defining piracy started when the international community tried to 
use municipal law to create a definition for piracy acts that could apply to international 
zones, such as the High Seas. A universal definition was difficult to achieve because of 
the different views States had on the scope of acts of piracy and the geographical reach 
of these acts.10  Still, pirates were considered, as discussed in Chapter One, hostis hu-
mani generis, enemies of the human race. This conceptualization of a crime against 
mankind was the reason there was a common agreement that nations had the responsi-
bility to act against pirates. This meant that pirates were subjected to the municipal law 
of the nation if they were captured.11 Therefore, any nation could prosecute a “common 
enemy,” using its domestic legal tools that varied, however, in form and character ac-
cording to that nation.12  
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 Acts of piracy are considered special offenses because they are punishable 
where encountered. Yet, even if nations could agree on universal piracy law and even 
with the presence of an international authority or tribunal that prosecuted pirates, pri-
vate persons are not legal persons under International Law.13 When the HRGroup com-
bined these views, they concluded that there was no such offence as piracy under na-
tional law.14 
 Based on these findings, the ICL published a report that became the basis of the 
1958 Geneva Convention. Articles 14 and 22 of the Geneva Convention addressed the 
piracy issue by stating the regulations applied to all ships, especially innocent passage 
issues which were almost literally repeated in articles 100, 107 and 110 of the UN-
CLOS.  The UNCLOS however, provided a more extensive definition of piracy.15 Fur-
thermore, the ICL argued that piracy does not necessarily have to be related to motives 
such as robbery, yet the ICL drafted the definition for the UNCLOS, as stated in Chap-
ter 2, that pirate acts could also be driven by motives such as hatred.16 Moreover, they 
asserted that piracy could only be committed by private ships, and not by warships or 
other government ships, yet they excluded cases of mutiny.17 
 The definition of piracy and the related state response provided a limitation be-
cause of the High Seas component. The territorial sea, internal waters and archipelagic 
waters are excluded. Furthermore, the reference to the High Seas made the Economical 
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Exclusive Zone (EEZ) an interesting subject because it failed to clarify how States 
should act when they encounter pirates in this zone. During the Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea, a proposition to include the EEZ in the definition of 
piracy was rejected.18 However, the UNCLOS did provide methods to combat piracy in 
this area. Article 58(2) States that Articles 88 to 115 of the International Law apply to 
the EEZ so far as they are not incompatible with this part.19 Moreover, the EEZ includ-
ed the contiguous zone as was defined in Article 55. This meant that piracy acts outside 
the territorial waters were treated as if they were committed on the High Sea.  
Under the pressure of maritime powers, the UN Security Council has passed a 
series of resolutions to repress piracy on the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden. 
One of the most interesting resolutions is resolution 1816, which addresses a shortcom-
ing of the definition of piracy which describes piracy as acts conducted only on the 
high seas.20 Because of this description, States are not able to do anything about the 
attacks conducted in the territorial waters of Somalia. They are also not able to respond 
efficiently when ships attacked on the High Sea are brought to Somali ports as de-
scribed in Chapter 4.21  
 “The authorization has been provided only following receipt of the letter from 
the Permanent Representative of the Somalia Republic to the United Nations to the 
President of the Security Council dated 27 February 2008 conveying the consent of the 
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TFG.”22 Naval ships can find themselves in the position where they must transfer ar-
rested pirates for prosecution. This provision however is based on the principle that the 
Somali government agrees with the exercise of the jurisdiction by member States of the 
EU.23  Thus, the EU did not base the mission’s authorization on the UN Resolution. An 
interesting notification in Resolution 1816 regarding the consent of the coastal state is 
the reference to the States responding to piracy attacks. The United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea encourages ‘all States’ to cooperate and repress piracy and armed 
robbery as mentioned in Chapter 2.24 In contrast, Resolution 1816 limits the authoriza-
tion only to 
States cooperating with the TFG in fighting against piracy and 
armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, for which advance 
notification has been provided by the TFG to the Secretary-
General.25 
 
This seems to emphasize, as analyzed in Chapter 4, the importance of Somalia 
in allowing authorization to act within its territorial waters only to States that Somalia 
is already cooperating with. Thus, Somalia maintains control over its territory.26 By 
stressing the importance of the consent of the coastal States under charter VII, the UN 
Security Council achieves three goals. The first goal is to show the importance of the 
sovereignty of States and illustrate the Security Council’s respect of this principle. This 
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ensures that the concerns about a change of the International Law of the sea are 
soothed.27  
The second goal is to make the position of Somalia in the United Nation strong-
er and to especially strengthen the position of the TFG because Somalia lacks the re-
sources to combat piracy off its coast. This measure gives Somalia a sense of power 
and instruments to fight the pirates.28 Furthermore, by adding this clause to the Resolu-
tion and referring to ‘States in cooperation with the TFG’ the Security Council suc-
ceeds in limiting the presence of the naval fleets on the coast of Somali to the fleets of 
States that are already involved in combating Somali piracy and to States that are will-
ing to cooperate.29 On the other hand, these acts have denied the naval forces efficient 
protection against acts of piracy off the Somali Coast. 
Finally, requesting and receiving the permission of the TFG to operate on the 
Somali territorial waters ends the debate about the legal width of the territorial waters 
of Somalia. However, since the permission of Somalia to enter its territorial waters 
means that warships can be everywhere no matter the width of these territorial waters, a 
discussion about the limits of these waters was avoided.30 
 According to the procedure after piracy arresting, the first transfer agreement 
was made between the Seychelles and the Somali Transitional Federal Government 
(TFG) in February 2011. This served as a legal model, which was soon extended to 
other agreements as stated in chapter 4. The Post Trial Transfer agreements were estab-
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lished in close collaboration with UNODC’s Counter-Piracy Program, which is devoted 
to constructing and modernizing prisons and courtrooms in Kenya, Seychelles, Mauri-
tius, and Somalia.31 
Therewith, facilitated the establishment of an effective mechanism that reached 
from apprehension to prosecution and sentencing. Although it does not lead to a high 
rate of prosecution, the system is a first step towards fighting impunity. Liisberg, an 
academic scholar on the law of piracy, explains that this system has contributed to an 
increased number of prosecuted pirates and a change in public perception regarding the 
efficiency of fighting piracy. National governments have redoubled efforts to bring pi-
rates to justice as well. In 2010, the United States held its first piracy trial since its civil 
war, soon followed by Germany's first trial in over four hundred years. Other agree-
ments have been established to try pirates in nearby countries like Kenya, such as the 
UNODC Trust Fund to Support the Initiatives of States to Counter Piracy of the Coast 
of Somalia, established in January 2010 as stated in Chapter 2. 
The IMO assists Member Countries in revising national legislation to criminal-
ize piracy, attacks against ships, and other illicit maritime activities; coordinating struc-
tures and procedures; and having in place well-trained operational, technical and logis-
tical personnel. A Code of Conduct concerning the repression of piracy, armed robbery 
against ships, and illicit maritime activity in west and central Africa was adopted for-
mally in Yaoundé in June 2013 by Heads of State or their representatives from twenty-
five West and Central African countries. IMO’s strategy and initiatives for enhancing 
maritime security and supporting development of a vibrant, sustainable maritime sector 
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in West and Central Africa, aims to ensure successful implementation of the Code of 
Conduct.32 
 
5.1.2 Problems Preventing and Combating Piracy 
 
The legal definition of piracy has provided for the necessary problems in the 
modern time as well. Joseph M. Isanga, federalist expert, States that fundamental to the 
discussion of establishing a new international legal treaty with regards to piracy, is an 
agreed-upon definition of what is piracy, who are the offenders, and who may prose-
cute them. If coastal States have no obligation to enact domestic laws aimed at combat-
ing acts considered to be piracy under International Law, the piracy threat will remain 
and increase.33 
The lack of uniformity in the definition of piracy throughout the world, in con-
junction with the complete absence of any definition of piracy in some countries, will 
continue to impede efforts to reduce incidents of piracy. Therefore, I agree with Isanga 
that there is a need for an overall accepted definition of piracy which applies to all pos-
sible form of this crime, and that the improvement of domestic laws, especially those 
pertaining to jurisdiction over piracy, is vital to ensure an effective enforcement regime 
problem as described in Chapter 4. 
On the other hand, UNCLOS does not provide a comprehensive definition what 
“piracy” means and Article 105 is only limited to actions on the “high seas.” Further-
more, the “may-wording” of Article 105 does not make it obligatory for the States to 
take jurisdictional action. Besides, this option has not been exercised much by States in 
                                               
32  Id. 
33  Id. 
 
223 
the past few years. Modifications of UNCLOS can be done according to Article 311 of 
UNCLOS as mentioned in Chapter 2 which provides that two or more state parties may 
conclude agreements modifying or suspending the operation of provisions of this Con-
vention, applicably solely between them.34 I agree that it would be easier to expand the 
existing regime of piracy in the UNCLOS provisions than establishing a totally new 
international code on piracy crime. 
The presence of international navies may sometimes deter pirates, but navies 
are for fighting wars; they are neither pirate chasers nor can they be everywhere all the 
time to suppress every piratical act. When asked about the presence of foreign military 
within Somalia’s territorial waters, a Somali pirate replied, “We are not scared of the 
U.S. troops or any other troops stationed off our waters. Why should we be scared? 
They have weapons, but so do we. And we are the ones with the human shields.”35  
I believe that the problem should be met where it starts. Hence, once it is estab-
lished why people engage in piracy and maritime terrorism as stated in Chapter 3, it is 
then possible to develop a comprehensive strategy for resolving the problem. This is 
how an anonymous Somali pirate highlighted the interconnectivity of violence, piracy 
and a lack of governmental reaction: “I am Somali; the gun is our government.”  
It shows that the African region lacks a harmonized legal framework to deal 
with piracy. African States concentrated on the land and ignored the potential of the sea 
as an instrument for economic growth.36  Since 2007, there was a call for the African 
Union to recognize the importance of the sea and to develop a regional legal frame-
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work. The attacks on the Somali coast and the Gulf of Aden only strengthened this as 
mentioned in Chapter 3.37 There are examples of successful response to piracy. Piracy 
in South-East Asia has been known to reach high proportions, especially during the 
eighties and nineties of the previous centuries. Piracy attacks in this region diminished 
during the last decade.38 Piracy attacks on the Somali Coast and the Gulf of Aden has 
its limitations, and there is a lesson to be learned.39  
 Limitations of the comparison exist in the sense that piracy in this region is not 
the same as the Somali piracy, because the type of lawlessness and the lack of commu-
nity support for pirates in Somalia do not exist in South East Asia. The Asian case 
does, however, show that a regional approach to piracy can be effective in reducing the 
attacks. States around the Strait of Malacca such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore 
signed various multilateral agreements in favor of a good cooperation and coordination 
in pursuing pirates.40  
 In June 2013, Memorandum of Understanding between ECCAS, ECOWAS and 
GGC,41 the parties agreed to (1) hold annual meetings to provide guidance, monitoring 
and evaluation of regional cooperation and (2) create an Inter-regional Coordination 
Centre (ICC) for the implementation of the regional strategy for maritime safety and 
security. Yet, all these MOU are only soft law which recently not binding any actor of 
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39            Id. 
40  Id. 
41  ECCAS: Economic Community of Central African States     ECOWAS: The Economic 
Community of West African States. 
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the piratical acts. Meaning that, all the agreements don't have any legal effect. 
 The first draft of what would be known later as Resolution 1816 was sponsored 
by the US, France, the UK and Panama and was sent to the other members of the Secu-
rity Council in 28 April 2008. This draft was based on the request of IMO to the Secu-
rity Council to encourage States to act against piracy and to permit ships to enter the 
territorial waters of Somalia when they suspect piracy activities or armed robberies as 
stated above.42  Until this moment, the UN Security Council did discourage action of 
other States taken near the coast of Somalia to protect their commercial ships because 
of International Law limitations on sovereignty issue.  
 In addition, the Security Council was bounded by its earlier statements and res-
olutions regarding this aspect.43 For instance, the Security Council’s presidential state-
ment of March 2006 declared the Security Council’s respect “for the sovereignty, terri-
torial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia, consistent with the pur-
poses and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.”44   
  The legal gaps between the various international regimes and institutional bod-
ies attempting to govern maritime piracy have, hence, not been eliminated, but are now 
governed more successfully through multi-stakeholder collaboration. While increased 
international cooperation existed on the military level, it was clear that a merely repres-
sive approach to piracy could not be sufficient.45 The participants were convinced that a 
meaningful governance of piracy off the coast of Somalia had to find a viable system 
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for prosecution, giving States an incentive to end the “catch and release” tactic and, 
therewith, closing the impunity gap. Two issues were of primary importance: Finding a 
regulation for where pirates would be prosecuted and determining where to incarcerate 
those convicted are necessary. 
“A total of 1,200 individuals have been convicted of piracy or awaited trial in 
twenty-one States world-wide – a very clear sign that there is no such thing as impunity 
for pirates.”46The international community has continued to serve as a forum to share 
information on the latest developments on prosecution, pending piracy court trials, and 
prison capacities. Affected by the proliferation of piracy and interested in its suppres-
sion, both public and private actors established a forum to jointly govern piracy off the 
coast of Somalia in 2009.47 While it did not create new law to govern maritime piracy, 
it only clarified the existing legal framework and facilitated the establishment of new 
models of cooperation. 
Coming up with a clear agreed upon standard for the provision of armed securi-
ty with no clear regulation on armed security will not be easy. Currently many major 
maritime entities insist on armed escorts which keep armed men off their corporate ves-
sels as well as the liability. Nevertheless, placing armed men on commercial ships is 
still not embraced to the international security regulations; consider the following pas-
sage for example:  
The carriage of firearms on board merchant ships is a complex legal 
issue with Member States taking diverse positions. The UN Securi-
ty Committee has determined that the carriage of armed personnel is 
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a matter for flag States to authorize, however it has also accepted 
that their carriage has legal implications for coastal and port States, 
particularly with respect to the carriage, embarkation and disembar-
kation of firearms and security equipment in areas under the juris-
diction of such port or coastal States.48 
 
Although the provision and use of weapons at sea for self-defense is legal, all 
have been faced with media scrutiny, controversy and varying degrees of helpful and 
unhelpful legislation. Although the provision of lethal force by private services rather 
than government services neither new nor even unexpected on land it seems to be more 
complicated on the ocean and in international waters. But the potential for missteps, 
such as the murder of fishermen, is high and the ability to adjudicate or gather evidence 
in the event of a violent event gone wrong, is lower than land-based operations. 
Briefing the Security Council on the situation in Somalia, UNODC Executive 
Director Yury Fedotov said, "Piracy money is also being reinvested into criminal activ-
ities that are not limited to piracy. Drugs, weapons and alcohol smuggling, as well as 
human trafficking, also benefit from the proceeds of piracy."49After all discussions, the 
inability of States to police their own waters, the depressed economic conditions that 
give rise to crime, and the geographical and jurisdictional difficulties of policing 
States’ waters combine to encourage piracy. Therefore, it is essential that States coop-
erate more effectively in the repression of piracy under Article 100 of UNCLOS. 
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The latter period of the Twentieth century saw the international crime of piracy 
overshadowed by the growing attention accorded by the international community to the 
problem of impunity in relation to genocide and crimes against humanity. Through a 
combination of circumstances, especially arising because of the collapse of effective 
governance and policing mechanisms within some coastal States, piracy has been al-
lowed to thrive in certain situations, as stated in Chapter 3. 
As the world’s navies realize that piracy cannot be effectively stemmed by ships 
designed to fight naval battles, regional and private solutions will come into play.  
1) Develop the Regional and domestic MOU and guidance to binding law 
2) Establish the state capacity to patrol, protect and prevent the sea territorial 
from acts of piracy 
Because Somalia is a failed state, all these solutions will be foreign-sponsored, land-
based and robust like the Puntland Marine Police Force, some will be domestically 
sponsored and under resourced like the Somaliland Coast Guard and some will be im-
aginary like the Somali Navy. Future efforts to combat piracy should continue to focus 
on the following: 
1) enhancing regional cooperation and agreements,  
2) strengthening the international and domestic legal instruments necessary 
to prosecute pirates, and addressing the root causes of piracy.  
3) ratifying and abide by the international regulations on suppression of pi-
racy. 
The best long-term solution against the crime of piracy may be the developed 
world’s commitment to re-establishing functioning order in Somalia, and other devel-
oping and failed States. Somalia’s capability to prosecute pirates has been very limited 
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due to its lack of internal coercive authority and incarceration capacity as mentioned in 
Chapter 3. Therefore, the global community must engage in discussions about how to 
best establish a complementary judicial mechanism to ensure that Somali pirates are 
held accountable for their crimes is needed. 
 
5.2.1 Definition and Codification 
 
Recent situations have made it clear that piracy and threats to maritime security can no 
longer be ignored. To date, the response of the international community to this threat 
has been rather haphazard. The development of a robust and universally applicable le-
gal regime to deal with the problem ought to form an essential part of any effective re-
sponse. A more coordinated approach is warranted, with a view to the resolution of the 
legal issues identified herein. To this end, the International community may see fit to 
revisit the definition of piracy. However, there are other options provided to both indi-
vidual States and the international community. 
This problem could be solved by establishing an international code on piracy 
applicable to all States to harmonize several important legal structures on an interna-
tional level. From my point of view, that it is questionable whether to establish a new 
international code, or whether better to expand the existing definitions and provisions 
in UNCLOS. Many commentators have suggested extending the regime of piracy to 
territorial waters in UNCLOS but in such a way that a costal state’s sovereignty would 
continue to be respected. Further, States which have not yet criminalized acts of piracy 
in their domestic legislation or provided the necessary authorization under the pertinent 
international conventions and customary International Law to prosecute and punish 
suspected pirates must do so as a matter of priority, to develop a comprehensive strate-
gy as to the  
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(1) development of domestic laws and regulations criminalizing piracy  
(2) development of a regional framework to counter piracy, and  
(3) development and strengthening of relevant domestic laws and regulations, 
all these agreements must be enacted as the bind able hard-law.  
Secondly, the international community should have an effective roster for naval ships 
that escort the ships or vessels that would enable them to safely deliver good and hu-
manitarian aid to the people. In addition to the IMO regulations, commercial ships 
could also be escorted by the skillful naval ships not an unreliable private armed-guard 
on board."  
Because of the insecurity and lack of a sovereign authority over the seas, mer-
chants formed associations among themselves to provide protection.50 These associa-
tions grew and became powerful over time. They became a significant actor in the en-
forcement of security of navigation.51 Principles and rulers made use of the armed flees 
of these associations. Not before long they became the policing entity on the seas. They 
enforced maritime regulations and customs which they developed themselves. This was 
regarded as one step farther from the assertion of exclusive dominion over the sea.52 
In a perfect world there would be no threat. Or if there were, the government 
under whose flag the vessel sailed would provide the required security. In the real 
world of flags of convenience and aggressive pirates, the industry has simply dealt with 
the unknowns under the rubric of “No ship with armed guards has been taken by pi-
rates.” Additionally, there is a growing public, government and industry concern that 
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the provision of this force may be yet another armed group that needs to be regulated. 
All elements of the maritime industry want a code of conduct for the use of force and a 
clear legal structure for the provision of security. Currently the industry is “self-
regulating” which at its best interpretation means that the management sets standards or 
that competitive force will create a Darwinian rise to the top. 
Maintaining the safety of waterways and strategic chokepoints is beyond the 
capacity of one state.53 That is the reason that cooperation between States and national 
navies is needed, especially in the world where non-state actors such as pirates can 
have access to arms, intelligence and high-tech equipment. However, States in this re-
gion do not have well trained navies and other resources to deal with piracy.54 The 
Counter-Piracy Program should be provided support to all East African countries not 
only the country willing to prosecute piracy, through training program for police, pros-
ecutors, judges and prison personnel in Kenya, Seychelles, Mauritius and, where secu-
rity conditions allow, Somalia. The areas of cooperation identified include: (1) tech-
nical cooperation (2) training and capacity building (3) information management and 
data collection (4) mobilization of resources (5) coordination of join activities (6) man-
agement of sea borders. 
Currently, the IMO is exploring ways to work in partnership with the UN Of-
fice on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the International Labor Organization (ILO), the 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), UNHCR, International 
Organization for Migration (IOM), INTERPOL and others, to address this significant 
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humanitarian problem which also places burdens on coastal States. IMO has issued 
standards and recommended practices for addressing the problem, associated guidance 
and is working with many countries to help address the problem. IMO strongly en-
courages Member States to fully implement the special measures to enhance maritime 
security contained in SOLAS chapter XI2 and the ISPS Code, which also contain clear 
specifications on access control and security measures for port facilities and ships. Un-
fortunately, these cooperation and agreements are still soft law and do not bind the 
state parties or members to strictly follow and authorize. The suggestion to this prob-





This dissertation suggests four broad options for a more efficient prosecution of pirates: 
(1) the establishment of a new ad hoc international court; (2) the establishment of a 
“hybrid” national/international court within a national legal system, but with UN sup-
port; (3) the establishment of a regional court based on a treaty among affected States; 
and (4) prosecution before a variety of national courts based on agreements governing 
the transfer of the suspects.  
 The international community soon reached consensus that the focus should lie 
on supporting the existing mechanisms of prosecution through regional capacity build-
ing. By early 2010,55 concluded that the most feasible option would be: “a specialized 
or dedicated piracy chamber – with or without international elements – established 
within the existing domestic criminal justice system of one or more States and located 
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in the one which willing and able to undertake prosecution, including Somalia when 
this idea becomes possible”.56 
As shown in the previous chapter, some commentators propose that pirates 
should be prosecuted at the place in the region where the piracy act was committed be-
cause of cultural, familial and linguistic considerations and the proximity to where the 
acts took place. In my opinion, this might lead to uncontrolled enforcement acts and 
jurisdictional differences between countries which are unlikely to combat piracy on a 
comprehensive approach.  
Apart of that, it is unlikely that a national court would be located close to the of-
fense and the evidences necessary to prosecute it. Pirate attacks usually involve perpe-
trators, victims and witnesses of many nationalities. International court would be able 
to provide justice that is fairer and more impartial than justice in national courts, pro-
vided that the judges will not be related to the state where the crime was committed or 
the defendants that committed that crime.  
Besides, Piracy cases ought to be tried in courts that are sufficiently equipped to 
handle piracy cases. Therefore, it is proposed to establish a permanent International Pi-
racy Tribunal, modeled after the International Criminal court (ICC) with special piracy 
jurisdiction. Some other legal writers, such as Yvonne M. Dutton, propose this possibil-
ity to expand the jurisdiction of the ICC instead of contributing new tribunal.57 For this 
expansion, the Statute of the ICC would have to be amended to include the specific 
crime of piracy.  
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The establishment of a special international criminal court for piracy may cause 
the criticize because if the international community leaves the crime of piracy under the 
domain of traditional universal jurisdiction, any state was permitted to prosecute sus-
pected pirates regardless of their nationality. The expansion of the ICC’s jurisdiction on 
piracy would be less costly than the establishment of an entirely new international tri-
bunal to adjudicate piracy cases. Bringing pirates to justice is essential for its deterrent 
effect. Prosecutions must be done in compliance with widely recognized principles of 
due process and applicable international human rights norms.  
Furthermore, an international court on piracy can apply international rules and 
laws thereby ensure as well the uniformity in the application of laws and the sentencing 
of offenders. Piracy affects not just only one nation but also the international communi-
ty. It is the kind of crime which an international criminal court could properly pass 
judgment on behalf of the world community. In any case, whether a new international 
crime court will be implemented or the existing International Chamber of Commerce 
(ICC)’s or The International Tribunal of Law of the sea (ITLOS)’ authority should be 
expanded on piracy, there is a certain need for such a tribunal to govern specifically on 
sea piracy. Piracy-combating countries may need to undertake additional efforts to re-
build such States and regions cooperation to ensure that such lawlessness does not oc-
cur in other regions in the world.  
Indeed, it would be more practicable to create a separate chamber at the ICC to 
ensure that piracy cases could be investigated, prosecuted and adjudicated by those 
with the expertise. In the contrary, Helmut Tuerk (vice president of the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS)) stated that the ICC has been established to 
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prosecute individuals for crimes more complicated than piracy, for instance, genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression.58  
Tuerk, therefore, believes that the ICC would not be suitable for dealing with 
criminals like pirates seeing that national tribunals are unwilling or unable to prosecute 
them. In addition, he reminds that the amendment of the statutes of the ICC would un-
doubtedly require several years. In any case, I would not agree with these opinions of 
Tuerk, but I would agree that if there would be a special chamber for pirates at the ICC, 
this would require time as the judges might need to develop their expertise in maritime 
laws.  
 Another discussion is whether the ITLOS should prosecute pirates. ITLOS is a 
functional tribunal and the judges are already trained on maritime laws. Thus, no addi-
tional training would be needed, and no additional personnel costs incurred by any na-
tion. In that case, ITLOS statute would need to be amended to encounter the crimes of 
piracy as well. Many scholars believe that, this process would be less complicated than 
that needed to amend the ICC statute. In my point of view, this would be the best solu-
tion to create an effective international tribunal on piracy crimes. 
 According to a review conducted by UNODC, 1,116 young Somali men faced 
criminal proceedings for piracy in 20 countries around the world, while 688 were dealt 
with in the region. "To make our efforts more effective, we need broader international 
support beyond this region. This is the most efficient way to sever the arteries that sus-
tain piracy," said Mr. Fedotov, adding that the issue of piracy required a strong inter-
agency approach that struck a careful balance between law enforcement and the judici-
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ary, on the one hand, and the rights of persons accused and convicted of piracy on the 
other. 
 
5.2.3 Post-Trial Transfer System  
 
We acknowledged that this model of prosecuting suspected pirates in the region 
could impose a significant political and practical burden on the cooperating States 
when convicted pirates would serve long sentences in their prisons.59 In the 2011 re-
port, the UN Special Advisor on Legal Issues related to Piracy off the Coast of Soma-
lia, Jack Lang, emphasized the importance of finding solutions to imprison convicted 
pirates in Somalia, enabling them to serve their sentences close to their families.60  
 Consequently, affected regional States, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC), developed the Post Trial Transfer System, which allows moving pirates that 
were prosecuted in one territorial jurisdiction to another. Post-Trial Transfers were es-
tablished between prosecuting countries lacking the capacity to incarcerate convicted 
pirates and Somalia, as well as other regional countries willing to incarcerate them.  
 The assistance provided is strengthening the criminal justice systems of those 
countries and helping them to become fair, efficient and consistent with human rights 
standards. In Kenya and Seychelles, UNODC has refurbished prisons and built court-
rooms, while also ensuring that witnesses appear at court hearings. However, the exist-
ence of child pirates within the criminal justice system represents a complex issue. In 
Garowe, Puntland, construction of a prison academy has begun; a court, a farm and a 
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prison with capacity to accommodate 500 prisoners is to follow soon. A piracy prisoner 
transfer program supports the transfer of convicted pirates back to Somalia to serve 
their sentences, while ensuring that prison conditions meet international standards. 
The legal gaps in the various anti-piracy regimes were, hence, not totally elimi-
nated but governed through the collaboration of many public and private stakeholders. 
By establishing new approaches to prosecution, the Post Trial Transfer Mechanism, as 
well as the legal toolbox and the trust fund, they would help to create a practical 
framework that regulates the process from the apprehension of suspected pirates to 
their prosecution and incarceration. As a result, the number of prosecuted pirates has 
decreased. By focusing on capacity building and cooperation between the regional ac-
tors, this process is, moreover, a sustainable solution with strong local ownership of 
prosecution. 
While it is essential to emphasize that the international community mostly con-
centrates on governing the situations randomly, and not necessarily the root causes of 
piracy. Furthermore, there is need to restore a central government in Somalia. An effec-
tive central government in charge of the country will help restore stability and political 
security in the country. If this domestic problem could be solved, it will play an im-
portant role in decreasing the number of piracy attacks in the Horn of Africa. The Asian 
countries can be considered a successful example of global governance and a role mod-
el, whose practical tools can be transferred to other world regions. The lessons learned 
from their collaborative, informal, experimental, and multi-stakeholder approach are 
also valuable for other policy areas.  
Besides, Counter Piracy Implementation Task Force, through country assess-
ment visits, capacity building coordination, and exchange of policy developments with 
other UN and partner entities involved in Border Management and Law Enforcement 
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are desired. Guidelines on maritime cyber risk management, aimed at enabling stake-
holders to take the necessary steps to safeguard shipping from current and emerging 
threats and vulnerabilities related to digitization, integration and automation of pro-
cesses and systems in shipping need improvement. 
Further, under the mandate of the international encountering on Piracy off the 
Coast of Somalia, the fund aims to defray the financial capital required from countries 
like Kenya, Seychelles, and Somalia to prosecute pirates, as well as to increase aware-
ness within Somali society of the risk associated with piracy and criminal activity. 
However, illegality, unseaworthiness and exemption clauses in a marine policy are 
identified as being legal issues that may prevent a ship owner from recovering the 
ransom payment. Some of these problems may be overcome if those clauses are care-
fully drafted to specifically cater for modern day piracy in a marine insurance policy. 
Several inconsistencies may also be resolved by transferring the piracy peril to war 
risks cover. The ship owner’s duty is to respond to the changing circumstances, by 
ensuring that his vessel is sufficiently equipped, and the crew is properly trained to 
resist a hijacking.  
 Finally, there is the piracy money-laundering protection. Counter Piracy Fi-
nance, as a key driver for maritime piracy is financial, and it is essential that counter 
measures must incorporate an in-depth understanding of finances and economics relat-
ing to piracy, which can be used as effective weaponry to achieve long term goals in 
mitigating the problem. Financial Intelligence – Efforts to collect and develop finance 
intelligence must be enhanced, especially in relation to global financial flows involving 
pirate finances, both in terms of pre-attack financing and the laundering of ransom 
monies.  
I suggest, therefore, that a financial law enforcement approach would be a valu-
 
239 
able additional tool in countering piracy. To date, however, two obstacles have limited 
the wider acceptance of those tools. First, until very recently, no ‘norm entrepreneur’ 
has stepped forward to make financial investigative tactics a central tool in counter-
piracy efforts. Secondly, while ‘following the money’ has much potential as a means of 
fighting piracy, we still know too little about the on-shore side of piracy to put those 
tools to use. 
 Considering the many issues international community included merchants, 
shipping companies, international organizations and victims from acts of piracy have 
encounter, more revision on piracy law need to be synthesized and presented to nation-
al and international parties. According to Somali law on piracy, Somalia not only has to 
worry about the development of infrastructure and the stability of the government but 
also their own country’s law regarding convicted pirate-transferring, anti-money laun-
dering and especially prosecution and post-trial regulations. Consequently, there is a 
need for more consideration on the driving factor of the anti-piracy policies, push and 
pull the ability to chase and arrest the pirates together with the protection of the coastal 
state sovereignty. Further, how to bring more smoothly universal jurisdiction to cope 
with marine piracy is desired.  
More than ever before in human history, we share a common 
destiny. We can master it only if we face it together. And that, my 
friends, is why we have the United Nations.61 
Even though, there are many difficulties to face, the vessels and shipping busi-
ness still must rely on this maritime route. One nation cannot fight or solve this 
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problem, thus, solid cooperation among nations would be ideal. Lastly, the hope 
to eradicate sea piracy is still alive and seems more attainable from Somalia and 
the African region if they are willing to put themselves in the position to obtain 
the international regulations on piracy also international community must legis-
late soft-law anti-piracy guideline to codification. This study has illustrated that 
while it is a difficult and complicated process, peace in the Gulf of Aden is well 
worth the struggle and sacrifice.  
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